# NEG CP—DoS SA—Simplified Version

## 1NCs

### 1NC – DoD PIC

#### Counterplan:

#### Without increasing its security cooperation,

#### the United States federal government should substantially increase Department of State security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity,

#### and reform and resource the Department of State, adapting best practices from the Department of Defense.

#### It competes – plan’s under DoD authority

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The What, Why, and How of Security Assistance

“Security assistance” refers to a specific set of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act. These programs are overseen by the State Department in cooperation with the Department of Defense. “Security cooperation” describes separately authorized Defense Department-led activities such as “global train and equip” programs. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which has provided military aid to that country since 2016, is one such example of these programs run by the Pentagon. I will use the more common term here, security assistance, in reference to either type. When security assistance works well, it gives partner nations the tools to address internal instability and deter and defend against external adversaries, reducing the likelihood that direct U.S. intervention will be called for in the future. It also helps to ensure that the United States maintains access, basing, and overflight privileges, strengthens interoperability, and accrues the less tangible benefit of military-to-military personal relationships.

#### DoS assistance solves case

Pierce 14 William G. Pierce, Harry A. Tomlin, Robert C. Coon, James E. Gordon, and Michael A. Marra, Professors in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College, “Defense Strategic Guidance Thoughtful Choices and Security Cooperation,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 74, 3rd Quarter 2014, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-74/jfq-74_72-79_Pierce-et-al.pdf> /GoGreen!

Determine Who Else Can Help.

Determine if others are engaging (or are willing to engage) to achieve similar SC objectives in the combatant command’s AOR. This analysis should be conducted from two perspectives. The first is to determine if other agencies of the U.S. Government are working with a focus nation. A way to decide that is through the recently constituted Promote Cooperation series of meetings initiated by the combatant command and hosted by the Joint Operational War Plans Division of the Joint Staff J5. These meetings are designed to foster interagency perspectives and contributions to combatant command planning efforts. Representatives from the other executive branch agencies participate in the Promote Cooperation meetings. These participants have discovered that DOD is not necessarily the only U.S. Government entity working to achieve specific national security objectives within a focus nation.16

Another way is through the “3-D Planning Methodology” and meetings being held periodically and representing the efforts of “Diplomacy, Development and Defense,” which are, respectively, the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Department of Defense.17

## NB—Politics

### PTX – CP Unpopular

#### CP costs PC – DoD and Senate Armed Services oppose

Gould 22 Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, “For America’s security aid programs, who will run the show?” Defense News, 4-11-2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2022/04/11/for-americas-security-aid-programs-who-will-run-the-show/> /GoGreen!

Any effort to uproot authorities and funding, to then shift them toward the State Department, would likely face an uphill fight with the Pentagon and potentially with the Senate Armed Services Committee. The committee has on its side the only reliable annual legislative vehicle in the National Defense Authorization Act.

Max Bergmann, a former State Department official who authored security assistance reform recommendations last year, said efforts to shift greater authority to the State Department will succeed only if the White House prioritizes them. In a high-stakes competition with China, the U.S. can’t afford for parallel security-assistance bureaucracies to undermine statecraft, he said.

“What is critical is that we have full control over that lever, and not have it be a bureaucratic mess where one hand doesn’t know what the other is doing and it’s difficult for any senior policymaker in the White House to know what the hell’s going on,” said Bergmann, now a senior fellow at Center for American Progress.

#### CP costs PC – the support their ev assumes (Foreign Relations/Affairs committees) will evaporate during the process – their author

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

Hypothetical costs of reforming the system and disrupting current implementation of U.S. security assistance are likely to be significantly outweighed by improvements in the policymaking process and well worth the political capital a new administration and Congress would need to expend.

Landscape of the security assistance system today

Security assistance has been a critical foreign policy tool for decades.24 Today, the United States provides assistance to a range of allies and partners to achieve its security goals. The primary objective of U.S. security assistance is to advance U.S. national and global security by empowering allies and partners to effectively confront shared security challenges.

The State Department system

The State Department provides security assistance primarily through the FMF program, an account with about $6 billion annually for military equipment and training to partners.25 The State Department’s other authorities receive about half that amount, averaging around $3 billion annually for professional military education, peacekeeping, counternarcotics, and other programs.26

**[Figure 2 OMITTED]**

The State Department’s security assistance funds, primarily FMF, provide little flexibility for diplomats. More than 80 percent of FMF flows to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, the top three recipients of U.S. security aid.27 After these partners, the State Department is generally left with about $1 billion to distribute among the remaining countries around the world, though most of this founding is already earmarked by Congress for specific countries.28 While State Department officials could in theory request more funds or flexibility, the department’s legislative affairs office has often failed to even ask Congress for more resources or flexibility. To that point, funding for the State Department has declined in real terms—compared with significant growth in the Pentagon budget—since 9/11.29

State Department security assistance programs

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE)

Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

There are several challenges with today’s State Department security assistance:

It’s not flexible. The majority of FMF’s funds are earmarked in appropriations for specific partners, such as Egypt and Israel. The top-down direction of FMF funding leaves very little available funding for State Department programmers to grant to countries in the event of crises or new political dynamics. This makes it difficult for the State Department to reallocate significant enough funds to provide useful security assistance in times of crisis, especially when compared with some of the DOD’s resources and more flexible authorities. Senior State Department officials have warned, “The more money and more authority you move out of traditional accounts we have used for decades to work with our partners, the more you lose the ability to balance.”30 For example, after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the State Department wanted to provide urgent security assistance but was only able to reallocate a few million dollars from its FMF account.31

This lack of flexibility stands in stark contrast to allocations of DOD resources, some of which are granted to combatant commands and security cooperation officers in country to decide when and to whom funding is granted based on more immediate security considerations.32 As a result of this lack of flexibility, the State Department is largely seen as slow and bureaucratic and unable to respond to security crises within the U.S. government. But the State Department is no slower or faster than the DOD. Often, the State Department is seen as being slow in acting when it is actually holding on a decision due to policy reasons or due to congressional concerns. This was the case, for instance, in providing security assistance to partly fund Pakistan’s acquisition of additional F-16s.33

Bureaucratic incentives favor the status quo. The State Department’s regional-functional bureaucratic divide—a perennial problem within the agency—inhibits its effectiveness in managing security assistance. In practice, the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs shares decision-making authority on security assistance with regional bureaus that are loath to cut funding for the countries under their purview. Many regional bureaus also needlessly maintain their own separate security assistance offices, reducing their reliance on the Political-Military Affairs Bureau and complicating internal policymaking. Critiques of the State Department’s internal disfunction are valid, and lessons learned within the U.S. government and the DOD about how best to implement security assistance should be incorporated into State Department reforms.

The State Department’s leadership has in the past refused to ask Congress for more money for security assistance. This has created an odd juxtaposition where Pentagon officials and military officers plead with Congress for more money for the State Department, while State Department officials do not.34 The department’s silence, however, was largely due to fears that a conservative Congress would not increase the State Department’s overall budget but instead take funds from other accounts such as development, undercutting the agency’s other missions.

To address these challenges, there should be a review of the security assistance structure at the State Department to centralize decision-making in order to inform better, more coherent policy that aligns with the secretary of state’s objectives for U.S. foreign policy. The reforms should also build more agility and flexibility into the State Department’s FMF program, in part by reducing the influence of some regional offices that can distort broader foreign policy goals.

The DOD system

While the DOD has long played a role in implementing security assistance—usually as directed by the State Department—the provision of expansive authorities to the DOD, enabling it to manage its own assistance programs, is relatively new. Beginning in the 1980s, the DOD was granted funds to conduct its own security assistance programs—separate from the State Department—under Title 10, with programs for counternarcotics, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism activities.35 After the 9/11 attack, the Bush administration sought to expand the DOD’s role to focus on counterterrorism and expanding partner special operations capabilities. In the following years, Congress more than doubled the number of DOD security assistance programs, granting new authorities and resources to the executive branch to bolster counterterrorism efforts and combat emerging threats.36

There are several challenges of this duplicative security assistance system at the DOD:

The DOD’s authorities duplicate authorities originally granted to the State Department. Congress originally granted long-term efforts to develop another country’s security forces to the State Department and put these efforts under the purview of diplomats. But in the post-9/11 security environment, rather than fix the State Department’s lack of resources to handle counterterrorism issues, appropriators gave the funds to the DOD, contributing to more bifurcation of security assistance policy. This was exemplified by the 2006 creation of Section 1206: a $350 million annual authority for the secretary of defense to support counterterrorism efforts and assist coalition partners. Though it required cooperation with the State Department, it was explicitly designed to empower the DOD, in part because some DOD officials thought the State Department was too slow and lacking expertise to carry out counterterrorism activities.37 In 2014, a Congressional Research Service report found that “government personnel state that Section 1206 has been used as a substitute for FMF, especially in the early years, given what many analysts believe is a shortage of FMF funds to meet legitimate foreign defense equipment needs.”38

Congressional barriers exacerbated the DOD-State Department imbalance. The 2011 Budget Control Act and a Republican-controlled Congress skeptical of the State Department made giving more resources to the department a nonstarter.39 Senior DOD officials urged Congress to grant the agency new authorities, such as in a 2008 House Armed Services Committee hearing with the secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.40 Faced with these constraints, the Obama administration opted to create more authorities at the DOD through the annual must-pass National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees, with jurisdiction only over the State Department’s security assistance programs, did little to correct the imbalance.41 According to one study before the recent consolidation efforts, the DOD managed 48 out of 50 new programs created after the 9/11 attacks.42 Of the 107 existing security assistance programs today, the DOD manages 87—a whopping 81 percent.43

DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46

Temporary programs become permanent. The majority of the new DOD security assistance authorities were premised as temporary, operational programs, designed to tackle immediate threats and challenges.47 But in practice, many programs have endured. Once a multiyear, multimillion-dollar program is established, it has a tendency to become entrenched, becoming a permanent assistance program with its own invested bureaucracy to sustain and expand it.48 The Section 1206 authority exemplifies this phenomenon: A 2017 DOD inspector general report found that “DoD officials stated that the temporary nature of the authority made it infeasible to commit the resources necessary to effectively manage Section 1206 as a ‘program’”—despite the fact that it was annually authorized and funded for 10 years until fiscal year 2015. Some $2.2 billion was appropriated for Section 1206 before it became law. Section 333 funding now replicates many of the same functions today.

The DOD’s duplicative security assistance programs complicate overall foreign policymaking. Reforming security assistance by centralizing resources at the State Department—and coupling the move with necessary reforms at the State Department—would go a long way toward improving this policy process.

DOD security assistance programs

Assessing total DOD funding for security assistance programs remains a challenge.49 Today, in addition to implementing State Department security assistance, the DOD operates a range of its own security assistance programs. This contributes to a system that is less coherent, less integrated, less transparent, and less subject to effective congressional oversight.

DOD security assistance programs related to train and equip include:50

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)

Section 333 Building Capacity of Foreign Security Forces (formerly Section 1206)

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)

Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF)

Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund

Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF)

Coalition Support Fund (CSF)

Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI)

European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)

Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)

Logistic Support for Allied Forces in Combined Operations

Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MODA)

Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)

Regional Centers for Security Studies (RCSS)

Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)

Wales Initiative Fund (WIF)

**[Table 1 OMITTED]**

Past attempts to reform the system

Recent efforts to reform the security assistance architecture tend to get bogged down by the complexity of the current system. This has led to an inevitable focus on incremental tweaks that address tactical-level concerns. These weedy discussions, while useful, often take the current structure of the U.S. security assistance system as a given—and therefore, do not address the broader strategic and budgetary issues and imbalance between diplomacy and defense. Furthermore, policymakers and politicians often get lost in the technical nature of these discussions, lack broader historical context, and are easily persuaded by officials with a stake in largely preserving the status quo and in protecting their offices, who tout the complexity of the challenge; as a result, they quickly lose interest in reform. A new administration should be wary of these past mistakes when embarking on suggested reforms in this report.

#### No support

Thompson 21 Natalie Thompson, PhD candidate, political science, Yale University, former research analyst for the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, research assistant and James C. Gaither junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Laura Bate, senior director with the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, 2021 Next Generation National Security Fellow and former policy analyst with the Cybersecurity Initiative at the Center for a New American Security; “The Right Way To Structure Cyber Diplomacy,” War on the Rocks, 8-25-2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/the-right-way-to-structure-cyber-diplomacy/> /GoGreen!

The unfortunate political reality is that reorganizing the State Department is hard. That alone is not a reason to forgo reform, but it does introduce constraints on what may be feasible. Any new office or bureau will need leaders, but current law strictly limits the rank that they can hold. Creating a new under secretary, or even a new assistant secretary, would require significant changes to the State Department Basic Authorities Act, and there is limited political momentum for that particular undertaking. The law currently authorizes the appointment of 24 assistant secretaries and six under secretaries. Although the Cyberspace Solarium Commission initially recommended creating an assistant secretary position to lead a new cyber bureau — and although it has been clear for two decades that the State Department’s structure should be overhauled — making such drastic changes to the necessary legislation may be a nonstarter on Capitol Hill for the foreseeable future. The Cyber Diplomacy Act provides the best available work-around by placing an ambassador-at-large at the head of the new bureau, ensuring that the position has the stature necessary for effective leadership.

### PTX – CP Popular

#### Support is bipartisan and more powerful than opposition

Gould 22 Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, “For America’s security aid programs, who will run the show?” Defense News, 4-11-2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2022/04/11/for-americas-security-aid-programs-who-will-run-the-show/> /GoGreen!

With the world transfixed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and debates breaking out on Twitter over whether the U.S. should send the country fighter aircraft and missile defense systems, security assistance ― usually a wonky topic ― is having a moment.

But it’s not just about public attention. With Democrats holding the reins in Washington, State Department officials have recommended a list of reforms to America’s globe-spanning security aid programs.

These programs provide billions of dollars in training, equipment and assistance directly to foreign governments, militaries, and international organizations and groups. They tilted in favor of the Pentagon after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks; now, the State Department and allies on Capitol Hill say they need to be tilted back.

“It’s time for a reckoning,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez, D-N.J., said at a recent hearing, where the State Department offered its reform ideas. Powerful lawmakers indicated they were supportive, and Menendez said he will spearhead legislation in the coming months with the panel’s top Republican, Sen. Jim Risch of Idaho.

The State Department’s proposals range from elevating human rights concerns to offering countries more attractive financing for weapons purchases.

The potential for a shakeup comes as the Biden administration rushes aid to Ukraine following Russia’s invasion. The administration had already committed about $2 billion in weapons and other aid to Kyiv, when Congress recently enacted a $13.6 billion package for the region, with $3.5 billion for Ukraine.

The U.S. government has spent hundreds of billions of dollars over the last two decades for programs that provide security assistance and cooperation to foreign countries, according to the Congressional Research Service. In particular, this work has become a core mission for the Pentagon since 9/11.

As building up foreign forces in Iraq and Afghanistan became key to post-9/11 national security plans, Congress gave the Defense Department new authorities and funding. From 2001 to 2022, the budgets for those programs tripled to $18 billion. The proportion managed by the Pentagon grew from 20% to slightly more than half.

Critics of the tilt toward the Pentagon say it relies too much on the military to solve foreign policy problems better handled by, or at least coordinated with, trained diplomats.

And at the center of the current conversation are some high-profile failures of recent years. Despite billions of dollars spent on the Iraqi security forces, for instance, many of them collapsed in the face of attacks from the Islamic State group in 2014. And $125 billion spent to bolster Afghan security forces didn’t stop the same from happening under Taliban pressure last year.

At the recent hearing, Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., said the $87 billion in U.S. security assistance to Afghanistan “went up in smoke overnight” when the Afghan military collapsed, calling it “an extraordinary waste of money.

“Clearly there is something very wrong with the way in which we are flowing military assistance to partner countries, especially in complicated war zones,” Murphy said.

A diplomatic wish list

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s recent hearing aired a long-running debate over the State-DoD divide. The assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, Jessica Lewis, who previously worked for Menendez as his panel’s staff director, detailed the department’s suggestions for change.

The State Department is asking for more money to improve its workforce, but is primarily seeking process-oriented reforms.

Ever since the Pentagon’s resources mushroomed after 9/11, the State Department says it has lacked flexibility. Because of the way aid has historically been structured, Lewis said, nearly all of the $7 billion in assistance her bureau gets annually is bound by congressional directives; after Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Iraq are accounted for, only $1.8 billion is left for the rest of the world.

State is now asking for flexibility in peacekeeping operations, and for the funding of some foreign military financing loans to be appropriated by region rather than country.

Lewis also wants to break countries of the “latent expectancy” they’ll receive aid in the U.S. budget every year. That could have a trickle-down effect on which countries get to buy their equipment of choice with American dollars.

Another recommendation is to elevate the goal ― in Washington’s dealings with allies over aid ― of making foreign forces more effective, transparent and accountable, and building their capacity. That aligns with Lewis’ argument that while security assistance is an important alliance-building tool in America’s competition with authoritarian Russia and China, that contest is fundamentally about democratic values and norms.

“We must keep the importance of security sector governance and respect for universal human rights front and center as we consider where to provide security assistance, and as we engage partner nations’ security institutions and empower them toward modernization, accountability and reform,” she said.

When it comes to acquisition, the DoD needs to better manage requests from allies for equipment outside existing departmental programs, and foreign military financing must provide more competitive loan options, Lewis said. She also said the State Department needs an improved contracting process to expedite urgent arms transfers.

The State Department is asking for more money to also retain and hire experts to better collaborate with the DoD. The State Department has a “political-military workforce that numbers in the low hundreds,” in contrast with the Pentagon’s security cooperation workforce of 20,000, Lewis said.

“While State actively supports many DoD security sector assistance activities, the Department currently lacks sufficient staff and bandwidth to fully participate in DoD planning processes and to thoroughly review proposed programs, including when some authorities include ‘joint formulation’ requirements,” Lewis said in a statement.

The State Department hasn’t framed its proposals as a competition with the Pentagon, but it is asking ― in the name of efficiency and coordination ― to expand requirements that the DoD get State Department “concurrence” — or approval — before it executes security assistance programs.

Concurrence requirements already apply to 25 such DoD efforts, but not all in existence, as the State Department would like.

While Lewis did not name specific programs as targets, one that offers the Pentagon broad latitude and could see scrutiny is the 127 Echo program, which funds surrogate forces in counterterrorism missions, often in Africa. The fund has quadrupled to $25 million since its inception in 2005.

Bipartisan support

Any effort to uproot authorities and funding, to then shift them toward the State Department, would likely face an uphill fight with the Pentagon and potentially with the Senate Armed Services Committee. The committee has on its side the only reliable annual legislative vehicle in the National Defense Authorization Act.

Max Bergmann, a former State Department official who authored security assistance reform recommendations last year, said efforts to shift greater authority to the State Department will succeed only if the White House prioritizes them. In a high-stakes competition with China, the U.S. can’t afford for parallel security-assistance bureaucracies to undermine statecraft, he said.

“What is critical is that we have full control over that lever, and not have it be a bureaucratic mess where one hand doesn’t know what the other is doing and it’s difficult for any senior policymaker in the White House to know what the hell’s going on,” said Bergmann, now a senior fellow at Center for American Progress.

Meanwhile, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on both sides of the aisle are generally supportive of shifts, arguing for an overhaul of the current setup.

“As the Defense Department continues efforts to cut the State Department out of security cooperation, we’ve seen a greater focus on short-term tactical capabilities than on sustainable forces aligned with strategic foreign policy,” Risch said. “We must address governance challenges like corruption in all our activities, and we need to professionalize our security assistance workforce.”

Likewise, a congressional source familiar with Menendez’s thinking said the chairman wants an integrated approach to foreign assistance that spans the U.S. government, but is led by the State Department. The idea is to help countries holistically and not measure success in the numbers of units trained or rifles sent.

“You could do these short-term, tactical things for years and the overall security situation in a country doesn’t improve because you have governance problems, corruption problems, and all the other things that alienate a populace from its government and [fosters] a terrorist group,” said the source, who was not authorized to speak on the record.

Some concerns have surfaced in the House as well. After a series of coups in Mali and other Sahel countries, which were carried out by American- and French-trained and -equipped personnel, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks, D-N.Y., and other lawmakers wrote to President Joe Biden on Feb. 4 to express alarm.

“We strongly recommend your administration focus on identifying and addressing the complex challenges surrounding conflict and violence, improve the efficacy of assistance designed to reform national security sectors and institutions, and — given the anti-democratic trends in the region — strengthen governance, civil society, and accountability based on rigorous conflict analysis and diplomacy,” said the letter, led by Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif.

#### Bipartisan consensus in favor of the counterplan

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

Centralizing authorities and resources to the State Department would simplify the interagency process. As noted above, moving security assistance authorities to the State Department would represent a huge realignment in the interagency process. But this reform effort would align with long-term broad, bipartisan consensus that there is a diplomacy-defense imbalance in U.S. foreign policy agencies.21 Realigning assistance resources must be fundamental to any effort to reempower the State Department and would eventually improve interagency functionality by resulting in better-managed policymaking. The costs of moving authorities would be well worth the improvements in overall U.S. policy by making it more coherent, less wasteful, and more effective.

## NB—DoD Overstretch

### O/S – CP Solves AM&E

#### AM&E is a net benefit – it’s part of our reform plank, AND its impacts of redundancy, waste, mismanagement, unintended consequences and blowback are the same warrants already embedded in all our DoD bad cards

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

Build in assessment, monitoring, and evaluation programs at the outset of security assistance programs

Effective monitoring mechanisms should be built in from the outset in reforming the State Department’s security assistance programs. In the current system, there is little evidence of what works or what does not in terms of improving a partner country’s capacity or will to achieve shared security objectives. Some reforms to DOD security assistance programs were an important step toward building assessment, monitoring, and evaluation into the DOD’s security assistance programs.95 Similarly, recent efforts to reform monitoring in the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations accounts have had notable success. These reforms should be copied and mandated for all programs conducted by the State Department and the DOD moving forward. Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation programs should be regularized and aggregated in order to be useful for U.S. officials implementing security assistance programs.96 This will be a significant undertaking, and so building up a professional workforce that can effectively monitor and evaluate security assistance programs must be a significant component and priority in personnel reforms at the State Department and the DOD. Further reforms should be considered, such as mandating that a small portion of funds for each security assistance program be set aside for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation purposes.

Congress should modify oversight structures to reduce stovepiping

Reforms to the security assistance framework are often slowed by congressional equities that remain stovepiped and unwilling to enable resource sharing and coordination between departments. The House and Senate Armed Services committees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee should consider working together to establish a joint subcommittee, working group, or task force on security assistance policy that would be responsible for the oversight of all forms of security sector assistance. Great strides were made in the Obama administration to increase State Department-DOD collaboration and integration, only to run into challenges when engaging a Congress that remained stuck in its agency oversight stovepipes.

Congress should also hold regular oversight hearings to hold the executive branch accountable for developing a coherent security assistance policy. It should require an annual report to track where funds are being allocated and to articulate how U.S. security assistance efforts support broader U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives. This will not only provide needed transparency and accountability, but also put political and public pressure on the Political-Military Affairs Bureau.

Conclusion

Moving resources to the State Department to conduct security assistance would result in more effective aid that is less likely to be wasted or flow to abusive partners. It would also reduce unnecessary bureaucracy from the current system. This would be an important step toward undoing the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and would give an important foreign policy tool back to American diplomats.

The new administration should move quickly to consolidate security assistance resources under the State Department, with accompanying reforms to the bureaucracy and workforce that handles these issues. Congress should support this realignment and transfer the necessary authorities and resources from the DOD to the State Department.

## Solvency

### AT: Deficit – DoD Key / DoS Capacity

#### DoD personnel can still carry out mil-mil activities, merely at the direction of DoS

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Reforming the State Department’s security assistance management could improve policy consideration and implementation. Many of the functions involving DOD security cooperation activities, such as funding related to exercises and certain training activities, should remain in the Pentagon. Unifying decision-making on policy—not the details of implementation—in the State Department system would also ensure hand-in-glove cooperation and coordination with the DOD because it is the DOD that, by and large, implements State Department programs. The DOD would therefore continue managing U.S. government security assistance programs even if its programs were folded into the State Department’s authorities, as currently is the case with the State Department’s FMF program.

#### Regardless, counterplan’s reform and resource planks redress their deficits

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How to fix the system

To change this, there is a straightforward solution: give the State Department the money. A new administration and new Congress should redirect almost all of the DOD’s security assistance resources to the State Department and build up the State Department’s capacity to administer assistance. Clearly, such a transfer must be accompanied by swift and far-reaching internal reforms at the State Department to enable this expanded role, but such reforms are long overdue and should not deter this bold step.

This proposal would help to fix many of the challenges of a duplicative, bifurcated security assistance system that spans multiple U.S. agencies and involves thousands of personnel. It would enable more coherent overall policy on American security assistance, allowing aid decisions to be guided by general foreign policy concerns and current priorities. It would better allow for ensuring that U.S. assistance comports with American values, including working closely with democratic states and prioritizing respect for human rights.

This report focuses on the relatively new development of parallel security assistance authorities at the DOD that mirror the State Department’s traditional authority for long-term capacity building of partner forces to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals. The State Department’s FMF account is the primary vehicle for this; it receives about $6 billion annually, about 80 percent of which goes to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. The remaining $1 billion of FMF is also heavily earmarked, limiting the State Department’s discretion.16 The DOD’s security cooperation programs, which are challenging to track due to frequent changes in accounts and programs, received about $2 billion total last year.17 The DOD accounts that most closely mirror the State Department’s FMF program, including the Section 333 capacity-building authority, the Maritime Security Initiative, and several other programs, received $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2020.18

Funding associated with long-term capacity building of partner militaries—such as the DOD’s funding to build partner capacity through Section 333—should be the domain of the State Department. DOD assistance accounts that currently fund U.S. involvement in endless wars or prolonged security assistance engagements meant to build the capacity over partners over the long term, such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ($4.2 billion), the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund ($1.2 billion), and funding for Ukraine ($250 million), should be reviewed with an eye to move the programs and funding to the State Department.19 Combined with Section 333 funds ($1.2 billion), this would result in a transfer of about $7 billion annually, more than doubling the State Department’s total security assistance resources. While it makes sense for the DOD to control authorities to provide operational assistance when engaged in combat, U.S. policy in Afghanistan has moved toward long-term projects of building up the security forces, which would point toward a larger role for the State Department.20 The other programs are also more aligned with broader foreign policy goals of long-term capacity building of partners.

While there are times when it is appropriate for the DOD to have the authority to directly provide assistance to a partner, these programs should be exclusive to when the United States is at war and fighting side by side with allied or partner forces. In these cases, such as in active combat in Iraq or Afghanistan, it may make sense for the Pentagon to have its own authorities to assist foreign partners. But outside these wartime situations, and especially in light of today’s efforts to end the forever wars, the State Department is fully able to oversee and manage the bulk of U.S. security assistance programs.

While this report calls for realigning U.S. assistance toward democratic allies and partners, it avoids diving into the specific policy debates over what countries should or should not receive security assistance. Those are obviously critical foreign policy debates, but the authors focus on improving the ability of U.S. officials to make coherent policy decisions by first creating an effective management and organizational structure of security assistance. This will also require major reform to the State Department’s own security assistance programs, which routinely and without deliberation provide billions in aid to non-democracies. Security assistance should not be a diplomatic handout or entitlement; it should serve U.S. foreign policy and be flexible enough in its administration to align with U.S. foreign policy objectives and values. That not only requires consolidating security assistance programs in one place, but also demands significant reforms to the decision-making structure and security assistance system at the State Department.

The Biden-Harris administration should therefore make rebalancing and reforming security assistance—and restoring the lead to the State Department—an immediate priority, working with Congress and pushing for shifting resources from the DOD to the State Department in its first budget.

Anticipating and rebutting arguments against reform

Of course, reforming the security assistance system will not be easy and will encounter challenges. But these would be outweighed by the benefits of a more coherent and effective security assistance policy guided by the State Department. Anticipated challenges and benefits might include:

The State Department must be scaled up in order to gain the capacity to absorb the DOD’s programs. Moving the DOD’s vast assistance budget to the State Department would be one of the most significant realignments of the U.S. national security agencies since the formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2002. Such a bureaucratic change will require real reform and a significant expansion in the State Department’s capacity to manage and administer the substantial increase in resources, as well as demand significant internal reform and reorganization. To be clear, State Department bureaucracy has often been its own biggest enemy; it is beset by turf battles, inefficiency, lack of clear and timely decision-making, and tangled lines of authority. As it currently stands, the State Department is far from capable of taking on the role this report suggests. However, these barriers should become the impetus for reform, not excuses to favor the status quo. Indeed, these efforts should be undertaken with other necessary reforms at the State Department to rebuild and improve U.S. diplomatic capacity.

Centralizing authorities and resources to the State Department would simplify the interagency process. As noted above, moving security assistance authorities to the State Department would represent a huge realignment in the interagency process. But this reform effort would align with long-term broad, bipartisan consensus that there is a diplomacy-defense imbalance in U.S. foreign policy agencies.21 Realigning assistance resources must be fundamental to any effort to reempower the State Department and would eventually improve interagency functionality by resulting in better-managed policymaking. The costs of moving authorities would be well worth the improvements in overall U.S. policy by making it more coherent, less wasteful, and more effective.

#### AND the best practices plank, too

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Incorporate best practices from the DOD into State Department assistance

The DOD’s expertise and best practices should not be lost in transferring programs and resources to the State Department. When the new administration announces its intent to transfer resources, it should also announce plans to conduct a review of best practices in U.S. security assistance and plan to incorporate these into the reforms at the State Department. For example, the flexibility granted to combatant commands in Section 333 assistance may be a better model for State Department officials than the top-down process of aid allocation in current FMF assistance. DOD programs have also made significant strides in improving and incorporating assessment, monitoring, and evaluation into its programs, as well as better processes for incorporating other aspects of security assistance such as institution building, which the State Department should seek to replicate. Furthermore, recent consolidation of security assistance accounts at the DOD may provide guidance for consolidating some of the State Department’s different assistance programs in the review process called for above.89

### AT: Deficit – DoS Bureaucracy

#### Reform plank solves

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Review and reform the State Department’s security assistance structure

The State Department will need to reorganize the structure of bureaus involved in security assistance to ensure that relevant offices and personnel are coordinating with each other. Various security assistance programs at the State Department, such as International Narcotics and Law Enforcement or Diplomatic Security’s Antiterrorism Assistance, may need to be reorganized under a new structure, such as one centralized security assistance office in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, under one undersecretary. The State Department should restructure the decision-making process to strengthen the role of the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, granting it more authority over funding decisions and the power to move funds between countries and regions. There should be a clear chain-of-command and decision-making hierarchy in order to enable coherent, consistent decisions on security assistance policy. The reforms should also work to establish effective systems for cross-department and interagency prioritization, planning, and dispute resolution.

In a new system, the offices charged with overseeing security assistance must have greater authority to make decisions and move funds to regain foreign policy leverage. As the Political-Military Affairs Bureau increases its relative authority, though, it should be required to offer a clear strategic vision for security assistance and should be held to account to implement this vision. The bureau should also be required to produce an annual report to Congress outlining goals and objectives for U.S. security assistance. For example, if the goal of U.S. foreign policy is to rebalance toward democratic partners, the Political-Military Affairs Bureau should have to show that it is taking steps to meet that goal, such as by moving funds and creating new initiatives that support emerging democracies.

Reorganize the decision-making structure for security assistance at the State Department

To improve the overall U.S. security assistance system, it will be critical for the State Department to set up a policy process where funds are not treated as diplomatic entitlements owed to the regional bureaus. Too often, regional bureaus—focused intensely on maintaining and improving diplomatic relations—win out in arguments over rights and values under the justification of prioritizing smooth diplomatic relations and avoiding uncertainty. Meanwhile, functional bureaus such as the Political-Military Affairs and the Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor bureaus often lack the clout internally to overcome regional bureau objections. The duplicative security cooperation offices currently housed in regional bureaus should be moved into the Political-Military Affairs Bureau to augment the workforce. By having their own security offices, regional bureaus are less reliant on the expertise in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, as they have duplicated it in-house. This leads to unending turf wars and poor coordination. At the same time, bureaus such as Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor should be given a greater role to inform security assistance policy, especially involving decisions related to nondemocracies and human rights violators.

#### Best practices plank, too

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Bureaucratic incentives favor the status quo. The State Department’s regional-functional bureaucratic divide—a perennial problem within the agency—inhibits its effectiveness in managing security assistance. In practice, the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs shares decision-making authority on security assistance with regional bureaus that are loath to cut funding for the countries under their purview. Many regional bureaus also needlessly maintain their own separate security assistance offices, reducing their reliance on the Political-Military Affairs Bureau and complicating internal policymaking. Critiques of the State Department’s internal disfunction are valid, and lessons learned within the U.S. government and the DOD about how best to implement security assistance should be incorporated into State Department reforms.

The State Department’s leadership has in the past refused to ask Congress for more money for security assistance. This has created an odd juxtaposition where Pentagon officials and military officers plead with Congress for more money for the State Department, while State Department officials do not.34 The department’s silence, however, was largely due to fears that a conservative Congress would not increase the State Department’s overall budget but instead take funds from other accounts such as development, undercutting the agency’s other missions.

To address these challenges, there should be a review of the security assistance structure at the State Department to centralize decision-making in order to inform better, more coherent policy that aligns with the secretary of state’s objectives for U.S. foreign policy. The reforms should also build more agility and flexibility into the State Department’s FMF program, in part by reducing the influence of some regional offices that can distort broader foreign policy goals.

### AT: Deficit – Delay

#### No delay deficit

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There are several challenges with today’s State Department security assistance:

It’s not flexible. The majority of FMF’s funds are earmarked in appropriations for specific partners, such as Egypt and Israel. The top-down direction of FMF funding leaves very little available funding for State Department programmers to grant to countries in the event of crises or new political dynamics. This makes it difficult for the State Department to reallocate significant enough funds to provide useful security assistance in times of crisis, especially when compared with some of the DOD’s resources and more flexible authorities. Senior State Department officials have warned, “The more money and more authority you move out of traditional accounts we have used for decades to work with our partners, the more you lose the ability to balance.”30 For example, after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the State Department wanted to provide urgent security assistance but was only able to reallocate a few million dollars from its FMF account.31

This lack of flexibility stands in stark contrast to allocations of DOD resources, some of which are granted to combatant commands and security cooperation officers in country to decide when and to whom funding is granted based on more immediate security considerations.32 As a result of this lack of flexibility, the State Department is largely seen as slow and bureaucratic and unable to respond to security crises within the U.S. government. But the State Department is no slower or faster than the DOD. Often, the State Department is seen as being slow in acting when it is actually holding on a decision due to policy reasons or due to congressional concerns. This was the case, for instance, in providing security assistance to partly fund Pakistan’s acquisition of additional F-16s.33

#### Best practices plank solves

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Develop a crisis response playbook for security assistance

Critics of the current system rightly point out that U.S. security assistance can move too slowly in a crisis. Relevant U.S. agencies should come together to develop a standard response playbook for U.S. security assistance during a crisis. This could involve incorporating the best practices from DOD and State Department security assistance, under the leadership of the State Department. Agencies should conduct a review of the most useful items—from nonlethal supplies to equipment that enhances lethality—to send quickly to a partner in crisis. These supplies should be maintained in stockpiles in convenient global locations so that they can be distributed quickly. Centralizing this response playbook at the State Department would help to ensure that the decision to respond to a crisis can effectively weigh all relevant political, rights, economic, and security concerns.

### AT: Deficit – Industry

#### No industry deficit

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The U.S. defense industry would not be damaged by reforms. Despite the recent insistence of the Trump administration, the objective of U.S. security assistance should not be to support the U.S. defense industrial base or as a jobs program; there are much more effective ways of supporting American jobs, such as through domestic infrastructure investments, than paying U.S. defense firms to build needless tanks. Unfortunately, this was the outlook for many in the Trump administration. Peter Navarro, the former president’s trade adviser, trumpeted that American jobs were sustained by continuing to build tanks for Egypt.22 This jobs claim has been challenged by academic researchers, who found that investments in arms sales do not create as many new jobs as other potential investments and offer underwhelming economic benefits for Americans.23 Security assistance should instead be viewed primarily as a diplomatic tool and thus controlled by diplomats.

Hypothetical costs of reforming the system and disrupting current implementation of U.S. security assistance are likely to be significantly outweighed by improvements in the policymaking process and well worth the political capital a new administration and Congress would need to expend.

### Solvency – Cybersecurity

#### Perception of DoD lead on cybersecurity cooperation backfires – only counterplan solves

Gady 15 Franz-Stefan Gady, Research Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Perceptions and the Creeping Militarization of US Foreign Policy,” The Diplomat, 1-9-2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/perceptions-and-the-creeping-militarization-of-us-foreign-policy/> /GoGreen!

Today, I would like to add an additional (albeit simple) point: The militarization of U.S. foreign policy makes it more likely that other countries will perceive the United States as dangerous and hostile, and this is not in the U.S. national interest.

One example is the slow progress on cooperation between the United States and China on cybersecurity. Despite various friendly overtures by the United States, the Chinese are still reluctant to sit down with the Americans and discuss ways to establish something akin to strategic stability in cyberspace. Beijing’s main critique is that the United States is militarizing cyberspace.

My point here is neither to deny that both countries are engaged in a long-term strategic competition, nor that a military component to this competition (in cyberspace) is a necessity given the nature of the current international system. Rather, I suggest that cooperation might be easier if China were not to assume that the U.S. military establishment dominates the discussion on cybersecurity within the U.S. government. As I pointed out here, this only feeds into Chinese fears of technological and military inferiority vis-à-vis the United States.

We tend to forget that the principle objective of any military is “the management of violence” as Samuel Huntington notes in The Soldier and the State. Thus, having the military too deeply involved in a field in which one of the operating principles is non-confrontation may send the wrong signal to the other side. Scanning various Chinese, Russian, Indian and European commentaries and analyses, the fear of a continuing militarization of U.S. foreign policy is pervasive.

According to Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray in their book Mission Creep – The Militarization of US Foreign Policy, militarization means, “a growing trend to view decisions on national security strategy, policies, and policy implementation from a military perspective.” The authors point out that this means that, “Foreign policy issues and security challenges discussed at the senior policymaker level are framed as military challenges, most readily susceptible to policy solutions and programs for which military capabilities are seen as the appropriate response.”

For example, returning to (the lack of) China-U.S. cooperation on cybersecurity, the merging of the position of the head of U.S. Cyber Command with that of the director of the National Security Agency (NSA), while perhaps making sense from an organizational point of view, only amplifies the sense that the United States is also militarizing cyberspace, underlining the old “if all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail” dilemma. However, civilian control over an institution like the NSA is entirely possible: In the United Kingdom, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British equivalent to the NSA, is headed by a civilian and reports to the Foreign Secretary.

The militarization of U.S. foreign policy did not happen overnight; its origins lie in the beginnings of the Cold War with the passing of the National Security Act of 1947, the adaptation of the Truman Doctrine, the creation of NATO, and the Korean War to name some of its roots. Throughout the Cold War decades an evolution slowly expanded the role of the U.S. military from military combat and deterrence to policy development (In 1977, the Defense Department founded the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy – an in-house State Department).

In the 2000s, this trend accelerated and the Pentagon further expanded its scope. One example that Murray and Adams cite in their book is the share of overall U.S. security assistance – traditionally a purview of the U.S. State Department – administered through the U.S. Department of Defense: It rose from 25 percent in 2002 to 70 percent in 2011 before evening out at 50 percent in 2014. In 2013, the Department of Defense budget was $619 billion; the State Department got $54 billion.

Of course, numbers only tell one story, and the variance in funds reflects the different mission sets of the two institutions. Still, it also emphasizes the reason why by default the military is often asked to step in – money. And this brings me back to my initial point: An inequality of resources leads to an inequality in policy and as a corollary the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, which is detrimental to U.S. national interests.

#### DoS lead is key to make cybersecurity cooperation effective – counterplan’s reforms overcome barriers

Garcia 21 Michael Garcia, Senior Policy Advisor at Third Way, former Senior Policy Analyst, Cybersecurity and Technology, Homeland Security and Public Safety Division, National Governors Association, MPA International Stabilization and Recovery, BA Political Science, James Madison University, “The Militarization of Cyberspace? Cyber-Related Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act,” Third Way, 4-5-2021, <https://www.thirdway.org/memo/the-militarization-of-cyberspace-cyber-related-provisions-in-the-national-defense-authorization-act> /GoGreen!

International Engagement and Nation-State Deterrence

The third-largest DoD-related category (fourth-largest overall) was provisions that fostered engagement with international partners to improve their cybersecurity posture, as well as policies to deter nation-state actors from conducting cyberattacks. Like other operational domains, DoD has an imperative to collaborate with allies in cyberspace. Since 2017, Congress has tasked DoD to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s cyber defenses,25 work with Baltic countries to improve their cybersecurity posture,26 and consider engaging in cyber exercises with allies in the Indo-Pacific.27 The last five NDAAs also emphasize the need to deter nation-state adversaries in cyberspace—specifically China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—with Congress mandating reports on how DoD deters these actors in FY 2017, 2018, and 2019.28

As a part of the US cyber-deterrent strategy, Congress included several measures that impose consequences on bad actors and hold them to account for their malicious cyber activities, like cybercrime. For example, the FY 2020 and FY 2021 NDAAs require DoD to assess North Korea’s revenue generated from their cybercrime activities and provide recommendations on how to counter China’s industrial espionage and intellectual-property theft.29 Similarly, an FY 2019 provision requires the Secretary of Defense to create a list of countries that pose a risk to US cybersecurity, including those that knowingly participate in criminal activity.30 Lastly, the FY 2021 NDAA establishes a Joint Cyber Planning Office within DHS, allowing federal agencies to collaborate with private entities to develop plans that disrupt the cyber infrastructure that cybercriminals use to conduct malicious cyber activities, like ransomware attacks.31

While these measures could deter cybercriminals and the nation-states that abet them, they do not impact other cyber enforcement areas. For instance, state and local law enforcement agencies require more resources to bolster their digital forensic capabilities to identify cybercriminals.32 The State Department, too, requires additional authorities and resources to support international partners’ efforts to improve their cybercrime enforcement capacity. As a result, the tools and resources available to the US government and its partners to pursue cybercriminals remain limited.

Beginning in FY 2020, the number of non-DoD-related cyber provisions began increasing, such as supply-chain security and industrial policy; critical infrastructure protection; and election security.

Supply-Chain Security and Industrial Policy

Provisions that protect and secure US Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) were the third-largest category that included measures to prohibit federal agencies from purchasing ICTs from specific companies and promote the creation of an ICT-industrial policy. Supply-chain security and the need to develop an ICT-industrial policy gained prominence because of 5G and the Chinese-based company Huawei’s dominance in the 5G supply-chain marketplace. This raised national-security concerns about the security and integrity of data flowing over networks with Huawei technology and Huawei’s ability to intercept or disrupt data and services at the request of the Chinese government.33 Since then, Members of Congress have included provisions in NDAAs and passed similar bills to “clean” US networks of Huawei technology and other companies owned and operated by nation-state adversaries.34 Yet, American and European companies lag behind Huawei in 5G technology and therefore lack a reliable alternative to replace Huawei;35 an issue that transcends 5G technology and pervades other ICT markets and supply chains.36 As a result, Congress has debated about how to create a new industrial policy that would invest federal funds into ICT companies to create a friendly competitor to Chinese businesses. However, the past two NDAAs show that Congress has ended this debate and inked a 21st-century industrial policy whose origin centers on national security.

From FY 2017 to FY 2019, these provisions focused on protecting DoD’s ICT supply chain from foreign-owned technology and establishing stronger information-sharing capabilities within intelligence agencies.37 These NDAAs also included significant laws to prohibit foreign companies' influence in US markets. For example, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 was included in the FY 2019 NDAA and expanded the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States’ scope to address additional national security concerns, such as the supply-chain integrity of ICTs.38

Beginning in the FY 2020 NDAA, Members of Congress included provisions to incentivize domestic production of ICTs to wean US businesses and agencies off foreign-owned hardware and software. In fact, the FY 2021 NDAA included the new title, “Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America.” Examples of provisions that fell within this title included:

a report on how to increase investments in the “industries of the future;”39

a trust fund within the Treasury Department to provide grants to promote and deploy 5G technology;40

a public-private partnership to provide incentives (e.g., grants) to a consortium of companies to develop and produce microelectronics;41 and

federal financial assistance to incentivize investment in US semiconductor manufacturing, among others.42

While increased federal investment into ICTs is needed and has precedent,43 Members of Congress must consider other areas of an industrial policy that may not fall squarely within the NDAA. For instance, the CSC detailed a series of recommendations on expanding the roles of the United States Agency for International Development, the Export-Import Bank, the Commerce Department, and the US International Development Finance Corporation to implement a whole-of-government approach to creating an industrial policy.44

Critical Infrastructure Protection, Election Security, and DHS’ Cyber Mission

In addition to creating an industrial policy, Congress has used the NDAA to protect domestic critical infrastructure, secure election systems, and empower DHS’ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). While these provisions are limited in number compared to other categories, they have significant implications in shaping US cybersecurity policy.

Although DoD does have a role in protecting domestic critical infrastructure from attacks, civilian agencies (known as Sector-Specific Agencies or Sector Risk Management Agencies) are primarily responsible for the day-to-day partnerships with private critical infrastructure partners. To further empower this partnership, Congress included key recommendations from the CSC to secure critical infrastructure from cyber threats. This included redefining the roles and responsibilities of sector-specific agencies who oversee the 16 critical infrastructure sectors;45 creating a plan that would maintain and restore the economy in the face of a significant event (e.g., cyberattack);46 and strengthening and institutionalizing DoD and other federal agencies cybersecurity initiatives with private partners.47

Election security also garnered significant attention among Members of Congress, with 11 provisions included in the past five NDAAs and a new title in the FY 2020 NDAA called “Election Matters.” These provisions examined how the National Guard could assist states in securing election systems;48 enabled information sharing with state election officials;49 and created a strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to US elections.50

DHS’ CISA also saw a surge of cyber-related provisions in FY 2021 compared to previous years mainly because it was created at the end of 2018 and due to a series of CSC recommendations that sought to strengthen its authorities. In fact, the FY 2021 NDAA was the first time in the past five NDAAs that Congress included a title called “Homeland Security Matters.” These provisions gave CISA the ability to:

issue subpoenas to internet-service providers so that they can identify a company that may have a cyber vulnerability;51

conduct threat hunting operations on federal networks;52 and

place cybersecurity coordinators in each state to improve federal relations with state and private partners, among other things.53

The 2021 NDAA also creates an office within CISA to convene federal agencies and private partners to develop joint cyber planning operations for protecting and responding to malicious cyber incidents.54 As noted previously, this could impose consequences on cybercriminals and other malicious actors by taking down the infrastructures they use to perpetrate their crimes and acts.

The culmination of these provisions has the potential to transform public-private partnerships, solidify state and federal cooperation to protect elections, and enable CISA to perform its duties.

With Congress passing limited cyber legislation, Members should weigh the pros and cons of either including additional non-DoD cybersecurity provisions in future NDAAs or creating a cyber-omnibus bill to take a holistic approach to cybersecurity.

The SolarWinds hack, the Microsoft Exchange Servers vulnerability, and the relentless ransomware epidemic illustrate the need for Congressional action, but Congress must consider the best approach to enact legislation. Congress should weigh whether to include additional cyber-related categories in future NDAAs or create a cyber-omnibus bill so all agencies are provided with authorities and resources to deter and respond to cyber incidents.

The NDAA Approach

Congress sent about two dozen cyber-related bills to the Oval Office over a four-year time-period, which contained additional cyber provisions within them. Yet, this pales in comparison to the near 300 cyber provisions included in the past five NDAAs, with a hundred in the past NDAA alone. The FY 2021 NDAA was unique among others due to three new sections, which expanded the type of cyber provisions typically seen in an NDAA—Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America, Cyberspace-Related Matters; and Homeland Security Matters. As noted, the CSC was responsible for over 20% of the FY 2021 NDAA’s cyber-related provisions, many of which fell within those three titles. With the CSC renewed for another year and advancing much-needed old and new recommendations to fill policy gaps, these and additional new titles may be included in the FY 2022 NDAA.

Congress should therefore not shy away from including other cybersecurity matters that are not directly related to the DoD. With ransomware and other forms of cybercrime at an all-time high, Congress should consider creating a new title in the FY 2022 NDAA called “Cybercrime Related Matters.” Members could then include provisions that would provide additional funds to states and locals to enhance their digital forensic capabilities, improve assistance awarded to cybercrime victims, transform cybercrime reporting, and provide aid to US allies to bolster their criminal justice systems to investigate cybercrime cases, in addition to the CSC cybercrime recommendations.55

However, Congress should consider the pros and cons of using the NDAA to shape US cybersecurity policy. It is possible that there are limited cons and that the NDAA is simply a legislative means to an end. Yet, there may be limitations to thinking about cybersecurity through the defense bill and a national security lens, rather than an economic or innovative one. In other words, should the US ICT-industrial policy strategy, for example, be grounded in a larger infrastructure package? Should filling the cybersecurity workforce gap be part of a 21st-century workforce bill? These types of bills will face political difficulties, and it is therefore understandable that they are included in a bill that has a perfect batting record for passing both congressional chambers over the past 50 years. But congressional members should then work together to overcome committee jurisdictional issues to include provisions in the NDAA that do not have a nexus to the DoD or national security, which will enable a holistic approach to US cybersecurity.

The Cyber-Omnibus Bill Approach

If Congress is already keen on including non-DoD provisions in the NDAA, they should consider the potential benefits of creating a cyber-omnibus bill. A cyber-omnibus bill would allow Congress to think about cybersecurity through a holistic approach by creating provisions that complement each other with a whole-of-society lens. For instance, such a bill could enumerate and resource a cyber bureau within the State Department,56 de-conflict its mission with DoD, and provide resources to FBI attaches to support overseas cybercrime efforts. It could also ensure that states and civilian agencies are provided the resources to prevent, respond to, and investigate cyber incidents to lessen the burden placed on DoD assets, like the National Guard.

This legislative approach would also allow for commensurate resources to be allocated to civilian agencies who are responsible for partnering with private companies to protect the US against cyberattacks. Currently, the DoD’s cyber operation budget is higher than CISA, the FBI, and the Justice Department’s National Security Division combined.57 DoD’s cyber-related budget is also “nearly 25% higher than the total going to all civilian departments, including the departments of Homeland Security, Treasury, and Energy.”58 Further, some of the provisions included in the NDAA are unfunded mandates. Congress, for example, did not appropriate funds to implement the industrial policy it created in the 2021 NDAA.59 Ensuring that the agencies responsible for helping state, local, private, and international partners prepare for and recover from cyber incidents is equally important as resourcing DOD’s cyber operations and necessary for a complete cyber deterrence strategy.

Conlusion

Congress has used the NDAAs to pass important cybersecurity legislation, but Members must be aware of the importance of non-national security cybersecurity issues that tend to not be included in the NDAA. To be sure, a new legislative package would cause congressional jurisdiction headaches, which may outweigh any cons of relying on the NDAA to pass cyber-related legislation. Yet, the recent nation-state and cybercriminal activities taken against the United States and private companies show the need for Congress to use any means necessary to pass a wide range of cyber-related bills, with adequate resources provided to agencies, to bolster areas of US cybersecurity strategy that have been ignored thus far.

#### DoS lead makes DoD more effective, and is key to allied consensus on hybrid war and ilaw, agreement and enforcement of cyber norms, and tech leadership

Goldman 20 Dr. Emily O. Goldman, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, former cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Law Review, 3(4), Fall 2020, p.84-101, <https://tnsr.org/2020/09/from-reaction-to-action-adopting-a-competitive-posture-in-cyber-diplomacy/> /GoGreen!

Cyber Diplomacy for Great-Power Competition: Seizing and Sustaining Initiative

Political conditions today favor an energetic U.S. diplomatic campaign. Russia and China’s aggressive information, political, and economic warfare campaigns have highlighted the risks to U.S. partners and allies.60 Those allies are eager to improve their cyberspace security and to work cooperatively with the United States. The U.S. government can capitalize on this favorable environment by forging agreements with foreign partners that encourage a deeper level of interaction. The United States can build coalitions for continuous pressure against adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict.61 Such agreements and the joint efforts that follow will normalize collaborative cyberspace operations for mutual defense.

Essentially, the State Department needs to operationalize the core objective of cyber persistence: seizing and sustaining initiative. The State Department is uniquely positioned to convene interagency discussions on defining boundaries of acceptable behavior below the level of armed conflict, to forge consensus with allies and partners on boundaries of acceptable competition, and to mobilize international coalitions to enforce those boundaries. It can better enable the Department of Defense to persistently engage and defend forward in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict — a necessary ingredient for constructing norms through interaction. Diplomats should be well-versed in the full range of U.S. cyber activities and explain them to U.S. partners in order to set the international conditions for the United States to compete in a globally interconnected domain. With these goals in mind, the following recommendations are offered as a roadmap for improving U.S. cyber diplomacy.

Communicate and Build Consensus

The State Department’s foreign service officers forward-deployed as “cyber diplomats” can strengthen consensus among allies and partners on the nature of the cyber security problem and on the need for action to address it. To do so, they should be conversant with the U.S. government’s efforts to address cyber competition and armed with information to speak authoritatively about them. The State Department has long promoted a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The key elements of that framework include: (1) affirmation that established principles of international law apply to state behavior in cyberspace;62 (2) adherence to certain non-binding norms of state behavior in cyberspace during peacetime; and (3) consideration, development, and implementation of practical confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace. Since not all states share American views on responsible behavior in cyberspace, the United States is working with partners and allies on collective attribution and imposition of consequences.

These initiatives are now being complemented by the Department of Defense’s strategy of defend forward and U.S. Cyber Command’s operational approach of persistent engagement. The State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) officers in missions around the world need to be well-versed in these other efforts and prepared to explain them to foreign partners on a routine basis. America’s partners want to understand U.S. government strategy and policies.63 It is U.S. policy that cross-domain responses to cyber aggression should be complemented with steady and sustained activities to make networks more resilient, to defend them as far forward as practicable, and to contest the most dangerous adversaries.64 Every diplomatic engagement that includes cyber issues would be an opportunity to build support for these mutually reinforcing approaches.

Bolster Cyber Cadre

The greatest talent, most consequential research and development, and most innovative applications of cyber and other emerging technologies are globally distributed across individuals, commercial entities, governments, and academia. Competing successfully requires recognizing, understanding, and leveraging insights and advances wherever they reside in real time. The nation that best understands and can most rapidly harvest the benefits of changing knowledge (e.g., quantum encryption, artificial intelligence, machine learning, high performance computing, big data, 5G) will be best positioned to secure its future. Conversely, states that lag behind competitors will find closing gaps a daunting and risky challenge. 5G represents the proverbial canary in the coal mine because the United States lags behind China in deployment. Unless the United States ensures the talent is in place to monitor and lead on future technologies, it may again be caught unprepared.

The State Department does designate foreign service officers with a cyber portfolio, but they are usually assigned as an additional duty, often to economic officers at embassies and consulates. One option would be a dedicated cadre of “cyber diplomacy-coned” officers,65 or even a regional dedicated officer cadre located at a large or strategic embassy in each region to augment the part-time officers at post. These cyber diplomacy-coned foreign service officers would report on priorities and trends in research and investments across governments, industries, academia, and research institutes worldwide, and identify where adversary regimes are vulnerable to diplomatic, information, military, and economic threats.66 They would “identify and catalyze opportunities,” in the words of the U.S. National Security Strategy,67helping to set the conditions for competition by building mechanisms for information sharing and agile collaboration.

Enable Defend Forward

The U.S. National Cyber Strategy’s guidance to promote a framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, one that ensures there are consequences for irresponsible behavior, is a key objective for the United States. To succeed, this framework should be pursued in tandem with an active approach to stem ongoing adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict. The Department of Defense is now defending forward, outside its existing networks, to mitigate threats before they reach the United States. It is time for the State Department to join in these efforts.

An informal division of labor currently exists between the departments of State and Defense, whereby the former promotes norms in traditional diplomatic channels while the latter pursues defend forward through military channels. Yet this leaves several problems unresolved. Parallel communication increases the risk of messaging fratricide across military and diplomatic channels in partner nations. Military cyber operations may engage foreign policy sensitivities that the State Department is better equipped to address. On the other hand, State Department desk officers may throw a wrench into planning because they do not understand Defense Department strategy.

The United States needs to operate continuously alongside allies and partners. Leadership from the State Department can increase the speed, agility, and scale of defend forward activities and operations by working through diplomatic channels to set the conditions for the United States to operate by, with, and through foreign partners and their networks in order to expose, contest, and defend against adversary cyber aggression. Sustained diplomacy can help institutionalize these operational partnerships and make defend forward more anticipatory and effective. Institutionalized cooperation, including the conduct of joint and coalition operations and the development of agreed-upon legal and policy frameworks, is essential to prevail in long-term strategic competition.

The State Department can set the conditions for consensual foreign partner-enabled discovery operations (i.e., “hunt forward” operations) through bilateral engagements.68 These operations enable the United States and its partners to understand an adversary’s tactics, techniques, and procedures. This will in turn enable network defense of U.S. partners, improve anticipatory resilience of U.S. and partner networks, and thwart cyberspace aggression. The State Department can scale the process of explaining the Defense Department’s defend forward strategy, enabling the United States to proactively set the conditions for “hunt forward” operations. The State Department can also actively ensure Defense Department cyber teams receive support from U.S. embassy country teams and benefit from insights about foreign partner networks gained through State and USAID-led cyber security capacity-building programs.

Mobilize Coalitions

The National Security Strategy calls on U.S. diplomats to “build and lead coalitions that advance shared interests” in the ongoing contests for power.69 The State Department has a history of coalition building, most recently with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS formed in 2014. The State Department is thus uniquely positioned to mobilize partners to sustain pressure on adversary cyberspace behavior and cyber-enabled campaigns. A three-tiered coalition could increase information sharing, agile collaboration, and operational agility.

At the core of this coalition would be states that possess the capability and capacity to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations and work with diplomatic, law enforcement, and industry partners. A second tier would comprise less-capable or less-committed states that core states operate with (and through) to counter and contest aggression below the level of armed conflict. The United States has extensive experience negotiating basing and transit rights in sovereign territory along the Soviet perimeter during the Cold War. It should negotiate the cyber analogue of basing and transit rights to set the conditions for swift and persistent action. The transit issue is likely to be less controversial for allies and partners than remote cyber operations on infrastructure within another state’s territory (addressed below).

A third tier would comprise public and private actors across the broadest practicable set of countries in a resilience consortium to leverage collective market power, secure the internet, and counterbalance the illiberal vision of information control promoted by Russia and China.70 This is especially urgent as countries shift from 3G and 4G (third and fourth generation) to 5G communications networks. By offering attractive financial terms, authoritarian governments can dominate the telecommunications industry in developing countries and control digital tools that increase censorship, repression, and surveillance. It is imperative that public and private actors assist the broader coalition in combating such trends.

Several pillars for a resilience consortium already exist. Cyber security capacity-building received a boost when the State Department and USAID launched the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership in July 2018, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region.71 In July 2019, USAID launched a development framework called Countering Malign Kremlin Influence. The framework was designed to build the economic and democratic resilience of countries targeted by Russia. Cyber security is considered high priority.72 The launch of the U.S. Development Finance Corporation in October 2019 can attract private capital flows into contested markets to stem the spread of surveillance networks.73 In November 2019, the United States, Australia, and Japan announced the Blue Dot Network to promote high-quality and trusted standards for global infrastructure development as an alternative to the predatory lending and debt-trap diplomacy of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.74 By re-prioritizing emerging market economies for affordable and reliable internet access and infrastructure, the United States can shore up internet freedom, ensure economic prosperity for the United States and its partners, and secure the outer ring of telecommunications networks as America’s first line of cyber defense.

Another important initiative is the Clean Network program. Building upon the 5G Clean Path initiative, the Clean Network is a comprehensive effort by a coalition of like-minded countries and companies to secure their critical telecommunications, cloud, data analytics, mobile apps, Internet of Things, and 5G technologies from malign actors. The coalition relies on trusted vendors that are not subject to unjust or extra-judicial control by authoritarian governments.75 Five new lines of effort were recently announced to ensure telecommunication carriers, mobile app stores, apps, cloud-based systems, and undersea cables are all rooted in digital trust standards.76 More than 30 countries and territories are now Clean Countries, and many of the world’s biggest telecommunications companies are Clean Telcos.77 These efforts have laid the foundation for a broader coalition the State Department could mobilize to implement competitive cyber strategies.

Accelerate Interagency Consensus on Conventions Below the Use of Force

What constitutes acceptable behavior in competition below the level of armed conflict? While there is a normative prohibition against crossing the threshold of armed conflict and while states appear to tacitly agree on many types of behavior that cross that threshold, the unilateral ingenuity states display in developing novel approaches to achieving strategic gains invites the potential for miscalculations on and around this threshold. Moreover, the strategic competitive space outside of armed conflict is still maturing. It is a space where the rules are malleable and where mutual understandings of acceptable and unacceptable behavior are few.78

The U.S. government needs to reach an interagency consensus on the preferred boundaries of acceptable behavior outside of armed conflict and promote them in international fora. The State Department is the natural leader for these efforts. Interagency discussions should proceed in tandem with consultations with the private sector. Currently, discussions with private sector entities all too often are isolated within individual agencies, with little coordination between agencies — even between the State Department and USAID. Agreed-upon conventions can then be reinforced by the actions of all departments and agencies. Working bilaterally, multilaterally, and through international institutions, the United States — led by the State Department — can influence and message what behaviors it views as unacceptable. This can help reduce the ambiguity that adversaries exploit, enhance the ability to build coalitions to support the U.S. view, and enable the United States to more effectively secure commitments from like-minded countries to impose consequences on those whose actions are counter to the principles.

However, the United States should first decide what it believes are the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behavior, which requires it to detail how national interests manifest in cyberspace and the security postures needed to defend those interests.79 Other nations will need to do the same. The issue is where there is convergence, not just with like-minded states, but with adversaries. Examples that come to mind are the integrity of the global financial infrastructure; nuclear command, control, and communications; and disinformation that disrupts public health efforts — an issue which is of special relevance in light of the current global health crisis.80

Shape International Discourse on Cyber Operations and Sovereignty

One of the greatest concerns for allies and partners are operations that generate cyber effects outside U.S. military networks. These operations are designed to disrupt the ability of an adversary to conduct cyber operations against the United States and its allies — what the 2018 U.S. Cyber Command vision refers to as “contest.”81 There is no U.S. declaratory policy on the sovereignty implications of cyber operations. Specifically, the United States has not declared its position on whether remote cyber operations that generate effects on infrastructure within another state’s territory require that state’s consent. There is a divide among states on this issue, and on whether such acts require international legal justification. There is also divergence in state views on how international law applies to states’ conduct of cyber operations below the threshold of a use of force and outside the context of armed conflict.82 On one end of the spectrum is the United Kingdom, which has publicly declared that remote cyber operations below the non-intervention threshold are not prohibited by international law and do not require consent.83 On the other end of the spectrum, the Netherlands agrees with the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations that such operations violate state sovereignty and require consent.84

The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have officially declared their respective positions and they have polar opposite views on this core question. Moreover, Estonia, Australia, and the United States have officially articulated their positions on the applicability of international law to cyber operations yet have not weighed in on this particular issue. Gary Corn considers this range of positions “prima facie evidence of the unsettled nature of the question.”85 The United States needs to seize the diplomatic initiative and publicly articulate its stance on this issue to help influence the court of world opinion. The most explicit official U.S. statement comes from the Department of Defense general counsel:

For cyber operations that would not constitute a prohibited intervention or use-of-force, the Department believes there is not sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice resulting from a sense of legal obligation to conclude that customary international law generally prohibits such non-consensual cyber operations in another State’s territory. This proposition is recognized in the Department’s adoption of the “defend forward” strategy: “We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.” The Department’s commitment to defend forward including to counter foreign cyber activity targeting the United States — comports with our obligations under international law and our commitment to the rules-based international order.86

This is an area where the State Department should be leading internationally if the United States hopes to persuade others to adopt its preferred norms, particularly as allies wrestle with legal ambiguities surrounding cyber operations.87

Adopt a Competitive Mindset

The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy challenged the Defense Department to adopt a “competitive mindset” in order to “out-think, out-maneuver, out-partner, and out-innovate” threat actors.88 The department responded to this challenge. It reorganized, fielded new technologies and capabilities, created cross-functional teams that effectively work across traditional bureaucratic lines to prepare for long-term strategic challenges from China and Russia, and pivoted to the proactive cyber strategy of defend forward.

There is progress at the State Department in adapting to great-power competition. Secretary Mike Pompeo has given a series of speeches on the challenges posed by China, most forcefully on July 23, 2020, at the Nixon Presidential Library.89 In 2019, all policy bureaus were directed to build strategic plans that prioritize competing with China.90China’s challenge to the Western-led, liberal world order has impacted decisions on foreign assistance. USAID’s “Clear Choice” framework provides alternatives in the energy, digital, and infrastructure sectors to China’s development model.91 The State Department-led campaign to convince countries to ban Huawei equipment from their 5G networks is bearing fruit as a growing number of states, including all members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, exclude Huawei from their 5G networks. China’s crackdown in Hong Kong and its lack of transparency about the origins of the novel coronavirus no doubt added to concerns regarding the use of Chinese technology.92

Thus, the State Department has begun to adopt a competitive mindset. Yet much remains to be done. Framing the Huawei issue as a strategic competition over the future of digital governance and control of the global digital backbone, in addition to the security risks of embedding a Chinese provider into critical communications infrastructure, reflects a competitive mindset. So does the proactive approach of the Global Engagement Center, which leads interagency efforts to address foreign adversary disinformation and propaganda that undermines U.S. interests. Cyber diplomacy by the State Department needs to embrace this competitive mindset, and this will require reprioritizing resources and revisiting current lines of effort.

Conclusion: A State Department Cyber Strategy

A new bureau for cyberspace within the U.S. State Department can help to consolidate cyber issues. However, it will remain an incomplete effort, as cyber issues touch nearly every bureau and require a broad-based approach. This reflects the pervasiveness of digital technologies across all facets of human endeavor — economic, social, political, and security. It also reflects adversaries’ integrated strategies that use cyberspace to gain strategic advantage and redefine the policies, principles, and standards of the global order. Consequently, no single bureau can manage the full panoply of cyber issues.

More importantly, making bureaucratic changes divorced of strategy is just rearranging deck chairs. The State Department should understand its role and then strategically reorient its bureaucracy to meet that strategy’s objectives. A cyber strategy is not a panacea. However, properly applied across the whole department, an effective strategy would unify efforts and ensure the State Department’s cyber priorities are aligned with the National Security Strategy’s focus on great-power competition, and improve coordination and integration — particularly between the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues, which focuses on technical cyber incidents, and the Global Engagement Center, which focuses on information and influence operations. Like the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, USAID, and the Department of Justice have all produced department-wide cyber strategies or frameworks that are internally focused and externally nested.93 An effective cyber strategy could build upon the progress the United States has already made and posture the nation to regain the initiative in cyberspace competition with authoritarian rivals. It should include the creation of a cyber diplomacy-coned career track for its foreign service officers. It should articulate how the State Department will lead, partner, and act in order to set the conditions for the United States to compete and sustain strategic advantage in cyberspace. And it should support U.S. government efforts to persistently counter and contest malicious foreign cyberspace campaigns and influence operations.

Adversaries of the United States and its allies and partners employ highly variable approaches, aligned to their national interests and competitive advantages against U.S. vulnerabilities across all elements of national power. Although competition in physical space is episodic, it is continuous in the cyber and information spaces where persistent campaigns gradually accrete meaningful advantage short of war. Without adopting and employing a proactive strategy against these threats across the whole of government, the United States may eventually find itself in a position of parity or even disadvantage with adversaries. In such a situation, emboldened adversaries will have shaped the competitive space to the point where they will have won without fighting.

#### DoS lead is key to effective attribution

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A U.N. Group of Governmental Experts produced a consensus report outlining norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that was welcomed by the U.N. General Assembly in 2015. However, U.N. members were by no means agreed on how international law applies to cyberspace. Although that issue was addressed more successfully in 2021, diplomats are still negotiating critical questions like what counts as cybercrime, critical infrastructure, espionage, or many of the other foundational concepts in this area. All of these questions, and many others beyond the negotiations of the United Nations, have long-term implications for the future of the internet, as cyberspace policy experts navigate a path between security and surveillance, and between openness and authoritarianism. To be successful in this diplomacy, the State Department should prioritize these issues and provide its diplomats with organizational structures that will support America’s proactive leadership. In short, the State Department should have a dedicated cyberspace policy bureau.

The focus and activities of such a bureau would be functionally very different from what will be involved in addressing other technology issues. A Bureau of International Cyberspace Policy would be responsible for implementing a relatively established policy for cyber diplomacy. The head of the bureau would be working to ensure an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, pushing back on authoritarian leanings in internet governance, and advocating for a multi-stakeholder model for the future of cyberspace. Certain details may change, but the core elements of this policy have been consistent across administrations and Congresses. Accordingly, the real added value of a cyberspace policy bureau is not in defining policy, but rather implementing that policy, which will require extensive engagement with “non-aligned” countries to help sway the balance of opinion toward an open internet, and international capacity-building efforts to help drive progress toward greater global cyber security.

By contrast, the challenge U.S. policymakers confront on emerging technologies is a question of establishing what America’s international policies and diplomatic strategies should be. As the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence observed in relation to the State Department, a lack of clear leadership on emerging technology “hinders the Department’s ability to make strategic technology policy decisions” as part of a larger reorientation toward strategic competition.

Policymakers and officials working on emerging technologies will also face the challenge of adapting overarching policies as technologies emerge, develop, and ideally stabilize over time. Emerging technologies do not remain “emerging” indefinitely, and so an organizational structure that allows the development of cohesive strategies around these technologies should have the flexibility to shift between topics. Of course, cyberspace policy and the strategic considerations that guide it will also certainly need to adapt to changes, but its basic focus is likely to remain more stable. Much of America’s work in outlining cyberspace policy has already been done, and thus the missions that remain — for example working with partners and allies on joint attribution of cyber attacks, rallying votes in the United Nations, and managing capacity building projects — are unlikely to change dramatically any time soon.

Undoubtedly, there will be many areas of overlap between the work of those handling emerging technology issues and the responsibilities of a cyberspace policy office. But there will also be overlap between efforts on emerging technologies and matters handled by the Bureau of Economics and Business Affairs, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and many others. The fact that there is overlap between two organizational constructs should not be taken as a justification to merge them, and while technology obviously plays a central role in both cyberspace policy and emerging technologies policy, the actual work required to address them is very different.

It also makes sense to keep some technology issues in their current bureaucratic homes because of their historical legacy and the subsequent development of specialized expertise within those homes. No one would suggest, for example, that emerging issues in nuclear technology should be pulled out of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and made the responsibility of a new emerging technology bureau. And some technologies might only have globally significant implications for a relatively short period of time. Advanced robotics, for example, might have a major impact on manufacturing and broader economic areas, which could require the sustained attention of policymakers as they grapple with the initial implications of such technology. But once advanced robotics become a routine part of industrial operations, it would make less sense to have brought the issue under a new bureau when the pre-existing functional and regional bureaus might be best poised to address the relevant challenges.

Making every technology policy the responsibility of one under secretary would not solve the State Department’s current problems. Instead, it would result in unclear prioritization, strained resources, and would leave one leader handling two very different mission sets.

The Importance of Avoiding a Security-Focused Approach to Cyberspace

In creating a Bureau of International Cyberspace Policy, the State Department should also avoid limiting that bureau’s focus solely to security-related matters. That was one of the flaws with the previous administration’s efforts to create the Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technologies. While that bureau never materialized, the Government Accountability Office roundly criticized the State Department for failing to provide data or evidence to support its plans and for its lack of consultation with other federal agencies. Rep. Gregory Meeks, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, emphasized that the proposed office would not have been in a position to “coordinate responsibility for the security, economic, and human rights aspects of cyber policy.”

Any reorganization of the State Department should ensure that diplomats can take into account all dimensions — political, economic, humanitarian, and security — of cyberspace policy and elevate them within the department. That would allow a new bureau to lead the way in promoting a free and secure internet. Some of the reform proposals that have been put forward reflect this approach. For example, the Cyber Diplomacy Act, which has already passed in the House, would create an ambassador-at-large position, with rank equal to that of an assistant secretary, to lead a new cyber bureau. That person would report to the under secretary for political affairs or an official of higher rank, which leaves open the possibility that the position would report directly to the secretary of state or one of the department’s two deputy secretaries. While some have proposed the deputy secretary for management and resources for this reporting chain, that position has a history of going unfilled, and having a new cyberspace bureau report to it is a recipe for undercutting the fledgling bureau before it can even get off the ground. A better alternative would be to allow the State Department some flexibility in determining a new bureau’s reporting structure, which might include the more natural choice of reporting to the other deputy secretary.

An overly narrow focus on security is not the only trap to avoid in creating a new cyber bureau. Orienting it around the idea of strategic competition with China would also be a problem. No doubt China will remain a key driver of U.S. policy for years to come, but global threats and opportunities may look very different in future decades than they do now. Cyber diplomacy should not be oriented around one adversary specifically and the structure and functioning of a new cyberspace policy bureau should stand the test of time.

The Devil Is in the Details, But a Cyberspace Policy Bureau Is the Best Approach

The unfortunate political reality is that reorganizing the State Department is hard. That alone is not a reason to forgo reform, but it does introduce constraints on what may be feasible. Any new office or bureau will need leaders, but current law strictly limits the rank that they can hold. Creating a new under secretary, or even a new assistant secretary, would require significant changes to the State Department Basic Authorities Act, and there is limited political momentum for that particular undertaking. The law currently authorizes the appointment of 24 assistant secretaries and six under secretaries. Although the Cyberspace Solarium Commission initially recommended creating an assistant secretary position to lead a new cyber bureau — and although it has been clear for two decades that the State Department’s structure should be overhauled — making such drastic changes to the necessary legislation may be a nonstarter on Capitol Hill for the foreseeable future. The Cyber Diplomacy Act provides the best available work-around by placing an ambassador-at-large at the head of the new bureau, ensuring that the position has the stature necessary for effective leadership.

The new bureau would also have to contend with the challenges of prioritization. The Cyber Diplomacy Act lists a wide variety of issues — including internet access, internet freedom, digital economy, cybercrime, deterrence, and international responses to cyber threats — that would become a cyberspace bureau’s responsibilities. Even without giving it emerging technology topics to handle, consolidating just cyberspace policy issues will require careful planning to determine which pieces get pulled from existing bureaus. To allow a new bureau to adequately deal with digital economy matters, for example, policymakers would need to decide which aspects of that issue get moved from the purview of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. The new bureau would have a good case for inheriting responsibility for portfolios like investment in information communications technology infrastructure abroad, particularly as it relates to cyber security capacity building, but there is a strong argument for other pieces like e-commerce to remain in their existing homes. The more bearing a particular team’s work has on preserving an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, the more it should be considered a strong candidate for incorporation into a new bureau.

Moving the responsibility for particular policy matters is not the only tool available, however. The Cyber Diplomacy Act creates an avenue for the new bureau’s personnel to engage other State Department experts to ensure that concerns like human rights, economic competitiveness, and security have an influence on the development of U.S. cyber policy. The proposed Cyberspace Policy Coordinating Committee would ensure that officials at the assistant secretary level or higher from across the department can weigh in on matters of concern for their respective portfolios.

With a new cyberspace policy bureau, a coordinating committee, and enhancements to emerging technology capacity in its existing regional and functional bureaus, the State Department would be structured to handle the digital age effectively.

### Solvency – AI

#### DoS solves AI cooperation – already has the lead role and expertise

--T Family = DoS Bureau of Arms Control Verification and Compliance, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Jenkins 22 Ambassador Bonnie Denise Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State, “Challenges to International Security,” 5-26-2022, <https://www.state.gov/priorities-regarding-the-new-and-emerging-challenges-to-international-security/> /GoGreen!

Priority Three: Address Emerging Technologies from a National Security Perspective

As part of the Secretary’s modernization efforts to address 21st Century threats, the T Family is important to the Department’s efforts to address emerging technologies from a national security perspective. That includes leading efforts to prevent the proliferation of these technologies for purposes related to weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and destabilizing advanced conventional weapons, to enhance alliance military cooperation on these technologies, and to develop appropriate norms of responsible behavior regarding their use. T Bureaus will enhance their work on emerging technology with new offices and expertise.

Our Bureaus are also engaged in discussions on other threats posed by emerging national security challenges presented by new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information sciences, and biotechnology, among others. We are looking at ways in which these challenges can be addressed considering the changing nature of the technology and threats posed by adversarial uses. The PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy, which blurs the lines between civil and military development, further compounds these challenges. The risk that sensitive technologies can be transferred via intangible means make it critical to conduct outreach to academia and industry and ensure proper vetting of foreign visitors and students, so they do not contribute to programs of concern.

We will work to implement related national security-focused strategies developed by the T Bureaus and including by supporting related Department efforts in the United Nations. This work will focus on how new technologies could present opportunities and risks to the security of U.S. allies and partners.

The T Bureaus and I will also promote the use of norms of responsible behavior or codes of conduct when promoting risk reduction in areas of emerging technologies such as space. AVC’s Office of Emerging Security Challenges has been consulting with allies and partners at multilateral forums and there is broad support for this approach. Other areas where we will seek to advance efforts to develop norms of responsible behavior include artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing.

The U.S. is also part of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS) under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). In March 2022, the U.S. Delegation submitted a proposal for consideration by the GGE titled “Principles and Good Practices on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” cosponsored by delegations from a number of other countries. This document builds on how International Humanitarian Law applies to LAWS and proposes additional measures that will be discussed by the GGE in July 2022. I will continue to support this effort.

Priority Four: Protect and promote the US and Allies Technological, Military, and Economic Advantages

American and allied technological advancements are core elements of the U.S. industrial strategy and President Biden’s key priorities, and the T Family will continue efforts to keep such technology and advancements from illegal acquisition. As noted, we are particularly concerned with threats posed by the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy that will fuse together its civilian economy and defense establishment so that advanced and emerging technologies drive economic and military modernization simultaneously.

The T Family has led U.S. participation in the four nonproliferation export control regimes for over 30 years and is partnering with allies and partners in other regional and bilateral efforts as we further build on these coalitions to protect sensitive technologies from adversarial acquisition and exploitation.

The T Family will also continue its updates to the U.S. Munitions List, engaging foreign governments as well as industry and university partners at home and at abroad to bolster their understanding on how to comply with applicable U.S. export control regulations, and strengthen allies and partners’ end-use monitoring programs for U.S. defense articles and services.

#### DoS lead is key to make AI cooperation effective – counterplan’s reforms overcome barriers

Dukeman 20 Ryan Dukeman, senior fellow at FP21, PhD candidate, Princeton University, formerly helped found the U.S. State Department’s Center for Analytics, “Winning the AI Revolution for American Diplomacy,” War On The Rocks, 11-25-2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/winning-the-ai-revolution-for-american-diplomacy/> /GoGreen!

The State Department Should Lead on AI

Why is diplomacy — rather than defense or industrial policy — the right venue for advancing a digital democracy agenda, or something like it? Simply put, the multidimensional and transnational nature of AI requires an integrated, strategic approach, and diplomats are uniquely skilled in making policy across these issues more than the sum of their piecemeal parts. To channel former French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, AI is too important to be left to the generals — or the technologists — alone.

So far, most of the government’s focus on AI has been through research and development investments at the Defense Department, or through White House Office of Science and Technology Policy efforts to capitalize on it as an innovative economic windfall. Unfortunately, this approach — including leaving much of the intergovernmental norm-setting on AI to peer-to-peer military discussions — misses the strategic forest for the tactical trees. Issue-specific approaches that target global AI only as a military tool or an economic boon have two dangerous flaws: They largely ignore AI as a human rights issue, and forsake the potential for alliances and issue-linkage across policy areas. For example, existing efforts have failed to leverage U.S. technological leadership to advance global norms aligned with Western values, or to use foreign assistance to promote inclusive digital development at scale.

The State Department’s diplomats maintain a comparative advantage over interagency peers in remedying exactly these flaws. Diplomats are skilled in dealing with crosscutting global problems, and well suited to play a leading, orchestrating role in advancing a concerted American vision for AI across its economic, security, and human rights aspects. In Washington, at their posts, and in multilateral organizations, diplomats spend much of their days integrating peer agencies’ competing perspectives to advance a concerted U.S. agenda; leveraging instruments of national power such as foreign aid, military assistance, or visa regulations to advance disparate goals across different issues; and negotiating in bilateral and multilateral fora on economic, political, human rights, and military matters. The State Department’s sustained leadership in international organizations, which will play a major role in digital technology governance, is an additional underutilized advantage. The White House is wrong not to include the State Department as a “key agency” in its strategy on AI. In fact, the department may be the keystone agency — linking disparate, issue-specific efforts together so the result is more than the sum of its parts.

From Data Diplomacy to Data-Driven Diplomacy

Beyond its leadership potential on AI as an international policy issue, the State Department has three key advantages in applying AI technologies to its way of working, increasing its value in the interagency foreign policymaking process and reclaiming some of the influence it has ceded to the Defense Department and National Security Council in recent decades. First, the State Department has an exclusive, novel dataset of millions of diplomatic cables representing a century of collective knowledge of foreign governments and societies. Second, it has a unique overseas infrastructure for overt information collection in the form of embassies and diplomats. Third, it has one of the most highly skilled workforces in the federal government, with incoming Foreign Service officers having, on average, a master’s degree and a decade of work experience. By activating these assets and using AI as a force multiplier, the department can contribute more to the interagency policymaking process by bringing original and rigorous insights to national security debates. America’s oldest cabinet agency — often maligned as stuck in the past, pining for an imagined diplomatic golden age and averse to technological reforms — can reclaim leadership by investing in AI as a tool for scenario planning, crisis response, and innovative policy analysis. While frontier technologies will ultimately find their way into most parts of how the department operates, there are a few areas that are most important to prioritize in the near term to deliver immediate impact.

Predictive platforms, similar to those commercially available in the political risk industry today — and some being prototyped by peer agencies — are remarkable in their ability to use micro-level data (e.g., credit card purchases, social media posts, and search engine trends) to predict macro-level geopolitical events in ways no humans on their own could detect. Unfortunately, however, the State Department today is unique among foreign affairs agencies in that it uses almost no quantitative scenario modeling in its strategic planning, limiting the utility of its crisis prediction or strategic planning based too often on anecdote and experience without sufficiently testing hypotheses or assumptions.

Peer agencies can point the way to a better process. For crisis prediction, for example, the U.K. Foreign Office has built a platform to automatically translate and analyze hundreds of thousands of hyperlocal news sources to spot early warning signs of humanitarian crises and violent extremism. For longer-term forecasting, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity’s Aggregative Contingent Estimation program uses advanced analytics to aggregate not just data but the wisdom of crowds: The program elicits judgments of event probabilities from many intelligence analysts, and then uses algorithmic techniques to weight them on factors like past performance and “cognitive style,” providing more systematic estimates than any analyst could provide individually. Even in the policymaking process, AI can greatly empower human analysts by ingesting orders of magnitude more information and applying human-defined rules and principles more consistently. Doing so tests long-held assumptions, questions well-documented cognitive biases, investigates patterns of history rather than relying on simple analogies, and casts a wider aperture on sources of analysis like social media, satellite imagery, and user-generated video content.

Where would the data feeding these prediction engines come from? Fortunately, in the parlance of data science, the State Department sits on top of a “novel data asset” — a unique trove of data only it owns, but which it has yet to fully leverage. For decades, the collective knowledge of diplomats across the globe has been transcribed, shared, and stored in cables. U.S. diplomats have documented everything from the department’s grand strategy to individual meetings with foreign officials. This corpus of cables constitutes America’s diplomatic equivalent of a “knowledge graph,” but unlike those that drive the functionality behind Facebook and Google, it has never been fully utilized to help diplomats do their jobs. Much foreign policy analysis today involves manually traversing this knowledge graph by consuming hundreds of cables a week, yielding a policy process overly reliant on anecdote and predictably subject to human cognitive biases toward action, “credibility” preservation, and parochial conceptions of national interests. AI-powered capabilities such as enhanced search, natural language processing, and natural language generation can augment this type of work to help diplomats quickly make connections they would otherwise not have discovered, such as by detecting patterns of state behavior, analyzing past interactions with foreign leaders, and evaluating alternative courses of action.

This is not to say that AI is a magic bullet in the craft of foreign policymaking. Pattern recognition algorithms, for instance, can break down in the face of truly unprecedented events. States’ behavior often results from the aggregation of thousands of individual decisions made by idiosyncratic individuals in diverse settings, yielding wide error bars in human- and machine-generated forecasts alike. Last but not least, effective predictive engines depend on vast troves of high-quality training data that require upfront investment to parse, clean, and validate, challenges even the Defense Department — with its vast resources — has handled far from perfectly.

Yet on the whole, advanced analytics can significantly augment, not automate, traditional diplomatic tradecraft, putting the State Department in a position to make first-in-class contributions to the interagency policy process and allow its workforce to focus on higher-value tasks. To consider a relatively low-tech example, if annual publications like the Trafficking in Persons Report looked less like 300-page narrative PDFs and more like the Johns Hopkins University COVID-19 Dashboard, State Department analysts could spend more time explaining why trends and events happened rather than simply describing what took place. Beyond tech upgrades, though, retooling the State Department’s hiring, training, and education practices to augment diplomatic expertise with the insights of AI can multiply the value the department brings to foreign policymaking.

Pathways to Change

Unfortunately, the State Department’s current structure is not optimized for its potential to lead on AI as a top-tier policy priority and transformative way of working. As Jared Cohen and Richard Fontaine recently noted, advanced technology “is not simply a niche functional issue buried in a crowded foreign policy agenda; it is a central element of modern geopolitical competition.” Indeed, reorienting the State Department and its people for great-power competition in the realm of frontier technologies is a central thrust of the second quarter report from the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, yet has received relatively little attention. Across the Foreign Service — traditionally generalist diplomats who rotate between overseas and Washington assignments — and Civil Service — typically Washington-based officials with relatively specialized training and longer assignments — reforms to mainstream AI, advanced analytics, and frontier-technology fluency are ambitious yet achievable.

First, the State Department should accelerate structural changes that elevate the importance of AI and related frontier-technology issues across security, economic, and human rights siloes. Currently, cyber policy (broadly defined) is handled by a special coordinator for cyber issues in the Office of the Secretary of State. Last June, the department proposed a new Bureau for Cybersecurity and Emerging Technologies. However, progress in creating this new bureau has stalled, with House Democrats placing a hold on its approval and the Government Accountability Office noting faulting State for not including key interagency stakeholders in its design. Getting a Bureau for Cybersecurity and Emerging Technologies properly established as a permanent home for diplomacy on advanced technological issues is a start, but the new bureau will be housed under the undersecretary for arms control and international security, potentially sidelining the economic and human rights aspects of AI. Today, for example, cybersecurity issues are handled by the coordinator for cyber issues, while “critical communications infrastructure” issues are overseen by the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, bifurcating interlocking topics along bureaucratic lines.

No bureaucratic structure is perfect, but to remedy this, the State Department should create a permanent office for digital human rights in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and promote frequent staff-level coordination across units like the Bureau for Cybersecurity and Emerging Technologies and its economic and human rights peers. Beyond a single focal point, though, the State Department should integrate or mainstream AI and frontier-technology diplomacy throughout its work. Recent proposals to do so include creating a “science cone” in the Foreign Service, or having dedicated technology policy officers in each major regional and functional bureau.

Beyond structuring the State Department to lead on AI as a policy area, training and professional education reforms can better prepare the diplomatic workforce to reap the benefit of AI as an analytic skill. Ultimately, the State Department’s most important asset is its people, and this workforce should see the use of advanced analytics as a benefit and not a hindrance. When incorporating new technologies into the work of the State Department, senior officials should be hyperfocused on empowering America’s world-class professional diplomats, thereby saving time, delivering novel insights, and serving as a foreign policy force multiplier. Simultaneously, foreign service officers need to be afforded training opportunities to understand the value of such tools to their day-to-day activities and be incentivized professionally to gain new skills that allow them to leverage technologies to make better decisions. Much as nuclear physicists were deeply embedded in America’s Iran deal negotiating team to integrate the finer points of scientific specialty with diplomatic expertise, 21st-century U.S. diplomats will need at least “conversational analytics” to integrate the data-scientific and geopolitical issues at the core of strategic competition between liberal democracy and surveillance authoritarianism.

Historically, this type of specialization cuts against the cultural grain at the State Department, which prides itself on adaptable generalism and learning on the job, particularly in the Foreign Service. Yet as several recent reports on the future of diplomacy have noted, “breaking away from ‘born, not made’” will be critical to equipping diplomats for effective interagency leadership on transnational issues of growing importance, and, as I’ve argued in the Foreign Service Journal, is more in keeping with a history of diplomatic professionalization than is typically assumed. AI and other growing specialist demands can help push the department to better incorporate professional education into diplomats’ career trajectory, meeting the moment by investing in its core asset: its people.

No such transformation is possible without congressional resourcing and executive sponsorship in the State Department. With some changes and investments, the State Department is well positioned to promulgate a democratic digital agenda that is aligned with American values, and to use investments in AI to transform its diplomatic and foreign policymaking functions. When discussing AI and innovation in government, it is common to fetishize technology and insist on its centrality to transformation. However, technological innovations should come with accompanying culture change, and leaders across the department should define and communicate the value of these innovations to the mission of diplomacy.

Skepticism towards technology is as old as the diplomatic profession itself: Upon receiving his first telegraph message in the 1860s, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, for example, exclaimed, “My God, this is the end of diplomacy!” Yet when used properly, AI can empower (rather than replace) career diplomacy like never before, putting civilian foreign policymakers back into the driver’s seat at home and overseas through leadership on a major “gray rhino” security threat and improved decision-making.

### Solvency – Biotech

#### DoS solves biotech cooperation – already has the lead role and expertise

--T Family = DoS Bureau of Arms Control Verification and Compliance, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Jenkins 22 Ambassador Bonnie Denise Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State, “Challenges to International Security,” 5-26-2022, <https://www.state.gov/priorities-regarding-the-new-and-emerging-challenges-to-international-security/> /GoGreen!

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#### DoS lead is key to biosafety, surveillance, research, and regulation

Mahmoud 9 Adel A. F. Mahmoud, Princeton University, Chair of the Committee on Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons in States Beyond the Former Soviet Union, National Research Council; David A. Ashford, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Sao Paulo, Brazil; Gail H. Cassell, Eli Lilly and Company; Claire Cornelius, U.S. Army Veterinary Corps; Timothy Endy, State University of New York, Upstate Medical University; Harvey Rubin, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine; Richard L. Witter, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service (retired); members of the Committee on Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons in States Beyond the Former Soviet Union, National Research Council; “Countering Biological Threats: Challenges for the Department of Defense's Nonproliferation Program Beyond the Former Soviet Union,” National Academies Press, 2009, pp.93-94, DOI [10.17226/12596](https://doi.org/10.17226/12596), <https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/12596/countering-biological-threats-challenges-for-the-department-of-defenses-nonproliferation> /GoGreen!

Department of State

The biological nonproliferation activities of the Department of State are of special importance for two reasons. First, the department has the most extensive activities of any organization worldwide designed explicitly to address biosecurity threats in developing countries outside the FSU. It has pioneered working with developing countries in this field and has significant budgetary resources to this end, with about $25 million focused on developing countries outside the FSU during FY 2008 and a comparable amount set aside for FY 2009. Second, the department has a lead role in the interagency process in Washington, which is designed to coordinate government-wide approaches to biosecurity in the developing countries. This responsibility is also discussed in Chapter 5. Thus, it has both experience and a mandate that are of considerable importance as BTRP begins to expand into developing countries beyond the FSU.

Geographically, engagement efforts are focused on areas where the department considers that there is the greatest biological risk, with substantial efforts under way in South and Southeast Asia, particularly Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, as well as in the Middle East. These regions will probably continue to be of high priority in FY 2009. The program is expanding regionally to cover areas in Africa and Latin America, as well as continuing efforts in Eurasia. The department has established field offices in Manila, Jakarta, and Islamabad, with a regional training hub planned for Thailand.

Global assistance is directed in the following areas:

• Strengthening laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, including best practices, standard operating procedures, personnel reliability programs, and enhanced physical security measures

• Ensuring safe, secure, and sustainable laboratory buildings, education, planning, management, and operations

• Enhancing molecular diagnostics and disease surveillance networks

• Fostering collaborative research projects in priority areas to engage scientists and promote sustainable implementation

• Advancing host-nation commitments to the International Health Regulations (IHR), particularly as they pertain to best practices, laboratory capacity development, and areas surrounding laboratory biosafety and biosecurity

• Promoting global cooperation on biosecurity standards, regulations, and legislation

## Competition

### AT: Perm – Do CP

#### Perm: do counterplan – is severance – BOTH textually and functionally:

#### “Security cooperation” must be DoD – “assistance” is DoS – that’s Gwinn

#### The core meaning differentiates based on oversight authority, NOT content or administration – means counterplan’s “assistance” CAN include DoD involvement BUT “cooperation” CANNOT include DoS control

White 14 Taylor P. White, Major, USMC, Joint Doctrine Development Officer with the Joint Staff J7, “Security Cooperation: How It All Fits,” Joint Force Quarterly 72, 1-1-2014, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-72/Article/577493/security-cooperation-how-it-all-fits/> /GoGreen!

Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities support or are combined with other assistance programs and often are a part of nation assistance. This often occurs in a manner that may appear confusing or convoluted to the joint warfighter. This article portrays how the programs and activities converge. Although the various terms and activities in show in the accompanying figure appear to have simple names and meanings, they in fact have strict definitions based on funding and authorities. While some of the activities directly support one another, others have distinct boundaries between their definitions and functions. The joint community is beginning to address the framework of security cooperation in a new joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (JP) 3-XX, Security Cooperation. It is important to embark with clear definitions and understanding of the complex relationship among these terms to facilitate understanding by the joint force.

Security cooperation is referred to in both joint professional military education programs and joint staffs as a tool to be employed by combatant commands. However, in other settings, it is a set of programs managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Extensive review of joint doctrine and policy reveals that the definition of security cooperation appears to encompass these areas and more. After expanding our understanding of security cooperation, other terms such as security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security assistance provide additional specificity for the tasks being conducted, yet some of these actions fall outside security cooperation. Even though security cooperation spans the range of military operations and is inclusive of large-scale operations conducted in support of foreign nations, it is not all-encompassing of security related support from U.S. agencies other than DOD.

Nation assistance is support rendered by foreign forces within another nation’s territory based on mutual agreements.1 While this term is used to describe the comprehensive approach to assisting other nations, the definition associated with nation assistance has two limitations: it does not encompass support to regional organizations, and it is only assistance by foreign forces. A better, broader term is foreign assistance, which is assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters.2 When examining the current definitions for foreign assistance and nation assistance, we find significant overlap:

Foreign assistance to foreign nations [ranges] from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. U.S. foreign assistance takes three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.3

This term is likely to resonate with the State Department, which has an Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance and a designated foreign assistance budget.

Nation assistance—assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.4

The term nation assistance is not often used in policy or strategy. For example, the current National Security Strategy mentions foreign assistance three times but does not use the term nation assistance. The first opportunity to create some clarity is to replace the term nation assistance with foreign assistance in the upcoming revisions of JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

If foreign assistance were to replace nation assistance in joint doctrine, the definition would include that portion of security cooperation that falls outside the realm of nation assistance in figure 1. Foreign assistance then encompasses all of security cooperation and reduces some of the ambiguity. Security cooperation then focuses strictly on the DOD contribution to foreign assistance and encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build both national and regional defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.5

Having addressed the larger constructs, it is possible to review and clarify the relationships between other programs and activities that occur within them. First is security assistance with a specific definition in relation to both DOD and State. It refers to a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. These programs are funded and authorized by State to be administered by DOD through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.6 This is the process by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services. That portion of security assistance outside of security cooperation in figure 1 reflects State and other civilian agency involvement.

#### Even if that’s not in the plan text, perms can be extra-topical but NOT non-topical

#### That’s best for debate:

#### 1 – predictable ground – the breadth of SC content is unpredictably broad, criticism is rarely mission-specific, and NATO bad and tech bad lose to thumpers without counterplans that the topic makes permable! – DoD authority is the only predictable definitional element

Mazarr 22 Michael J. Mazarr, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, former professor and associate dean of academics at the U.S. National War College, former special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior defense aide on Capitol Hill, PhD public policy, University of Maryland, MA security studies, Georgetown University; with Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Jonah Blank, Samuel Charap, Michael S. Chase, Beth Grill, Derek Grossman, Dara Massicot, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lyle J. Morris, Alexander Noyes, Stephanie Pezard, Ashley L. Rhoades, Alice Shih, Mark Stalczynski, Melissa Shotak, David E. Thaler, and Dori Walker, all at the RAND Corporation; “Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition,” RRA650-1, RAND Corporation, 2022, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RRA600/RRA650-1/RAND\_RRA650-1.pdf /GoGreen!

Definitions and Scope

To pursue this analysis, we first had to define the bounds of what we would assess. Official U.S. government definitions of security cooperation are very broad. One definition from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency states that security cooperation

comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.3

Such definitions clearly include almost any security-related activity for any purpose. To scope the focus of the study, we reviewed official state documents and strategies and the literature on security cooperation to identify 11 types of activities:

1. military aid, which includes funding through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, the Excess Defense Articles program, and other grants and loans

2. arms sales and transfers,4 such as U.S. arms sales through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs

3. military capacity-building, such as U.S. activities under Section 1206 of the annual National Defense Authorization Act and Sections and 2282 and 333 of U.S. Code, Title 10 (the train and equip authority)

4. education and training, including international military education and training (IMET), professional military education (PME), and regional centers

5. personnel exchanges, such as U.S. activities under the Military Personnel Exchange Program and the State Partnership Program

6. military exercises, both bilateral and multilateral and those that involve foreign partners

7. access-related agreements, such as status of forces agreements (SOFAs) and agreements related to base access and information-sharing

8. armament-related agreements, such as those for co-development of systems and for research, development, test, and evaluation activities

9. sustainment of donor-nation equipment by the donor, the partner, or third parties

10. institutional capacity–building to strengthen the partner institutions that support security services

11. humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), which offers support for efforts to relieve suffering.

These categories offered a consistent template for gathering data across our various study components. A major challenge was that reliable and consistent data on each of the 11 categories were not available for all the competitors—not even for the United States. Especially at the unclassified level, there is simply no comprehensive roster of security cooperation activities by the United States, and neither China nor Russia publishes inclusive data sets of its programs. An additional challenge was that, in some cases, the different countries define the categories somewhat differently, so we could not develop data on entirely comparable sets of security cooperation activities.

#### 2 – functional limits – blurring the authority-based brightline between assistance and cooperation makes agent-dependent generics like trade-offs and politics impossible – it’s better for both sides to make the AFF cut ONE DoD key warrant than making any agency, privatization and delegation all topical

Epstein 18 Susan B. Epstein, Coordinator, Specialist in Foreign Policy, Congressional Research Service; and Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics, Congressional Research Service; “U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends,” CRS Report for Congress, R45091, 2-1-2018, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R45091.pdf> /GoGreen!

Interagency Terminology

Discussion of military and related assistance to foreign countries is sometimes hindered by a lack of a standard terminology.9 The following terms are frequently used to describe assistance to foreign governments, security services, and militaries:

* Security Assistance (Title 22). Although not defined in Title 22 of U.S. Code, the term security assistance is commonly used to refer to the six budget accounts for which the State Department requests international security assistance appropriations and whose underlying authorities reside in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195) and Arms Export Control Act in 1976 (AECA, P.L. 90-629), as amended.10

**[FOOTNOTE 10]**

10 Security assistance is also used as a generic term used throughout the U.S. government to describe assistance provided to foreign military and security forces, regardless of the agency providing that assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ) identifies six budget accounts under the heading “International Security Assistance,” which are commonly referred to as the State Department’s security assistance portfolio.

DOD also uses the term security assistance to refer specifically to a group of State Department programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961(FAA) and Arms Export Control Act (AECA), funded by State Department appropriations and managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), an agency under the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD)(P).

**[/FOOTNOTE 10]**

* Security Cooperation (Title 10). DOD uses the term security cooperation to refer to activities authorized by provisions in Title 10 and National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs). The FY2017 NDAA defines security cooperation as “any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows:
* To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
* To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation.
* To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests.”11
* Security Sector Assistance. In April 2013, the Obama Administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 23 (PPD-23). The directive called for an overhaul of U.S. security sector assistance policy and for the creation of a new interagency framework for planning, implementing, assessing, and overseeing security sector assistance. The term security sector assistance refers to all State Department security assistance programs and virtually all DOD security cooperation programs, exercises, and engagements, as well as related activities of the USAID, DOJ, and other agencies.12

### AT: Perm – Do CP – AT: SC includes DoD Implementation of DoS SA

#### It’s most precise – DoS-funded but DoD-administered is “hybrid security assistance/cooperation” – legally distinguished from “security cooperation,” for which DoD does everything – prefer Congressional definitions, because each agency defines everything differently

Quinn 19 Major Jason A. Quinn, Judge Advocate, United States Army, assigned as Assistant General Counsel, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, LLM Judge Advocate General’s School, JD George Mason University School of Law, “Other Security Forces Too: Traditional Combatant Commander Activities Between U.S. Special Operations Forces and Foreign Non-Military Forces,” Military Law Review, 225(4), 2019, <https://tjaglcs.army.mil/other-security-forces-too-traditional-combatant-commander-activities-between-u.s.-special-operations-forces-and-foreign-non-military-forces> /GoGreen!

A. “Security Sector Assistance” as an Umbrella Term

The foundational and initial task of defining “security sector assistance” and the related terms “security assistance” and “security cooperation” is not simple, with different branches and agencies of the U.S. government defining and applying the terms differently. This can make it difficult to coherently discuss the respective responsibilities of the various executive agencies or identify where TCA ends and statutory authorities begin.

As a starting point, presidential policy, defined “security sector assistance” as any U.S. Government “policy, program, [or] activity” used to:

Engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector;

Help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; [or],

Enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges. 129

Under this definition, “security sector assistance” includes the relevant policies, programs, or activities of any executive agency. Complicating matters, though, Congress has considered a proposed definition for “security sector assistance” that, in contrast to the presidential policy definition, 130 encompasses DoS programs, but not DoD or other executive agency programs. 131 In addition, Congress has defined “security cooperation” as DoD specific, 132 but it has not defined “security assistance.”

The DoD adheres to the presidential policy definition and further defines “security cooperation” as all its relationship building and foreign partner development activities, including “security assistance,” which the DoD defines as a subset of security cooperation that is funded and authorized by the DoS and administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 133 The DoS, on the other hand, uses the term “security assistance” in a manner that contradicts the DoD’s definition, employing it to describe any DoS or DoD assistance to foreign military or other security forces. 134

To synthesize these definitions, and consistent with presidential policy, this article uses the term “security sector assistance” to mean: (1) DoS approved, funded, and administered “security assistance;” (2) DoD approved, funded, and administered “security cooperation;” and (3) hybrid security assistance/cooperation, approved and funded by the DoS, but administered by the DoD. 135

#### Worst-case, their definition only redefines the counterplan text to mean it is NOT administered by DoD, BUT still competes

Kerr 18 Alexandra Kerr, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” Connections, 17(3), Summer-Fall 2018, pp.23-38, JSTOR /GoGreen!

Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance).

DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.21 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.22 Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

#### Do NOT regard DoD’s definitions as precise – they do NOT reflect how practitioners – even those within DoD itself! – use the term

Lenze 17 Major Anthony V. Lenze, Judge Advocate, United States Army, assigned as Associate Professor, Contract and Fiscal Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, LLM Contract and Fiscal Law Specialty, JD University of Dayton School of Law, “Traditional Combatant Commander Activities: Acknowledging And Analyzing Combatant Commanders' Authority To Interact With Foreign Militaries,” Military Law Review, 225(3), 2017, <https://tjaglcspublic.army.mil/traditional-combatant-commander-activities> /GoGreen!

C. Evolving Terminology for Peacetime Engagements

Military operations of any scale require precise language to communicate information efficiently.[82] Common sense dictates that terms and concepts applicable to a joint environment are standard and well-known between the services in order to foster efficient communication. Confusion and general misunderstandings result when military terms are used improperly or when their evolving definitions outpace doctrine. The DoD recognizes the importance of standardizing its terminology by instructing the military departments to identify, delete, modify, and incorporate standard definitions.[83] Nonetheless, the misuse and misunderstanding of key terms within security cooperation is pervasive.[84]

Security cooperation is now a term that encompasses “any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the [DoD] with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a [strategic] purpose . . . [.]”[85] The DoD assigns such strategic importance to security cooperation that, with the help of Congress, it created the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to direct and guide the execution of all DoD security cooperation programs.[86] The DSCA helps administer security cooperation, now a multi-billion dollar industry within the annual Defense appropriation.[87] With all the money and strategic brainpower pouring into security cooperation, newcomers to the field may presume fully-vetted, standardized terms and definitions. However, this could not be further from reality.

Members of the DoD frequently mischaracterize security cooperation or outright disagree with respect to its doctrinal definition.[88] For example, the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) used the term security cooperation to include rebuilding damaged infrastructure and establishing conditions necessary to end military operations in Afghanistan.[89] With the exception of combat operations, it would seem that almost any military action could fit under the 2010 NSS’s version of security cooperation.[90] Nevertheless, if security cooperation is in fact an evolving term in the DoD, making sense of the authorities under which the military executes security cooperation events is even more troublesome.[91] This is especially true when authorities are based upon a set of specific terms. Hence, with doctrine lagging behind and accompanied by undefined terminology, no authority in the realm of security cooperation is more ambiguous than the authority for military-to-military contacts.[92] With ambiguity surrounding military-to-military contacts, planners and lawyers should defer to commanders to decide the best way to employ these strategic interaction events. The fate of 10 U.S.C. §168 and its ultimate repeal is illustrative of this point.

#### In the context of a topic that does NOT enumerate specific agents and activities (only vague mission fields), our limits and ground claims outweigh

Zaccor 5 Colonel Albert Zaccor, Director for Southern Europe in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy – NATO/Europe, U.S. Army Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, MA area studies, University of Michigan, BA political science, Hofstra University, “Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy,” Atlantic Council, Occasional Paper, August 2005, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-State_Threats.pdf> /GoGreen!

It is an oft-repeated mantra that in order to defeat transnational terrorism, and by extension other related non-state threats, the United States must apply all the elements of national power, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.34 The OSD SCG directs that DOD Security Cooperation “will be integrated with other elements of national power…in order to achieve national security, defense, and foreign policy objectives.”35 This formulation, while helpful, obscures two key facts. First, Security Cooperation includes activities that by their very nature involve the simultaneous application of more than one element of national power. Security Cooperation at a minimum requires the combination of diplomatic relations, military assistance, military-to-military contacts, and public diplomacy. In other words, Security Cooperation is itself an application of at least three of the classic elements of national power.36 Second, DOD is not the only entity in the USG that interacts with foreign governments to achieve the stated objectives: relationships, capabilities, information and intelligence, and access. The Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and to a lesser extent, other departments and agencies, conduct activities aimed at the accomplishment of these objectives, broadly understood. There is, however, no common USG, or interagency, definition or concept of Security Cooperation.37 We will return to this issue in the final section of this paper. For the purposes of the present discussion, this paper offers the following working definition of Security Cooperation:

Security Cooperation refers to all USG assistance provided to foreign law enforcement, security, and defense establishments in support of national defense, security, and foreign policy objectives.38

**[FOOTNOTE 38]**

38 The application of the Security Cooperation paradigm to the entire USG requires a precise definition of security. Defined too broadly, Security Cooperation would simply be a surrogate for foreign policy. Limiting the objectives to specific enumerated defense and security objectives and assistance to foreign establishments playing a role in national security or defense is necessary to circumscribe the issue adequately.

### AT: Perm – Do Both

#### Perm: do both – still overstretches DoD SC planners – including the plan as DoD SC, authorized under Title 10, means it’s funded from the defense budget and planned by DoD’s SC planners – unlike the counterplan alone, which is planned by embassy staff, even if implemented by DSCA

#### Independent turf wars DA – duplicate programming by BOTH departments separately provokes interagency fights

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

Contributes to an inefficient bureaucracy and coordination nightmare

Because of the patchwork of existing authorities to provide security assistance, there are multiple systems for U.S. officials in Washington and on the ground in embassies to manage. For the security assistance system to work effectively, U.S. officials at the State Department, the Pentagon, and in the field need to closely coordinate—but this does not always happen in the current structure. Military officers conducting and implementing security assistance have to juggle multiple security assistance programs with different types of reporting requirements, human rights vetting standards, and administrative barriers, while also being beholden to two chains of command—the ambassador and the combatant command—with sometimes divergent perspectives.

Many programs are supposed to be dual key and require signoff from both the secretary of defense and secretary of state. But because the DOD owns the authority, their control over the direction of the program exceeds the State Department’s capacity and available political influence to shape programs. A Congressional Research Service report found that in practice, “many more projects are submitted by the Combatant Commands than by embassy staff.”78 The resource imbalance between the DOD and the State Department also affects coordination; for example, State Department officials usually only see planned Section 333 activities when the DOD transmits a hefty tranche of proposals for a 14-day concurrence—hardly a joint planning process.79 This leaves the State Department in a position where, if it cannot persuade the DOD of the merits of any particular concerns, it must either sign off on the package or risk an interagency battle over one minor piece of it. Doing the latter not only puts the State Department in a very tough bureaucratic position vis-a-vis the DOD, but it can also be hard to convince a secretary of state that the objection is worth the battle with their DOD counterpart. This suggests that DOD programs, even if dual key, are likely to reflect military considerations and priorities, regardless of intentions.

### AT: Perm – Do Both – No Add-On DA

#### Turns case

Lugar 6 Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator (R-IN), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” Senate Prints 109-52, report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 12-15-2006, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT31324/html/CPRT-109SPRT31324.htm> /GoGreen!

Overview

Protecting Americans from terrorist attacks within the United States depends, to a great extent, on U.S. success overseas. The task is vast and worldwide. It requires enlisting host country police to track and capture terrorists, uncovering terrorist financing, sharing intelligence with foreign partners, strengthening border surveillance in remote and unpopulated regions and building partnerships with foreign militaries. In the longer run, it requires convincing entire societies to reject terrorist propaganda and recruitment. A successful counterterrorism policy depends on strong relationships with foreign governments and the people residing in countries on every continent.

Embassies are on the frontline in the overseas campaign against terror and demands on ambassadors, staffs, and physical facilities have increased exponentially. Since September 11, 2001, embassies have hosted a continuing influx of inter-agency personnel tasked with the full range of counterterrorism activities.

Under the direction of Chairman Richard G. Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff visited selected embassies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as the headquarters of four combatant commands, to focus specifically on the civilian/military nexus. He asked staff to assess whether the State and Defense Departments are working together overseas in a way that contributes to overarching U.S. foreign policy goals in the individual countries and in the regions.

FINDINGS

1. The number of military personnel and Defense Department activities in non-combat countries is increasing significantly. Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.

2. While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual terrorists and their support networks is an imperative in the war against terror, it is repairing and building alliances, pursuing resolutions to regional conflicts, fostering democracy and development, and defusing religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the terrorist threat in the long-term. It has traditionally been the military's mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies' mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense's focus on war fighting.

3. The increases of funding streams, self-assigned missions, and realigned authorities for the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders are placing new stresses on inter-agency coordination in the field. Currently, overlapping missions and inter-agency frictions are, for the most part, refereed by the U.S. ambassador and other State Department leadership in the embassy with intermittent referral to headquarters for guidance. But, as the role of the military expands, particularly in the area of foreign assistance, embassy officials in some countries question whether the Department of Defense will chafe under the constraints of State Department leadership and work for still more authority and funding.

4. There is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America's profile overseas. Some foreign officials question what appears to them as a new emphasis by the United States on military approaches to problems that are not seen as lending themselves to military solutions. Host country militaries clearly welcome increased professional contact and interaction with the U.S. military. However, some host countries have elements in both government and general society who are highly suspicious of potential American coercion. There is no sense so far that foreign hosts believe the U.S. military is dominating U.S. policy in-country, but if such a perception were to gain hold, it would give ammunition to U.S. adversaries. More importantly, it would weaken the bilateral relationships that are necessary to win the war against terror. Likewise, one misstep or poorly calculated military or other operation can significantly set back the full range of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in an entire region.

### AT: Perm – Do Both – Terror DA

#### Turns case – AND, perception alone collapses counterterrorism

Lugar 6 Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator (R-IN), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” Senate Prints 109-52, report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 12-15-2006, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT31324/html/CPRT-109SPRT31324.htm> /GoGreen!

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#### Extinction

Hayes 18 Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, PhD energy and resources, University of California, Berkley, "Non-State Terrorism And Inadvertent Nuclear War," Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 1-18-2018, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/> /GoGreen!

Catalytic nuclear attack Catalytic nuclear attack is a metaphor for the possible malevolent third party who sets out to induce a nuclear war between two other nuclear weapons states. It is based on a metaphor drawn from chemistry whereby a catalyst increases the rate of chemical reaction without catalyst itself being destroyed. Tiny amounts of a catalyst often suffice to bring about such a transformative effect. Such a “catalytic” nuclear attack between nuclear weapons states was a serious policy concern in the nineteen-fifties in the United States where strategists were seized of the notion that a “small” nuclear weapons state (for which read “China”) could start a nuclear war between the United States and the former Soviet Union (FSU). As articulated by the ubiquitous Herman Kahn, the concern was that the small “catalytic” state instigating the conflict would be the least damaged at the end of a nuclear war, and could increase its relative power by starting a war between other nuclear armed states that resulted in their catastrophic destruction. In his classic essay outlining this argument, Donald Kobe derived what he termed to be suspicion, retaliation, destruction, catalytic war utility, and casualty matrices for each country that defined outcomes for each state in a “catalytic nuclear war.”[2] As China began to test its own nuclear weapons and the United States and the FSU began to anticipate its deployment in the sixties, the ability of the two nuclear superpowers, even at this relatively early stage in their rapidly growing nuclear forces, to overwhelmingly retaliate and damage the catalytic state soon allayed this concern. Nonetheless, the concept motivated these two nuclear armed states to strive for nuclear non-proliferation, in part driven by their mutual fear of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism should nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology and materials become freely available—a concern that persisted over the subsequent decades.[3] Is catalytic nuclear terrorism still a serious policy concern? Today, the notion of “catalytic” nuclear war seems archaic in certain respects, and reflected a dismissive view at the time in the United States of the rationality of a state leadership armed with nuclear weapons and facing an overwhelming external adversary—in the case of China, not just one, but soon to be two external nuclear enemies that targeted its cities and nuclear forces. As China’s minimum deterrent posture evolved, and as its nuclear threat rhetoric subsided with the end of the Cultural Revolution, so the fear of catalytic nuclear war also receded. However, the fear of a catalytic nuclear war returned with a vengeance at the end of the Cold War when multiple states found themselves nuclear-armed almost overnight due to the collapse of the former Soviet Union, or proliferated independent nuclear forces in rapid succession in South Asia and in slow motion, North Korea. In the United States and Russia, formal and informal discussion of the importance of avoiding war and nuclear war due to third party nuclear attack, by state or non-state actors, took place in diplomatic, military, and private channels, driven in part by the risk of nuclear “mega-terrorism” as the efforts of various insurgencies and global terrorist networks to acquire and use nuclear weapons came to light. The continued salience of the concept of catalytic nuclear war rests on three nested arguments. The first is that inadvertent nuclear war is possible, that is, the probability is greater than zero albeit unknowable. Multiple “threshold” events that could trigger inadvertent nuclear war are conceivable. In some unknowable combination, such drivers contribute to a probability greater than zero that nuclear war between states will occur, variously estimated at 0.1-1 percent year by strategic analysts—although there is no objective basis for such estimates, simply subjective estimates buttressed by the perception that specific near-nuclear wars punctuated the Cold War and post-Cold War decades, at which time the probability was perceived to be much higher for months at a time. The second is that of all the drivers of inadvertent war, state-supported and non-state nuclear terrorism may be the least “directly controllable” by nuclear weapons states. Moreover, such nuclear terrorist attacks may coincide in the future with the influence of other drivers that could trigger rapid escalation to nuclear first use in conditions of complex nuclear confrontation involving two or more nuclear weapons states. Thus, the non-state terrorist driver of nuclear war may render “normal” positive and negative controls on nuclear use far less stabilizing than in the past when states were the sole concern in nuclear confrontations, depending on how a terrorist nuclear attack might affect the various contributing pathways to inadvertent nuclear war (listed in the next section). The third is that such nuclear terrorist attacks may take many forms, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1: Types of Nuclear Terrorism from Least to Most Damaging • Credible Threats of Nuclear Terrorism • Hostage Taking • Steal, Smuggle, Acquire Radioactive Material for Dirty Bomb • Steal, Smuggle, Acquire Footloose Fissile Material • Attack Reactors • Attack Spent Fuel • Simultaneous Cyber Attacks Disable Critical Infrastructure Leading to Mass Casualties or to Enable Nuclear Terrorism • Acquire Nuclear Weapon; Detonate Nuclear Weapon Notes to Figure 1: a credible threat not accompanied by one or more actions to realize the threat is the least damage act of terrorism, and rests on the perception of those threatened as to the perpetrator’s intention and capability. Many nuclear terrorism threats are made. Relatively few are credible. The types below “mere” threats are characterized by actions which may (or may not) have been preceded by credible threats. “Footloose” here is shorthand for loss of control of legitimate and authorized control entity, public or private, that is subject to diversion and seizure by a non-state entity. Cyber attacks may be part of the types of nuclear terrorism because a competent terrorist entity will employ cyberattacks as part of a nuclear terrorist attack. However, a cyber attack that disables critical infrastructure at the same time as another type of direct nuclear terrorist attack is conducted would be highly damaging and if it results of itself in mass casualties, may enable and amplify the consequences of dirty bomb or an actual nuclear detonation. In this sense, a cyber attack may be a cyber-multiplier for other types of nuclear terrorism. Of course, a cyber attack aimed at mass casualties and terrorist effects may be undertaken without any form of nuclear terrorism associated with it. Finally, acquisition of radioactive materials or fissile material may occur via theft, purchase, or self-manufacture (the least likely and most difficult of the three acquisition pathways). Some may argue that radiological weapons (dirty bombs) are not nuclear at all in that they do not involve criticality at all, just the radioactive properties of the materials, and may be relatively crude and low technology. However, some nuclear weapons aim to achieve precisely such radiological effects on varying scales and long-term radiological effects, rather than blast and other direct irradiation of targeted humans. Dirty bombs and nuclear bombs exist on a spectrum and where competent, malevolent, and motivated non-state actors might position themselves on that spectrum remains an open question. \*\*\* These many types of terrorist nuclear attack present states with starkly different potential damage, greater possible ambiguity or even opacity in terms of precursor indicators as well as identity of the perpetrator. Any of these types of attack may affect nuclear-armed states in unpredictable ways with respect to their own nuclear use decisions at times when inter-state conflict may be more or less likely. These various types of attack by non-state actors reduce into three basic categories of threat and use, as follows: Credible threat of either nuclear detonation or radiological attack with possible massive damages Actual or sub-critical nuclear detonation Actual spent fuel or reactor attack with substantial radiological release. In turn, such categories of terrorist attack might be realized in or against one or more types of targeted state, viz, a nuclear armed state, a nuclear umbrella state that receives nuclear extended deterrence from a nuclear armed state, or a non-nuclear weapons state which may or may not have nuclear fuel cycle facilities in and/or fissile material stored on its territory. (Thus, the target may or may not be a state, a state agency, or a state facility—it might be a civilian target such as a company or a religious entity; but in this paper, all terrorist nuclear attacks are assumed to take place only in places controlled by functioning states). Nuclear terrorism post-cold war: trigger for inadvertent nuclear war? The possible catalytic effect of nuclear terrorism on the risk of state-based nuclear war is not a simple linkage. The multiple types and scales of nuclear terrorism may affect state-nuclear use decisions along multiple pathways that lead to inadvertent nuclear war. These include: Early warning systems fail or are “tripped” in ways that lead to launch-on-warning Accidental nuclear detonation, including sub-critical explosions. Strategic miscalculation in crisis, show of force Decision-making failure (such as irrational, misperception, bias, degraded, group, and time-compressed decision-making) Allied or enemy choices (to seek revenge, to exploit nuclear risk, to act out of desperation) Organizational cybernetics whereby a nuclear command-control-and communications (NC3) system generates error, including the interplay of national NC3 systems in what may be termed the meta-NC3 system. Synchronous and coincident combinations of above.[4] Exactly how, where, and when nuclear terrorism may “ambush” nuclear armed states already heading for or on such a path to inadvertent nuclear war depends on who is targeting whom at a given time, either immediately due to high tension, or generally due to a structural conflict between states. Nuclear armed states today form a complex set of global threat relationships that are not distributed uniformly across the face of Earth. Rather, based on sheer firepower and reach, the nine nuclear weapons states form a global hierarchy with at least four tiers, viz: Tier 1: United States, clear technological supremacy and qualitative edge. Tier 2: Russia, China, global nuclear powers and peers with the United States due to the unique destructive power of even relatively small nuclear arsenals, combined with global reach of missile and bomber delivery systems, thereby constituting a two-tiered global “nuclear triangle” with the United States. Tier 3: France, UK, NATO nuclear sharing and delivery NATO members (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and the NATO and Pacific nuclear umbrella states (Japan, South Korea, Australia) that depend on American nuclear extended deterrence and directly and indirectly support US and US-allied nuclear operations even though they do not host nor deliver nuclear weapons themselves. Tier 4: India, Pakistan, Israel, DPRK. The first two tiers constitute the global nuclear threat triangle that exists between the United States, Russia, and China, forming a global nuclear “truel.” Each of these states targets the others; each represents an existential threat to the other; and each has a long history of mutual nuclear threat that is now a core element of their strategic identity. Tier three consists of states with their own nuclear force but integrated with that of the United States (even France!) that expand the zone of mutual nuclear threat over much of the northern and even parts of the southern hemisphere; and states that host American nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence systems that support US nuclear operations and to whom nuclear deterrence is “extended” (if, for example, Australia’s claim to having an American nuclear umbrella is believed). The fourth tier is composed of smaller nuclear forces with a primarily regional reach and focus. Between most of these nuclear armed states and across the tiers, there are few shared “rules of the road.” The more of these states that are engaged in a specific conflict and location, the more unpredictable and unstable this global nuclear threat system becomes, with the potential for cascading and concatenating effects. Indeed, as the number of nuclear states projecting nuclear threat against each other increases, the notion of strategic stability may lose all meaning. The emergence of a fifth tier—of non-state actors with the capacity to project nuclear threat against nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states (although not only these states)—is a critically important possible catalytic actor in the new conditions of nuclear threat complexity that already exist today. Such a layer represents an “edge of chaos” where the attempts by nuclear armed states to exert absolute “vertical” control over the use of nuclear weapons confront the potential of non-state entities and even individuals (insiders) to engage in “horizontal” nuclear terrorism, presenting radically different control imperatives to the standard paradigm of organizational procedures, technical measures, and safeguards of various kinds. This tier is like the waves and tides on a beach that quickly surrounds and then causes sand castles to collapse. In 2010, Robert Ayson reviewed the potential linkages between inter-state nuclear war and non-state terrorism. He concluded: “…[T]hese two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them.”[5] How this linkage might unfold is the subject of the next sections of this essay. Are non-state actors motivated and able to attempt nuclear terrorism? A diverse set of non-state actors have engaged in terrorist activities—for which there is no simple or consensual definition. In 2011, there were more than 6,900 known extremist, terrorist and other organizations associated with guerrilla warfare, political violence, protest, organized crime and cyber-crime. Of these, about 120 terrorist and extremist groups had been blacklisted by the United Nations, the European Union and six major countries.[6] Some have argued that the technical, organizational, and funding demanded for a successful nuclear attack, especially involving nuclear weapons, exceeds the capacity of most of the non-state actors with terrorist proclivities. Unfortunately, this assertion is not true, especially at lower levels of impact as shown in Figure 1; but even at the highest levels of obtaining authentic nuclear weapons capabilities, a small number of non-state actors already exhibit the motivation and possible capacity to become nuclear-armed. Ellingsen suggests a useful distinction that nuclear terrorists may be impelled by two divergent motivations, as shown in Figure 2, creating “opportunistic” and “patient” profiles.[7] The requirements for an opportunist non-state nuclear terrorist tend towards immediate use and the search for short-term payoffs with only tactical levels of commitment; whereas the patient non-state nuclear terrorist is able and willing to sustain a long-term acquisition effort to deal a strategic blow to an adversary in a manner that could be achieved only with nuclear weapons. [FIGURE 2 OMITTED] In turn, many factors will drive how a potential nuclear terrorist non-state organization that obtains nuclear weapons or materials may seek to employ them, especially in its nuclear command-and-control orientations. Blair and Ackerman suggest that the goals, conditions, and capacity limitations that shape a possible nuclear terrorist’s posture lead logically to three types of nuclear terrorist nuclear command-and-control postures, viz: pre-determined (in which the leadership sends a fire order to a nuclear-armed subordinate and no change is entertained and no capacity to effect change is established in the field, that is, the order is fire-and-forget); assertive (in which only the central command can issue a nuclear fire order, central control is maintained at all times, with resulting demanding communications systems to support such control); and delegative (in which lower level commanders control nuclear weapons and have pre-delegated authority to use them in defined circumstances, for example, evidence of nuclear explosions combined with loss-of-connectivity with their central command).[8] An example of such delegative control system was the November 26, 2008 attack on Mumbai that used social media reporting to enable the attacking terrorists to respond to distant controller direction and to adapt to counter-terrorist attacks—a connectivity tactic that the authorities were too slow to shut down before mayhem was achieved.[9] Logically, one might expect nuclear terrorists oriented toward short-term, tactical goals to employ pre-determined nuclear command-and-control strategies in the hope that the speed of attack and minimum field communications avoids discovery and interdiction before the attack is complete; whereas nuclear terrorists oriented toward long-term, strategic goals might employ more pre-delegative command-and-control systems that would support a bargaining use and therefore a field capacity to deploy nuclear weapons or materials that can calibrate actual attack based on communications with the central leadership with the risk of interdiction through surveillance and counter-attack. These differing strategic motivations, timelines, and strategies in many respects invert those of nuclear weapons states that rely on large organizations, procedures, and technical controls, to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authorization; and if they are used, to minimize needless civilian casualties (at least some nuclear armed states aspire to this outcome). The repertoire of state-based practices that presents other states with credible nuclear threat and reassures them that nuclear weapons are secure and controlled is likely to be completely mismatched with the strengths and strategies of non-state nuclear terrorists that may seek to maximize civilian terror, are not always concerned about their own survival or even that of their families and communities-of-origin, and may be willing to take extraordinary risk combined with creativity to exploit the opportunities for attack presented by nuclear weapons, umbrella, and non-nuclear states, or their private adversaries. For non-state actors to succeed at complex engineering project such as acquiring a nuclear weapons or nuclear threat capacity demands substantial effort. Gary Ackerman specifies that to have a chance of succeeding, non-state actors with nuclear weapons aspirations must be able to demonstrate that they control substantial resources, have a safe haven in which to conduct research and development, have their own or procured expertise, are able to learn from failing and have the stamina and strategic commitment to do so, and manifest long-term planning and ability to make rational choices on decadal timelines. He identified five such violent non-state actors who already conducted such engineering projects (see Figure 3), and also noted the important facilitating condition of a global network of expertize and hardware. Thus, although the skill, financial, and materiel requirements of a non-state nuclear weapons project present a high bar, they are certainly reachable. [FIGURE 3 OMITTED] Along similar lines, James Forest examined the extent to which non-state actors can pose a threat of nuclear terrorism.[10] He notes that such entities face practical constraints, including expense, the obstacles to stealing many essential elements for nuclear weapons, the risk of discovery, and the difficulties of constructing and concealing such weapons. He also recognizes the strategic constraints that work against obtaining nuclear weapons, including a cost-benefit analysis, possible de-legitimation that might follow from perceived genocidal intent or use, and the primacy of political-ideological objectives over long-term projects that might lead to the group’s elimination, the availability of cheaper and more effective alternatives that would be foregone by pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the risk of failure and/or discovery before successful acquisition and use occurs. In the past, almost all—but not all—non-state terrorist groups appeared to be restrained by a combination of high practical and strategic constraints, plus their own cost-benefit analysis of the opportunity costs of pursuing nuclear weapons. However, should some or all of these constraints diminish, a rapid non-state nuclear proliferation is possible. Although only a few non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State have exhibited such underlying stamina and organizational capacities and actually attempted to obtain nuclear weapons-related skills, hardware, and materials, the past is not prologue. An incredibly diverse set of variously motivated terrorist groups exist already, including politico-ideological, apocalyptic-millenarian, politico-religious, nationalist-separatist, ecological, and political-insurgency entities, some of which converge with criminal-military and criminal-scientist (profit based) networks; but also pyscho-pathological mass killing cults, lone wolves, and ephemeral copy-cat non-state actors. The social, economic, and deculturating conditions that generate such entities are likely to persist and even expand. In particular, rapidly growing coastal mega-cities as part of rapid global urbanization offer such actors the ability to sustain themselves as “flow gatekeepers,” possibly in alliance with global criminal networks, thereby supplanting the highland origins of many of today’s non-state violent actors with global reach.[11] Other contributing factors contributing to the supply of possible non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons include new entries such as city states in search of new security strategies, megacities creating their own transnationally active security forces, non-states with partial or complete territorial control such as Taiwan and various micro-states, failing states, provinces in dissociating, failing states that fall victim to internal chaos and the displacement effects of untrammeled globalization, and altogether failed states resulting in ungoverned spaces. To this must be added domestic terrorist entities in the advanced industrial states as they hollow out their economies due to economic globalization and restructuring, adjust to cross-border migration, and adapt to cultural and political dislocation. In short, the prognosis is for the fifth tier of non-state actors to beset the other four tiers with intense turbulence just as waves on a beach swirl around sandcastles, washing away their foundations, causing grains of sand to cascade, and eventually collapsing the whole structure. Observed non-state nuclear threats and attacks In light of the constraints faced by non-state terrorist actors in past decades, it is not surprising that the constellation of actual nuclear terrorist attacks and threats has been relatively limited during and since the end of the Cold War. As Martha Crenshaw noted in a comment on the draft of this paper: We still don’t know why terrorists (in the sense of non-state actors) have not moved into the CBRN [chemical,biological, radiological or nuclear ] domain. (Many people think biosecurity is more critical, for that matter.) Such a move would be extremely risky for the terrorist actor, even if the group possessed both capability (resources, secure space, time, patience) and motivation (willingness to expend the effort, considering opportunity costs). So far it appears that “conventional” terrorism serves their purposes well enough. Most of what we have seen is rhetoric, with some scattered and not always energetic initiatives.[12] Nonetheless, those that have occurred demonstrate unambiguously that such threats and attacks are not merely hypothetical, in spite of the limiting conditions outlined above. One survey documented eighty actual, planned attacks on nuclear facilities containing nuclear materials between 1961-2016[13] as follows: 80 attacks in 3 waves (1970s armed assaults, 1990s thefts, post-2010, breaches) High threat attacks: 32/80 attacks posed substantial, verified threat of which 44 percent involved insiders. All types of targets were found in the data set—on reactors, other nuclear facilities, military bases leading Gary Ackerman and to conclude: “Overall, empirical evidence suggests that there are sufficient cases in each of the listed categories that no type of threat can be ignored.”[14] No region was immune; no year was without such a threat or attack. Thus, there is a likely to be a coincidence of future non-state threats and attacks with inter-state nuclear-prone conflicts, as in the past, and possibly more so given the current trend in and the generative conditions for global terrorist activity that will likely pertain in the coming decades. Of these attacks, about a quarter each were ethno-nationalist, secular utopian, or unknown in motivation; and the remaining quarter were a motley mix of religious (11 percent), “other” (5 percent), personal-idiosyncratic (4 percent), single issue (2 percent) and state sponsored (1 percent) in motivation. The conclusion is unavoidable that there a non-state nuclear terrorist attack in the Northeast Asia region is possible. The following sections outline the possible situations in which nuclear terrorist attacks might be implicated as a trigger to interstate conflict, and even nuclear war. Particular attention is paid to the how nuclear command, control and communications systems may play an independent and unanticipated role in leading to inadvertent nuclear war, separate to the contributors to inadvertency normally included such as degradation of decision-making due to time and other pressures; accident; “wetware” (human failures), software or hardware failures; and misinterpretation of intended or unintended signals from an adversary. Regional pathways to interstate nuclear war At least five distinct nuclear-prone axes of conflict are evident in Northeast Asia. These are: US-DPRK conflict (including with United States, US allies Japan, South Korea and Australia; and all other UNC command allies. Many permutations possible ranging from non-violent collapse to implosion and civil war, inter-Korean war, slow humanitarian crisis. Of these implosion-civil war in the DPRK may be the most dangerous, followed closely by an altercation at the Joint Security Area at Panmunjon where US, ROK, and DPRK soldiers interact constantly. China-Taiwan conflict, whereby China may use nuclear weapons to overcome US forces operating in the West Pacific, either at sea, or based on US (Guam, Alaska) or US allied territory in the ROK, Japan, the Philippines, or Australia); or US uses nuclear weapons in response to Chinese attack on Taiwan. China-Japan conflict escalates via attacks on early warning systems, for example, underwater hydrophone systems (Ayson-Ball, 2011). China-Russia conflict, possibly in context of loss-of-control of Chinese nuclear forces in a regional conflict involving Taiwan or North Korea. Russia-US conflict, involving horizontal escalation from a head-on collision with Russian nuclear forces in Europe or the Middle East; or somehow starts at sea (mostly likely seems ASW) or over North Korea (some have cited risk of US missile defenses against North Korean attack as risking Russian immediate response). Combinations of or simultaneous eruption of the above conflicts that culminate in nuclear war are also possible. Other unanticipated nuclear-prone conflict axes (such as Russia-Japan) could also emerge with little warning. Precursors of such nuclear-laden conflicts in this region also exist that could lead states to the brink of nuclear war and demonstrate that nuclear war is all too possible between states in this region. Examples include the August 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, in which the United States deployed nuclear weapons to Taiwan, and the US Air Force has only a nuclear defense strategy in place to defend Taiwan should China have escalated its shelling campaign to an actual attack; the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when a US nuclear armed missile was nearly fired from Okinawa due to a false fire order; the March 1969 Chinese-Soviet military clash and resulting consideration of nuclear attacks by both sides; and the August 1976 poplar tree crisis at Panmunjon in Korea, when the United States moved nuclear weapons back to the DMZ and the White House issued pre-delegated orders to the US commander in Korea to attack North Korea if the tree cutting task force was attacked by North Korean forces. Loss-of-control of Nuclear Weapons As is well known, nuclear armed states must routinely—and in the midst of a crisis—ensure that their nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authority, but also ensure at the same time that they are always available for immediate use with legitimate authority. This “always-never” paradox is managed in part by a set of negative and positive controls, reliant upon procedural and technical measures, to maintain legitimate state-based command-and-control (see Figure Four). [FIGURE 4 OMITTED] In this framework, Jerry Conley has produced a taxonomy of nuclear command-and-control structures that embody varying notional national “command-and-control” orientations (also referred to as stability points or biases). Each nuclear armed state exhibits a distinct preference for technical and procedural measures to achieve negative and positive control of nuclear weapons. The way that a state constructs its control system varies depending on its size, wealth, technology, leadership, and strategic orientation, lending each state a unique use propensity affected by the information processing and transmission functions of the nuclear command-and-control system, that in part determines the use or non-use decisions made by the leaders of nuclear armed states. The resulting ideal nuclear command-and-control state structures are shown in Table 1. [TABLE 1 OMITTED] These ideal types are summarized with respect to the defining axes of control measure in Figure Five. [FIGURE 5 OMITTED] In Northeast Asia, a four-way nuclear threat system exists that has a three world-class nuclear armed states, the United States, Russia and China, interacting with a fourth tier, barely nuclear armed state, the DPRK. In this quadrilateral nuclear standoff, the DPRK’s simple NC3 system likely is an amalgam of a poorly resourced, militarized, and personalized leadership—which may lead it to oscillate between procedural and technical measures as the basis of control, with a primary emphasis on positive use control, not negative control to avoid unauthorized use. China’s large, centralized NC3 system co-mingles nuclear and conventional communications between national commanders and deployed nuclear forces and may emphasize negative more than positive use controls to ensure Party control. Russia’s highly centralized, complex NC3 system relies on legacy technology and limited economic base for modernization. It too may be more oriented towards negative controls in peacetime, but have the capacity to spring almost instantly to primary reliance on positive controls in times of crisis or tension. The US NC3 system is large, complex and based on wealth and technological prowess. It is under civilian, not military control, at least in principle and in peacetime, and is redundant, diverse, and relatively resilient. Non-state nuclear attack as trigger of inter-state nuclear war in Northeast Asia The critical issue is how a nuclear terrorist attack may “catalyze” inter-state nuclear war, especially the NC3 systems that inform and partly determine how leaders respond to nuclear threat. Current conditions in Northeast Asia suggest that multiple precursory conditions for nuclear terrorism already exist or exist in nascent form. In Japan, for example, low-level, individual, terroristic violence with nuclear materials, against nuclear facilities, is real. In all countries of the region, the risk of diversion of nuclear material is real, although the risk is likely higher due to volume and laxity of security in some countries of the region than in others. In all countries, the risk of an insider “sleeper” threat is real in security and nuclear agencies, and such insiders already operated in actual terrorist organizations. Insider corruption is also observable in nuclear fuel cycle agencies in all countries of the region. The threat of extortion to induce insider cooperation is also real in all countries. The possibility of a cult attempting to build and buy nuclear weapons is real and has already occurred in the region.[15] Cyber-terrorism against nuclear reactors is real and such attacks have already taken place in South Korea (although it remains difficult to attribute the source of the attacks with certainty). The stand-off ballistic and drone threat to nuclear weapons and fuel cycle facilities is real in the region, including from non-state actors, some of whom have already adopted and used such technology almost instantly from when it becomes accessible (for example, drones).[16] Two other broad risk factors are also present in the region. The social and political conditions for extreme ethnic and xenophobic nationalism are emerging in China, Korea, Japan, and Russia. Although there has been no risk of attack on or loss of control over nuclear weapons since their removal from Japan in 1972 and from South Korea in 1991, this risk continues to exist in North Korea, China, and Russia, and to the extent that they are deployed on aircraft and ships of these and other nuclear weapons states (including submarines) deployed in the region’s high seas, also outside their territorial borders. The most conducive circumstance for catalysis to occur due to a nuclear terrorist attack might involve the following nexi of timing and conditions: Low-level, tactical, or random individual terrorist attacks for whatever reasons, even assassination of national leaders, up to and including dirty radiological bomb attacks, that overlap with inter-state crisis dynamics in ways that affect state decisions to threaten with or to use nuclear weapons. This might be undertaken by an opportunist nuclear terrorist entity in search of rapid and high political impact. Attacks on major national or international events in each country to maximize terror and to de-legitimate national leaders and whole governments. In Japan, for example, more than ten heads of state and senior ministerial international meetings are held each year. For the strategic nuclear terrorist, patiently acquiring higher level nuclear threat capabilities for such attacks and then staging them to maximum effect could accrue strategic gains. Attacks or threatened attacks, including deception and disguised attacks, will have maximum leverage when nuclear-armed states are near or on the brink of war or during a national crisis (such as Fukushima), when intelligence agencies, national leaders, facility operators, surveillance and policing agencies, and first responders are already maximally committed and over-extended. At this point, we note an important caveat to the original concept of catalytic nuclear war as it might pertain to nuclear terrorist threats or attacks. Although an attack might be disguised so that it is attributed to a nuclear-armed state, or a ruse might be undertaken to threaten such attacks by deception, in reality a catalytic strike by a nuclear weapons state in conditions of mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation for such a strike from other nuclear armed states would be highly irrational. Accordingly, the effect of nuclear terrorism involving a nuclear detonation or major radiological release may not of itself be catalytic of nuclear war—at least not intentionally–because it will not lead directly to the destruction of a targeted nuclear-armed state. Rather, it may be catalytic of non-nuclear war between states, especially if the non-state actor turns out to be aligned with or sponsored by a state (in many Japanese minds, the natural candidate for the perpetrator of such an attack is the pro-North Korean General Association of Korean Residents, often called Chosen Soren, which represents many of the otherwise stateless Koreans who were born and live in Japan) and a further sequence of coincident events is necessary to drive escalation to the point of nuclear first use by a state. Also, the catalyst—the non-state actor–is almost assured of discovery and destruction either during the attack itself (if it takes the form of a nuclear suicide attack then self-immolation is assured) or as a result of a search-and-destroy campaign from the targeted state (unless the targeted government is annihilated by the initial terrorist nuclear attack). It follows that the effects of a non-state nuclear attack may be characterized better as a trigger effect, bringing about a cascade of nuclear use decisions within NC3 systems that shift each state increasingly away from nuclear non-use and increasingly towards nuclear use by releasing negative controls and enhancing positive controls in multiple action-reaction escalation spirals (depending on how many nuclear armed states are party to an inter-state conflict that is already underway at the time of the non-state nuclear attack); and/or by inducing concatenating nuclear attacks across geographically proximate nuclear weapons forces of states already caught in the crossfire of nuclear threat or attacks of their own making before a nuclear terrorist attack.[17] An example of a cascading effect would be a non-state attack on a key node of linked early warning systems that is unique to and critical for strategic nuclear forces to be employable, or the effect of multiple, coincident and erroneous sensor alerts of incoming attacks (as occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis with radar in Florida monitoring Soviet missiles in Cuba that mistakenly fused an erroneous reading of a missile trajectory with a real observation of a Soviet satellite that happened to be passing overhead). An example of a concatenating effect would an attack that leads a nuclear weapons state to target two other states forces because it cannot determine whose forces attacked its own. This circumstance might arise if key anti-submarine forces or an aircraft carrier battle group were attacked and it was impossible to determine in a given waterway or area of ocean whose submarines were present or responsible for the attack, leading the attacked state to destroy all the submarines presenting on-going threat to its strategic forces. As we noted above, a terrorist nuclear shock may take various forms and appear in different places. Ever since an extortion attempt in Boston in 1974 based on the threat of nuclear detonation, the threat of an improvised nuclear device has been credible. For such a threat to be credible, a non-state terrorist entity must release a plausible precursor such as nuclear material or warhead design information, or stage an actual demonstration attack that makes it plausible that the attacker controls a significant quantity of fissile material (most likely plutonium, or simply radioactive materials suitable for a radiological device that might be used to draw in first responders and then detonate a warhead to maximize damage and terror). Such an attack might be combined with a separate attack on critical infrastructure such as a cyberattack. The attacker might retain sufficient material for bargaining and insurance should the initial attack fail. Given the need to adapt to circumstances, such an attacker is likely to be patient and strategic, in the terms defined earlier, and to have extensive organizational and communication capacities; and to be able to operate at multiple targeted sites, possibly in multiple countries. Given its patience and stamina, such an attacker would select a highly symbolic target such as a high level meeting. Such a case would present the targeted state with an exquisite dilemma: bargaining and negotiation with the non-state actor threatening such an attack may be justified given the explicit and plausible nature of the threat, which may be politically impossible while making counter-terrorism operations very risky and only possible with extreme caution. And, such an attacker might well issue a false statement about state-sponsorship to invoke third parties in ways that vastly complicate the response to the threat. If the attacker is less capable and driven for immediate political or other returns, then it may be satisfied with highly delegated delivery with no recall option, and no use of communications to minimize the risk of discovery or interdiction. Such an attacker is also less likely to wait for the circumstances in which inter-state nuclear war is more likely due to inter-state tension; and also less likely to seek third party effects beyond the damage to the immediate target and resulting terror. Should surveillance indicate that an improvised nuclear device is in motion, then an all-out search to interdict the attackers and to retrieve the device or materials would likely ensue. In these two instances of credible threat of non-state nuclear attack, the insider versus outsider perpetrator factor will affect significantly how the attack affects possible inter-state conflicts. In Kobe’s terms, if the perpetrator is confirmed to be an outsider, then a country-of-origin suspicion matrix may cast suspicion onto another state as possible sponsor. For an attack threatened in China, the linkage might be back to Russia, the United States, or North Korea. For an attack threatened in Russia, the linkage might be back to the United States, China, or North Korea. For an attack threatened in North Korea, the linkage might be back to the United States, China, or Russia. And for an attack threatened in one of the umbrella states in the region, South Korea and Japan, such an attack might be linked to each other, as well as to China, North Korea, or Russia. In each case, the shadow of suspicion and possible accusations could tilt decision-making processes in one or more of these states and ways that could worsen pre-existing views about the nuclear use propensity of an opposing nuclear armed state. Should an actual nuclear attack occur, the situation is even more complex and problematic. Such an attack might be purely accidental, due to hardware, software, or human error while nuclear materials or weapons are in transit. In principle, this limits the site of such an event to the nuclear weapons states or their ships and aircraft as neither South Korea nor Japan host nuclear weapons today. If an insider is involved, then the perpetrator may be identified quickly, and whether there is a linkage with another state may become evident (depending on nuclear forensics as well as insight obtained from surviving attackers). If an outsider is the perpetrator, then the suspicion matrix will come into play again, with possibly severe effects on inter-state tension due to accusation, suspicion, and fear of follow-on attacks. During the attack, especially if it is a hostage-taking type of attack, the identity of the perpetrator may be unknown or ambiguous, and maintaining this ambiguity or even opacity as to the attacker may be deliberate—as was the case with the 2008 Mumbai attack in which the controller tried to ensure that all the attackers were killed in the course of the twelve separate but coordinated attacks across the city over four days. Although much progress has been made in establishing local nuclear forensics capability in Japan,[18] China, and South Korea, there is no certainty that it is sufficiently developed to identify the perpetrator of an act of nuclear terrorism, especially if there is a state sponsor and deception involved. Conclusion We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational procedures and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities. If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could trigger these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war, especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed, when the potential for miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states. If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above. The critical question is, just as a catalyst breaks some bonds and lets other bonds form, reducing the energy cost and time taken to achieve a chemical reaction, how would a nuclear terrorist attack at time of nuclear charged inter-state tension potentially shift the way that nuclear threat is projected and perceived in a four or five-way nuclear-prone conflict, and how might it affect the potential pathways to inadvertent nuclear war in such a system? Such a pervasive incremental effect is shown in Figure 6 below. [FIGURE 6 OMITTED] Any one or indeed all of these starting nuclear control profiles may be disputed, as might the control profile at the end of the response arrow. (In Figure 6, each nuclear state responds to a terrorist nuclear attack by loosening or abandoning negative controls against unauthorized use, and shifts towards reliance mostly on positive procedural controls biased towards use). But each nuclear armed state will make its moves in response to the posited terrorist nuclear attack partly in response to its expectations as to how other nuclear armed states will perceive and respond to these moves, as well as their perception that an enemy state may have sponsored a terrorist nuclear attack—and considered together, it is obvious that they may not share a common image of the other states’ motivations and actions in this response, leading to cumulative potential for misinterpretation and rapid subsequent action, reaction, and escalation. It is also conceivable—although intuitively it would seem far less likely–that a terrorist nuclear attack at such a conjuncture of partly or fully mobilized nuclear armed states might induce one or more of them to stand down, slow down its decision making or deployments, establish new communication channels with potential nuclear enemy states, and even make common cause to hunt down and eliminate the non-state nuclear terrorist entity, or coordinate operations to respond to the threat of a second terrorist nuclear attack—the credibility of which would be high in the aftermath of a successful initial non-state nuclear attack. As Robert Ayson concluded: In considering the ways in which a terrorist nuclear attack could (wittingly or unwittingly) spark off a wider nuclear exchange government leaders are entitled to be just as worried about their own actions—how they would respond to a terrorist nuclear attack and how that response might get very catastrophically out of control—as about the terrorist act per se. If so, states need to do more than consider the best ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring, deploying and then detonating a nuclear weapon. They also need to think about how they can control themselves in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack (even if some might suggest this risks handing the terrorist a premature and unnecessary victory by giving them indirect influence over the choices states make).[20]

### AT: Perm – Do Both – Miscalc DA

#### Turns case

Lugar 6 Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator (R-IN), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” Senate Prints 109-52, report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 12-15-2006, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT31324/html/CPRT-109SPRT31324.htm> /GoGreen!

Overview

Protecting Americans from terrorist attacks within the United States depends, to a great extent, on U.S. success overseas. The task is vast and worldwide. It requires enlisting host country police to track and capture terrorists, uncovering terrorist financing, sharing intelligence with foreign partners, strengthening border surveillance in remote and unpopulated regions and building partnerships with foreign militaries. In the longer run, it requires convincing entire societies to reject terrorist propaganda and recruitment. A successful counterterrorism policy depends on strong relationships with foreign governments and the people residing in countries on every continent.

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Under the direction of Chairman Richard G. Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff visited selected embassies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as the headquarters of four combatant commands, to focus specifically on the civilian/military nexus. He asked staff to assess whether the State and Defense Departments are working together overseas in a way that contributes to overarching U.S. foreign policy goals in the individual countries and in the regions.

FINDINGS

1. The number of military personnel and Defense Department activities in non-combat countries is increasing significantly. Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.

2. While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual terrorists and their support networks is an imperative in the war against terror, it is repairing and building alliances, pursuing resolutions to regional conflicts, fostering democracy and development, and defusing religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the terrorist threat in the long-term. It has traditionally been the military's mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies' mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense's focus on war fighting.

3. The increases of funding streams, self-assigned missions, and realigned authorities for the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders are placing new stresses on inter-agency coordination in the field. Currently, overlapping missions and inter-agency frictions are, for the most part, refereed by the U.S. ambassador and other State Department leadership in the embassy with intermittent referral to headquarters for guidance. But, as the role of the military expands, particularly in the area of foreign assistance, embassy officials in some countries question whether the Department of Defense will chafe under the constraints of State Department leadership and work for still more authority and funding.

4. There is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America's profile overseas. Some foreign officials question what appears to them as a new emphasis by the United States on military approaches to problems that are not seen as lending themselves to military solutions. Host country militaries clearly welcome increased professional contact and interaction with the U.S. military. However, some host countries have elements in both government and general society who are highly suspicious of potential American coercion. There is no sense so far that foreign hosts believe the U.S. military is dominating U.S. policy in-country, but if such a perception were to gain hold, it would give ammunition to U.S. adversaries. More importantly, it would weaken the bilateral relationships that are necessary to win the war against terror. Likewise, one misstep or poorly calculated military or other operation can significantly set back the full range of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in an entire region.

#### AND, perception alone causes miscalculation by China and Russia and nuclear war

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

Security assistance in a tense era of great power competition is extremely sensitive and can increase tension and lead to miscalculation. The risk in today’s geopolitical environment is that providing sensitive and potentially provocative assistance will not receive the same scrutiny from policymakers and will become the norm for the administering agency, the DOD. In the last era of great power competition, the Cold War, security assistance often stoked tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and led to spiraling commitments. For instance, Soviet provision of nuclear missiles to Cuba led to a nuclear standoff, while U.S. military support for Vietnam led to deepening U.S. engagement.

As competition with China and Russia increases, security assistance could once again prove a major source of tension and cause miscalculation. Providing aid in this environment is not a mere technical military matter, but ultimately a political and diplomatic concern that is highly sensitive. Yet today, it is the DOD that is driving assistance to countries such as Ukraine and regions such as Southeast Asia.13 When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the National Security Council became significantly involved in policymaking and limited types of assistance that could be provided, including lethal aid.14 Such unique scrutiny was warranted because there was a crisis involving a U.S. partner and a nuclear-armed state. But the nature of White House intervention was necessary in large part because the security assistance process—for both decision-making and for providing assistance—was broken.

A military-led response can overprioritize military engagement and could unintentionally steer American engagements into high-risk confrontations. Without careful calibration and understanding of broader political context, there is real concern that the DOD could get ahead of U.S. policy or drive it in a more military-centric direction. For example, China could interpret the DOD’s provision of some security assistance through the agency’s Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative as an act of aggression if it is not carefully and effectively calibrated against broader political concerns in the region.15 Given the political sensitivities of great power competition, responsibility and oversight for security assistance decisions should rest with the agency most in tune with broader U.S. foreign policy concerns and diplomatic developments: the State Department.

Reforming security assistance by centralizing it at the State Department would help to elevate the diplomatic considerations of this policy area, while reducing the military-first priorities of the current system that are ill-suited to today’s geopolitical challenges.

### AT: Perm – Do Both – Readiness DA

#### Turns case

Lugar 6 Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator (R-IN), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” Senate Prints 109-52, report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 12-15-2006, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT31324/html/CPRT-109SPRT31324.htm> /GoGreen!

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#### AND, independently collapses readiness

Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, <http://neptuneasc.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Neptune-Whole-of-Government-U.S.-Security-Cooperation-Review-20160208.pdf> /GoGreen!

Various legislative and policy changes have attempted to modernize the SSA paradigm to keep pace with the threat environment. The most recent innovations, to include “1206” (now 2282) “train and equip,” Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), and Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF), have received mixed reviews and assessments that generally fall along predictable parochial lines. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus that the current framework has become a cumbersome “patchwork” of authorities atop an outdated foundation. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the second decade of the 21st century would bring relief from the post-9/11 fatigue of foreign crisis and engagements and that this lull would allow the national security apparatus to “reset” itself and prepare for a new model of conflict in the 21st century. However, the pace of escalating global conflict in recent years defied those expectations, leaving little bandwidth or space to do more than add to, or tinker with, the “patchwork” framework.

**[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]**


The existing SSA infrastructure is not only outdated and dysfunctional, it is also seen as ineffective in tackling the growing mission of building partner capacity in fragile, high-threat environments. SSA is generally seen as effective when making gradual improvements to some existing capabilities in countries such as in Colombia and the Philippines and in countries where SSA is used to purchase access or influence (Pakistan, Israel, Oman, etc). In contrast, applying SSA in high-risk theaters with fragile political institutions (Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) to build new capability has shown little success. Despite much criticism of a system often deemed ineffective, many stakeholders resist change for parochial reasons. In fact, there are many actors who are better able to exercise perceived control of and oversight of policy by utilizing the patchwork. Bureaucratic elements often jealously guard the unique nature of these “stovepipe” authorities because it provides influence over policy decisions via the control or vote on the allocation of resources using such authorities. In addition, each authority reports to a congressional committee and provides an oversight mechanism that the congressional staffs will often strongly defend in the face of reform initiatives. As such, additional authorities are added that only marginally contribute to total effort but do not streamline or incorporate previous and existing authorities.

The growing reliance on “partnerships” and “building partner capacity” strains the Department of Defense’s ability to carry out its core requirement to be prepared to win our nation’s war in the more classic model of state-on-state conflict. In some cases, the partnership and BPC paradigm is being leveraged to return to the conventional security paradigm of preparing for state-on-state conflict, as in the case of the new South China Sea authority in the FY16 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). But elsewhere, and particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, the Defense Department will continue to struggle to resource and organize the military to support both pillars one (win our nation’s wars) and two (build partner capacity) of the QDR’s strategic framework. This tension could be reconciled through a “partnership” model of defense (The Center for Strategic and International Studies terms this “federated defense”) that applies to both paradigms of conflict and both pillars of the QDR. In many ways, the South China Sea authority represents this way of thinking. However, critics of this approach suggest that the U.S. has already ceded too much leadership and influence, and exercised too much restraint, as evidenced by the rise of Russian assertiveness relative to Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Structurally, as DoD authorities increase and DoS legislation lags, the long-running tension between State and Defense grows. This is a complex problem with multiple root causes. Chief among them are the legacy stovepipes of authorities (Title 10 vs. Title 22) and oversight committees (Armed Services vs. Foreign Affairs), the lack of State expeditionary resources to civilian-based security sector assistance, and a perceived lack of State agility and interagency/White House coordination of efforts. In addition, in the absence of a common operating picture and tools to process the flood of critical data, there is no refinement of strategic goals into complementary concepts of operations applied against a common operational picture. Other actors such as State National Guard units, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the intelligence community are employing Titles 32, 21, and 50, respectively, in largely disconnected and often uncommunicated endeavors.

Figure 2. Imbalanced Security Sector Assistance (SSA) Approach

SSA initiatives are ideally a balance between Department of State and Department of Defense efforts, with security programs a part of broader programs that contribute to overall governance and stability. Current SSA is perceived to be playing a dominant role led by DoD.



#### Extinction

Alan Dowd 15, senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose, “Shield & Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence”, https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/

Surely, the same principle applies in the realm of nations. Our world teems with violent regimes and vicious men. And something precious—our notion of peace, sovereignty, liberty, civilization itself—sits exposed to all that danger. In a world where might makes right, the only thing that keeps the peace, defends our sovereignty and liberty, and upholds civilization is the willingness to use our resources to keep the dangers at bay. Yet too many policymakers disregard the wisdom of military deterrence, and too many people of faith forget that the aim of deterrence is, by definition, to prevent wars, not start them. Some people of faith oppose the threat of military force, let alone the use of military force, because of Christ’s message of peace. This is understandable in the abstract, but we must keep in mind two truths. First, governments are held to a different standard than individuals, and hence are expected to do certain things individuals aren’t expected to do—and arguably shouldn’t do certain things individuals should do. For example, a government that turned the other cheek when attacked would be conquered by its foes, leaving countless innocents defenseless. A government that put away the sword—that neglected its defenses—would invite aggression, thus jeopardizing its people. Second, all uses of force are not the same. The sheriff who uses force to apprehend a murderer is decidedly different from the criminal who uses force to commit a murder. The policemen posted outside a sporting event to deter violence are decidedly different from those who plot violence. Moral relativism is anything but a virtue. Some lament the fact that we live in such a violent world, but that’s precisely the point. Because we live in a violent world, governments must take steps to deter those who can be deterred—and neutralize those who cannot. In this regard, it pays to recall that Jesus had sterner words for scholars and scribes than He did for soldiers. In fact, when a centurion asked Jesus for help, He didn’t admonish the military commander to put down his sword. Instead, He commended him for his faith.[i] “Even in the Gospels,” soldier-scholar Ralph Peters reminds us, “it is assumed that soldiers are, however regrettably, necessary.”[ii] They are necessary not only for waging war but, preferably, for maintaining peace. It’s a paradoxical truth that military readiness can keep the peace. The Romans had a phrase for it: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.” President George Washington put it more genteelly: “There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.” Or, in the same way, “We infinitely desire peace,” President Theodore Roosevelt declared. “And the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war.” After the West gambled civilization’s very existence in the 1920s and 1930s on hopes that war could somehow be outlawed, the men who crafted the blueprint for waging the Cold War returned to peace through strength. Winston Churchill proposed “defense through deterrents.” President Harry Truman called NATO “an integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength…we devoutly pray that our present course of action will succeed and maintain peace without war.”[iii] President Dwight Eisenhower explained, “Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk its own destruction.” President John Kennedy vowed to “strengthen our military power to the point where no aggressor will dare attack.” And President Ronald Reagan steered the Cold War to a peaceful end by noting, “None of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong.” Reagan also argued, “Our military strength is a prerequisite for peace.”[iv] Even so, arms alone aren’t enough to deter war. After all, the great powers were armed to the teeth in 1914. But since they weren’t clear about their intentions and treaty commitments, a small crisis on the fringes of Europe mushroomed into a global war. Neither is clarity alone enough to deter war. After all, President Woodrow Wilson’s admonitions to the Kaiser were clear, but America lacked the military strength at the onset of war to make those words matter and thus deter German aggression. In other words, America was unable to deter. “The purpose of a deterrence force is to create a set of conditions that would cause an adversary to conclude that the cost of any particular act against the United States of America or her allies is far higher than the potential benefit of that act,” explains Gen. Kevin Chilton, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command. It is a “cost-benefit calculus.”[v] So, given the anemic state of America’s military before 1917, the Kaiser calculated that the benefits of attacking U.S. ships and trying to lure Mexico into an alliance outweighed the costs. That proved to be a grave miscalculation. In order for the adversary not to miscalculate, a few factors must hold. First, consequences must be clear, which was not the case on the eve of World War I. Critics of deterrence often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it were that simple, then a) there wouldn’t have been a World War II, since the Allies allowed their arsenals to atrophy after 1918, and b) there would have been a World War III, since Washington and Moscow engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that miscalculation lit the fuse of World War I. The antidote, as alluded to above, is strength plus clarity. A second important factor to avoid miscalculation: The adversary must be rational, which means it can grasp and fear consequences. Fear is an essential ingredient of deterrence. It pays to recall that deterrence comes from the Latin dēterreō: “to frighten off.”[vi] Of course, as Churchill conceded, “The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics.”[vii] Mass-murderers masquerading as holy men and death-wish dictators may be immune from deterrence. (The secondary benefit of the peace-through-strength model is that it equips those who embrace it with the capacity to defeat these sorts of enemies rapidly and return to the status quo ante.) Third, the consequences of military confrontation must be credible and tangible, which was the case during most of the Cold War. Not only did Washington and Moscow construct vast military arsenals to deter one another; they were clear about their treaty commitments and about the consequences of any threat to those commitments. Recall how Eisenhower answered Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s boast about the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional advantage in Germany: “If you attack us in Germany,” the steely American commander-in-chief fired back, “there will be nothing conventional about our response.”[viii] Eisenhower’s words were unambiguously clear, and unlike Wilson, he wielded the military strength to give them credibility. Discussing military deterrence in the context of Christianity may seem incongruent to some readers. But for a pair of reasons it is not. First, deterrence is not just a matter of GDPs and geopolitics. In fact, scripture often uses the language of deterrence and preparedness. For example, in the first chapter of Numbers the Lord directs Moses and Aaron to count “all the men in Israel who are twenty years old or more and able to serve in the army.” This ancient selective-service system is a form of military readiness. Similarly, I Chronicles 27 provides detail about the Israelites’ massive standing army: twelve divisions of 24,000 men each. II Chronicles 17 explains the military preparations made by King Jehoshaphat of Judah, a king highly revered for his piety, who built forts, maintained armories in strategically located cities “with large supplies” and fielded an army of more than a million men “armed for battle.” Not surprisingly, “the fear of the Lord fell on all the kingdoms of the lands surrounding Judah, so that they did not go to war against Jehoshaphat.” In the New Testament, Paul writes in Romans 13 that “Rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong…Rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.” Again, this is the language of deterrence. Those who follow the law within a country and who respect codes of conduct between countries have nothing to fear. Those who don’t have much to fear. Likewise, to explain the importance of calculating the costs of following Him, Jesus asks in Luke 14, “What king would go to war against another king without first sitting down to consider whether his 10,000 soldiers could go up against the 20,000 coming against him? And if he didn’t think he could win, he would send a representative to discuss terms of peace while his enemy was still a long way off.” In a sense, both kings are wise—one because he recognizes that he’s outnumbered; the other because he makes sure that he’s not. Put another way, both kings subscribe to peace through strength. Again, as with the Centurion earlier, Jesus could have rebuked the martial character of these kings, but he did not. This is not just description but commendation. We ignore their example at our peril. Secondly, it is not incongruent if we understand military deterrence as a means to prevent great-power war—the kind that kills by the millions, the kind humanity has not endured for seven decades. We know we will not experience the biblical notion of peace—of shalom, peace with harmony and justice—until Christ returns to make all things new. In the interim, in a broken world, the alternatives to peace through strength leave much to be desired: peace through hope, peace through violence, or peace through submission. But these options are inadequate. The sheer destructiveness and totality of great-power war testify that crossing our fingers and hoping for peace is not a Christian option. Wishful thinking, romanticizing reality, is the surest way to invite what Churchill called “temptations to a trial of strength.” Moreover, the likelihood that the next great-power war would involve multiple nuclear-weapons states means that it could end civilization. Therefore, a posture that leaves peer adversaries doubting the West’s capabilities and resolve—thus inviting miscalculation—is not only unsound, but immoral and inhumane—unchristian. “Deterrence of war is more humanitarian than anything,” Gen. Park Yong Ok, a longtime South Korean military official, argues. “If we fail to deter war, a tremendous number of civilians will be killed.”[ix] Peace through violence has been tried throughout history. Pharaoh, Caesar and Genghis Khan, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, all attained a kind of peace by employing brutal forms of violence. However, this is not the kind of “peace” under which God’s crowning creation can flourish; neither would the world long tolerate such a scorched-earth “peace.” This option, too, the Christian rejects. Finally, the civilized world could bring about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the 38th Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you can have it in the next second—surrender.”[x] The world has tried these alternatives to peace through strength, and the outcomes have been disastrous. After World War I, Western powers disarmed and convinced themselves they had waged the war to end all wars. By 1938, as Churchill concluded after Munich, the Allies had been “reduced…from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it.”[xi] Like predators in the wilderness, the Axis powers sensed weakness and attacked. In October 1945—not three months after the Missouri steamed into Tokyo Bay—Gen. George Marshall decried the “disintegration not only of the Armed Forces, but apparently…all conception of world responsibility,” warily asking, “Are we already, at this early date, inviting that same international disrespect that prevailed before this war?”[xii] Stalin answered Marshall’s question by gobbling up half of Europe, blockading Berlin, and arming Kim Il-Sung in patient preparation for the invasion of South Korea.[xiii] The U.S. military had taken up positions in Korea in 1945, but withdrew all combat forces in 1949.[xiv] Then, in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that Japan, Alaska and the Philippines fell within America’s “defensive perimeter.”[xv] Korea didn’t. Stalin noticed. Without a U.S. deterrent in place, Stalin gave Kim a green light to invade. Washington then reversed course and rushed American forces back into Korea, and the Korean peninsula plunged into one of the most ferocious wars in history. The cost of miscalculation in Washington and Moscow: 38,000 Americans, 103,250 South Korean troops, 316,000 North Korean troops, 422,000 Chinese troops and 2 million civilian casualties.[xvi] The North Korean tyranny— now under command of Kim’s grandson—still dreams of conquering South Korea. The difference between 2015 and 1950 is that tens of thousands of battle-ready U.S. and ROK troops are stationed on the border. They’ve been there every day since 1953. The lesson of history is that waging war is far more costly than maintaining a military capable of deterring war. As Washington observed, “Timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it.” Just compare military allocations, as a percentage of GDP, during times of war and times of peace: In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States devoted an average of 0.7 percent of GDP to defense; during the war, U.S. defense spending spiked to 16.1 percent of GDP. In the decade before entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1 percent of GDP on defense; during the war, the U.S. diverted an average of 27 percent of GDP to the military annually. During the Cold War, Washington spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter Moscow; it worked. Yet it seems we have forgotten those hard-learned lessons. In his book The World America Made, Robert Kagan explains how “America’s most important role has been to dampen and deter the normal tendencies of other great powers to compete and jostle with one another in ways that historically have led to war.” This role has depended on America’s military might. “There is no better recipe for great-power peace,” Kagan concludes, “than certainty about who holds the upper hand.”[xvii]

### AT: Perm – Do Both – XT: Turf Wars

#### Yes turf wars

Corker 17 Bob Corker, U.S. Senator (R-TN), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Managing Security Assistance To Support Foreign Policy,” Senate Hearing 115-666, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 9-26-2017, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg37504/html/CHRG-115shrg37504.htm> /GoGreen!

This is the committee's second hearing on security assistance in just over a year, but it is an issue that has been raised during many of our other meetings. This kind of assistance is an investment in our own security. We help ourselves by helping other nations police their own neighborhoods. Which nations we help and how we help them are crucial foreign policy decisions.

Since the 1960s, the law provides that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, has the responsibility for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and training programs. We need to be clear on that because our security demands that we work across agency lines to develop coherent security assistance programs that serve our interests and those of our partners.

While the Defense Department has long played an important role in this area, since 9/11 that role has grown enormously in size and scope. We cannot tackle the real challenges if we are fighting turf wars within other bureaucracies. And while teamwork is necessary, it is not enough.

We need clear goals and a way to keep track of how we are doing. Between State and DOD, we are spending about $18 billion a year on security sector assistance. As General Hooper said the other day, this is not a pickup game. We need professionals.

Last year, Congress consolidated many of the narrow and overlapping authorities on the defense side, and it has given the Defense Department more flexible and global train and equip authority. I was pleased that the measure signed into law requires the concurrence of the Secretary of State for these activities and encourages both departments to jointly develop and plan such programs.

I would like to hear from our OSD and State witnesses on the question of concurrence versus coordination as it pertains to security cooperation activities already in progress such as the counter-ISIS train and equip.

At the State Department, significant security assistance roles are held by four different functional bureaus, each with their own budget, plus all of the regional bureaus. And these bureaus report down through four different secretaries, making it difficult to see who is in charge. Under this current organizational structure, I have concerns about the Department's ability to manage its own programs while also reviewing and shaping DOD efforts. I hope the redesign plan will address this matter, and any insight our witnesses could share to that process will be greatly appreciated.

#### Only counterplan alone solves

House 16 Carole N. House, former Captain, U.S. Army, served in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, with the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division as assistant chief of operations and intelligence collection manager, graduate student, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, B.A. University of Georgia, “Proposal of an Unconventional Warfare Strategy to Dominate the Human Domain,” Small Wars Journal, 3-7-2016, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/proposal-of-an-unconventional-warfare-strategy-to-dominate-the-human-domain> /GoGreen!

For the UOW to be able to plan and implement effective strategy, the bureaucratic culture in much of Congress and the government agencies must significantly evolve. Political culture in Washington, D.C. is risk averse and focused on election cycles rather than countering long-term strategic goals of U.S. adversaries. Turf wars and tunnel vision plague interagency relationships, and tensions between civil and military leadership create barriers to cooperation. Some concrete measures can facilitate unconventional warfare strategy development. The President and the National Security Advisor must empower the State Department and the OUW to enforce coordination of long-term interagency efforts supporting American foreign policy. This requires special selection and development of adaptive leadership that is willing to work together in creative, closely coordinated, and synchronized operations under guidance by the State Department and the National Security Council to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. The Council on Foreign Relations suggests the creation of political warfare career tracks in relevant government agencies, which would establish a trained community of political warfare expertise in the government to help sustain long-term operations and planning.[xvi]

### AT: Perm – Do Both – AT: Coordination Shields

#### Mere coordination is insufficient – CP alone is key

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance.

### AT: 2017 NDAA Solves

#### The 2017 NDAA only made things worse

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

Recent efforts to reform the security assistance architecture tend to get bogged down by the complexity of the current system. This has led to an inevitable focus on incremental tweaks that address tactical-level concerns. These weedy discussions, while useful, often take the current structure of the U.S. security assistance system as a given—and therefore, do not address the broader strategic and budgetary issues and imbalance between diplomacy and defense. Furthermore, policymakers and politicians often get lost in the technical nature of these discussions, lack broader historical context, and are easily persuaded by officials with a stake in largely preserving the status quo and in protecting their offices, who tout the complexity of the challenge; as a result, they quickly lose interest in reform. A new administration should be wary of these past mistakes when embarking on suggested reforms in this report.

Obama administration efforts attempted to improve interagency cooperation

During the first years of the Obama administration, White House officials led an interagency review of U.S. security assistance policy. The result, Presidential Policy Directive 23, established goals and policy guidelines for U.S. security assistance in 2013 and sought to increase interagency, meaning State Department-DOD, collaboration.51 But there were challenges in implementing these reforms. For example, the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) was created under the Obama administration as an experimental program designed as a joint effort, housed at the State Department with staff from both agencies and new funds to pool resources.52 But the GSCF turned out to be bureaucratically unwieldy and ultimately unsuccessful: Because it was housed at the State Department and the DOD, eight congressional committees exerted oversight, and projects were easily stymied by skeptical staffers.53 It also lacked institutional buy-in from the DOD, which was slow to provide staff and resources and focused on working around the State Department instead.

Congressional efforts have primarily focused on the DOD’s resources

Rather than concentrate on the overall security assistance landscape, congressional reform efforts focused entirely on consolidating DOD authorities and bridging silos within the existing system. For example, the fiscal year 2017 NDAA sought to institutionalize DOD assistance by merging many of the Pentagon’s authorities into a “new, broader global train and equip authority,” creating a new Section 333 under the DOD’s Title 10 authority.54 But Section 333 is essentially redundant to many of the State Department’s authorities, including FMF; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs. And while the authorization calls for the “concurrence” of the secretary of state, in practice, it leaves the State Department with very little leverage and little ability to shape DOD programs. Some analysts found, “There are varying degrees of Section 333 implementation and buy-in from combatant command leadership,” with some viewing the State Department-DOD integration as a check-the-box exercise.55

While there have been some notable attempts, such as 2019’s Department of State Authorization Act in the House of Representatives,56 Congress has failed to enact any major legislation to modernize State Department authorities or resources. Moreover, these reforms to the DOD’s security assistance authorities did nothing to improve the State Department’s authorities; though Section 333 included reporting requirements that are considered a “gold standard” for assessing a partner’s capacity to absorb U.S. assistance, such assessments are not required for assistance from the State Department.57

### AT: Congressional Oversight Solves

#### Oversight is our net benefit – Congress can’t do it effectively now

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

Inhibits congressional oversight

By creating two separate security assistance bureaucracies—one at the State Department and one at the DOD—there is no uniform oversight of security assistance by Congress. DOD security assistance residing in Title 10 is a relatively tiny piece—comprising about 2 percent of the overall DOD budget—of the oversight jurisdiction for the Senate and House Armed Services committees and DOD appropriators. Meanwhile, the assistance under State Department authorities comprises a far more significant proportion of the State Department budget—about 15 percent—and therefore can be subject to more expert attention.

Congressional staff are expected to review a continuous flow of piecemeal security assistance notifications from the executive branch and track reports about the myriad authorities. Many congressional staff report being unable to keep up with reviewing even the biggest program, and reports—even those made public—are rarely reviewed in any depth.74 Moreover, these committees rarely talk to each other or coordinate over specific security assistant programs. They also jealously guard their jurisdictions and have a poor track record of communication, let alone cooperation.75

As a result, security assistance rarely gets a vetting before the public eye. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held two hearings on security assistance in the last 10 years—and tends to focus on the foreign policy dimensions of the most problematic partnerships.76 Congressional notification requirements are not uniform and only mandated for certain types of authorities, making it impossible to see a “full and authoritative accounting” of U.S. security assistance funding around the world.77

### AT: No Solve NB if DoD Implements

#### DoD implementation of the rare components that actually require military personnel does NOT thump our net benefit – Bergmann says “unifying decision-making on policy—not the details of implementation” is key (in AT: Deficit – DoD Key)

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

The DOD’s security assistance authorities and funds related to train and equip accounts should be transferred by Congress from the DOD to the State Department. The State Department should have full decision-making authority over all U.S. funding for security assistance programming—as indeed the Foreign Assistance Act requires.84 While the DOD would remain the agency in charge of implementing programs, the State Department needs to have the lead in deciding what, who, and when to fund security assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should work with Congress to pass legislation to transfer the requisite resources and authorities to the State Department, including the DOD’s Section 333 program and train and equip accounts such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund, the Iraq Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

#### It’s sufficient

Rand 15 Dr. Dafna H. Rand, former Deputy Director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta fellow at the Center for a New American Security, formerly served on the National Security Council staff and as a Middle East expert on the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff; and Stephen Tankel, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, Assistant Professor in the School of International Service at American University, former Senior Adviser for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs at the Department of Defense; “Security Cooperation & Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment,” Center for a New American Security, August 2015, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report\_Security-Cooperation\_FINAL.pdf /GoGreen!

1. Consolidate, rationalize, and rebalance the many security assistance and cooperation authorities. With a glut of new authorities, policymakers have begun using them in a piecemeal and disconnected fashion. In addition to the imbalance and lack of coordination between State and DoD authorities, the connection between Title 10 and Title 22 authorities has been lost, and State’s position as the lead agency in determining the strategy and direction of security assistance has been diluted. DoD and State should develop a coordinated reform proposal that consolidates DoD’s glut of new and overlapping authorities and transfers the appropriate authorities to State, even if administration remains under DoD’s purview in certain cases. Consolidation should also ensure that the provision of assistance and cooperation can be done through regional budgetary funds and to consortia of partners. Finally, the proposals should be presented to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Congress should commission a study by the Congressional Research Service, GAO, or an independent commission to produce new proposals and hold hearings on these proposals to solicit insight and recommendations. The collective findings should inform new legislation codifying the necessary reforms to the post-September 11, 2001, authorities.

2. Undertake regional reviews of security assistance and cooperation programs. Because some of the objectives of security assistance and cooperation will always conflict and there will continue to be debates about how to scope U.S. objectives, it is incumbent on policymakers to candidly prioritize goals, delineate where they are willing to accept risks, and plan ahead to mitigate anticipated consequences associated with these risks. This is best done through a regional framework. The National Security Council should direct representatives from the regional bureaus at State and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at DoD to work together to produce joint reviews of U.S. security assistance and cooperation in their respective regions. Each review should prioritize U.S. interests and objectives in the relevant region, provide relevant updates on the regional environment, and delineate how assistance and cooperation are being deployed to realize U.S. objectives. Reviews should also identify where objectives conflict as well as where U.S. policymakers are taking clear risks as they weigh and make trade-offs among U.S. foreign policy priorities. Policymakers need to discuss ways in which to mitigate these risks. These reviews should clearly delineate short- and long-term goals and identify where these are complementary or in conflict. In the event of potential conflicts or moral hazard, reviews must make a clear case for why they are prioritizing either short- or long-term objectives. Over time these reviews should take into account new methods of measuring outcomes. These reviews should inform and be informed by an ongoing effort by embassy-based diplomats, defense attachés and Office of Security Cooperation chiefs to coordinate their security assistance and cooperation plans in the field in order to identify areas for potential cooperation and conflict. State should have ultimate responsibility for coordinating and producing the final product for the National Security Council (NSC). Finally, the president should establish a commission composed of outside experts and former officials to assess and provide feedback periodically on these regional reviews and to offer external, objective views on these documents.

3. Increase the use of regionally-appropriated funds for assistance and cooperation where appropriate. The overwhelming amount of security assistance and cooperation is still provided bilaterally to individual countries despite the admonition in PPD 23 that these efforts must be linked to a broader regional approach, including cross-border program coordination, support for regional organizations, and facilitation of linkages among partner countries. Seeking regionally-appropriated funds would advance this cause and could have the ancillary benefit of reducing the entitlement problem. Not all regional security organizations are similarly equipped to receive U.S. assistance. In the Middle East, for example, subregional institutions are weak and so regional assistance to organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council will need to be calibrated accordingly.

4. Improve interagency coordination and enhance State’s capacity to manage security assistance programs. In addition to the other steps recommended to improve the integration of security assistance and cooperation, better awareness and coordination among different agencies is necessary. A new mechanism should be created to allow foreign and civil service officers from the country desks at State and personnel from DSCA and the Defense Technology Security Administration at DoD to serve in six– twelve-month rotations at the other’s agency. These rotations will help the State Department to build a cadre of diplomats and civil servants with a deeper understanding of the mechanics of security assistance and cooperation.

To augment its capacity to manage or contribute to the management of security assistance, the State Department will also need to hire more people and reform its personnel management practices. More FSOs should be trained to oversee security assistance programs and incentivized to choose this as a career track.57 Increasing the number of FSOs with the financial, legal, legislative, and programmatic skills to work on the details of security assistance would help correct the imbalance between State and DoD that is particularly pervasive in the field.

# AFF AT: CP—DoS SA

### Perm: Do CP – 2AC

#### Perm: do counterplan – it’s plan-plus:

#### “Cooperation” includes “assistance” under State control – prefer legal precision

Serafino 16 Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense,” CRS Report for Congress, R44444, 5-26-2016, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf> /GoGreen!

Terminology

The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are “security assistance” and “security cooperation.” Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance.

There is no State Department definition for security assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ), however, lists six budget accounts under the heading “International Security Assistance.” These accounts, with their underlying Title 22 authorities (the 1961 FAA and the AECA), are commonly regarded as the State Department’s security assistance portfolio.

DOD formally defines security assistance as the group of State Department 1961 FAA and AECA programs that a DOD organization, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), administers. These include programs conducted under two of the State Department international security assistance accounts and attendant authorities, as well as programs conducted under four related 1961 FAA and AECA authorities.

DOD uses the overarching term “security cooperation” to denote the State Department security assistance administered by DSCA through which the U.S. government furnishes defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, as well as all other DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments. The purposes of the interactions with foreign defense establishments defined as security cooperation are to “build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multilateral operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”8

### Perm: Do CP – 1AR

#### This is the DoD definition all of their ev and ours is referencing

DoD 16 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” 12-29-2016, <https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/DoDD_513203_on_Security_Cooperation.pdf> /GoGreen!

G.2. DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.

**country-specific security cooperation section**. A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.

**Integrated Country Strategy**. Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.

**international agreements**. Agreements binding under international law that facilitate defense and security cooperation with allied and partner nations and international organizations.

**defense institution building**. Defined in DoDD 5205.82.

**SCOs**. DoD organizations permanently located in foreign countries and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions in accordance with Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. SCOs may include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, and Offices of Defense and Military Cooperation, designated to perform security cooperation functions. SCOs do not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities, such as mobile training and education teams, or operational units.

**senior defense official/defense attaché**. The chief of mission’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, or the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The senior defense official/defense attaché in the U.S. Mission can be the defense attaché or the chief of the SCO, as designated by the Secretary of Defense.

**security assistance**. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is one element of security cooperation, which is funded and authorized by the Department of State and administered by the DSCA.

security cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.

**security sector assistance**. Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.

#### Yes legal precision – Title 10 of U.S. Code confirms the DoD definition

DoD 21 Defense Security Cooperation University, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, “Chapter 1 Introduction to Security Cooperation,” Security Cooperation Management (aka DSCU Green Book), Edition 41.0, May 2021, <https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/01_Chapter.pdf> /GoGreen!

Introduction

The term security cooperation was first introduced in 1997 by the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). At that time, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) already had day-to-day management responsibilities of many security assistance programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Armed Export Control Act (AECA). The DRI proposed that DSAA also manage certain Department of Defense (DoD)-funded international programs along with their personnel and associated resources. In order for U.S. government (USG) agencies, the private sector, and foreign governments to better understand DSAA’s enlarged mission and diverse functions beyond security assistance (SA), DoD re-designated DSAA as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), effective 1 October 1998.

In recent years, DSCA has absorbed management responsibilities for many DoD international programs while also leading the wider USG security cooperation enterprise. However, many security cooperation programs continue to be managed by other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the combatant commands (CCMDs), or the military departments (MILDEPs). Further complicating the management of security cooperation was the in-country point of contact between the USG and the host nation. This point of contact was either the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)- sponsored Defense Attaché Office (DAO) or the DSCA-sponsored Security Cooperation Office (SCO). These two spigots of security cooperation within a country required a broad knowledge and skill baseline of the very different international programs that are initiated, funded, and managed throughout the DoD, its agencies and the MILDEPs. Most disconnects regarding SCO-DAO coordination of in-country security cooperation were generally resolved with the establishment of the Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) having oversight over both the SCO and DAO organizations.

On 9 June 2004 that DoD published a formal, yet still very broad, definition of security cooperation in Joint Pub 1-02:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, 29 December 2016, further defines security cooperation with assigned responsibilities:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.

According to Title 10 U.S. Code Section 301, the term “security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense” means any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the DoD with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: (A) To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. (B) To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation. (C) To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests. Other DoD policy statements identify DoD-managed or administered security assistance programs as components of security cooperation.

The purpose of this first chapter is to provide definitions of the various programs within security assistance and the broader area of security cooperation.

#### Most comprehensive independent review of both cooperation and assistance authorities agrees

GAO 17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts,” GAO-17-255R, 3-24-2017, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-255r.pdf> /GoGreen!

House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (H.R.1735), includes a provision for us to report on an inventory of DOD security cooperation programs intended to build partner security capabilities.3 DOD defines these programs as including DOD-administered State security assistance activities. According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.4 In this report, we provide a fiscal year 2016 inventory of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts that may be used by the U.S. government to build foreign partners’ capacity to address security-related threats, including each effort’s name, description, associated legal authorities, and agency involvement as required by the associated authorities. This inventory includes efforts that have building partner capacity (BPC) to address security-related threats as a primary goal as well as efforts that may have BPC as an ancillary goal or effect.

**[FOOTNOTE 4]**

4 Various government and nongovernment entities have compiled lists of security cooperation efforts, including security assistance efforts administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), but none of the lists are sanctioned by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as both current and complete.

**[/FOOTNOTE 4]**

To develop an inventory of BPC security cooperation and security assistance efforts, we reviewed data, documents, and reports from DOD, State, RAND, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS); conducted searches of laws; and reviewed prior GAO reports. We interviewed DOD, State, RAND, and CRS officials about their research on, and listings of, security cooperation and security assistance efforts used for BPC and the efforts’ associated authorities; the methodologies they used; and the limitations they encountered. The efforts we selected for our inventory comprise what our sources referred to as “programs,” “subprograms,” “tools,” “funding accounts,” “authorities,” or “activities.” We used “efforts” as the most inclusive possible term, because the DOD and DOD-sponsored sources we consulted used undefined and varying terminology—for example, sometimes using terms such as “programs” and “activities” interchangeably and sometimes including funds and the names of authorities—and because these sources and DOD officials did not provide DOD-sanctioned definitions of the program and subprogram levels for security cooperation programs. We broadly defined building partner capacity to include efforts that were intended solely to build partner security capacity as well as those that could have a partial or ancillary effect on partner security capacity. For example, we included military exercises, training, and equipment as well as BPC-related personnel exchanges and military contacts. To focus our inventory on BPC efforts to address security-related threats, we excluded efforts whose sole purpose was humanitarian, health, disaster, or development assistance. To eliminate duplicative and expired efforts, we compared the data we obtained from these sources and reviewed associated authorities. We worked with DOD and State officials to resolve any discrepancies, to add additional efforts, and to group subefforts with overall efforts when the officials made such information available. See enclosure I for further information about our objective, scope, and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to March 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

### Perm: Do Both – 2AC

#### Perm: do plan and the non-mutually-exclusive parts of the counterplan – “slippery slope” is a fallacy, NOT a link – fiat shields it

#### There’s no functional difference – especially if they include DoD implementation

Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, <http://neptuneasc.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Neptune-Whole-of-Government-U.S.-Security-Cooperation-Review-20160208.pdf> /GoGreen!

“Concurrence” vs. “Coordination.” The reality of the shift in authorities is more complex than a simple erosion of State’s traditional authority. The 1206 authority did provide Defense with a “train and equip” authority that had previously been a State responsibility under Title 22, but the 1206 authority did, as does the 2282 authority now, require State “concurrence” with the Defense-developed plan. So while the responsibility for the planning and programming has shifted to Defense, State also has a veto. In practice, this is not profoundly different than a State (Title 22) authority, such as FMS or IMET, which is implemented by DoD through DSCA. Previously, many DoD authorities had required either “coordination” or “consultation” with the State Department, which constituted a relatively weak requirement in practice, as those terms are poorly defined and could mean as little as a phone call notification. Concurrence, on the other hand, is a relatively formal requirement usually requiring written documentation. And the trend is toward joint, or “concurrence” authorities, where State has a stronger hand in the planning.

### AT: NB – AT: Militarization Link

#### No net benefit – “militarization” is fake news – the structural irrelevance of diplomats in the face of technological change – NOT authority – is what matters

Quainton 18 Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, Distinguished Diplomat in Residence at American University, “Militarization and Marginalization of American Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,” American Diplomacy, March 2018, <https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2018/03/militarization-and-marginalization-of-american-diplomacy-and-foreign-policy/> /GoGreen!

The issue of militarization of foreign policy is a common theme. One of the New York Times 100 notable books of 2016 was Rosa Brooks How Everything became War and the Military Became Everything. In the spring of 2016 Georgetown University Press published a collection of essays entitled Mission Creep designed to explore the Militarization of US Foreign Policy. As far back as 2003 Dana Priest, a journalist for the Washington Post, wrote a book entitled The Mission which asserted that American diplomacy was being outgunned by the military and that the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on the military to manage its role in world affairs. She claimed that “on (president Bill) Clinton’s watch the military slowly, without public scrutiny or debate came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world”. Specifically she identified the regional combatant commanders. (In Europe the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR) as sources of increasing diplomatic influence. In the introduction to her book she assets that “U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic.” This shift she argues “has been going on for more than a decade without much public discussion or debate.” Ms. Priest describes a world in which four star generals and admirals fly around the world in large jet aircraft, accompanied by substantial staffs to engage in diplomatic contacts not just with ministers of defense and force commanders but with heads of state and government as well. She asserts that they were eclipsing the role of hapless Ambassadors who lacked both resources and access.

It was and is still true that the Combatant Commanders have at their disposal substantial resources. They can offer foreign governments materiel, training and in some cases development assistance. They are also a remarkably well-educated and impressive group. Many have doctoral degrees. All have over thirty years of military service. They are not amateurs. In comparison, successive administrations of both political parties have regarded diplomacy as an amateur business, reflected in the fact that about a third of Ambassadors are appointed from outside the career service, often to key posts. In this new Trump administration, politicians or business friends of the President have already been appointed to Moscow, Tokyo, Beijing and London, continuing a practice which goes back across the last five or six presidencies. Even more disturbing from a career Foreign Service point of view is the Administration’s decision to appoint a non-career Director General of the Foreign Service, for the first time in the Department’s history.

For all that, Ms. Priest may have overstated her case. From interviews which I and my colleague Dr. Shoon Murray carried out last year with over 20 recently retired ambassadors from all corners of the globe, we found that almost all said they welcomed these military resources. They did not feel that the occasional high visibility visits of combatant commanders undermined their authority or access to the key players in the host government. They saw local officials on a regular, even daily basis, while the combatant commander would come through the capital city once or twice a year. Indeed, they saw these generals and admirals as allies in a common cause. One general went so far as to require his senior staff to wear buttons which proclaimed “One Team, One Fight” to ensure the complementarity of the military and diplomatic roles. There were, to be sure, tensions, but they arose largely from personal friction between the Ambassador and the Combatant Commander about style and not over issues of regional or bilateral policy.

Nonetheless for at least 15 years policy analysts have been asserting that this growth in military power and influence has harmed American foreign policy. It is currently fashionable to say that if your only policy tool is a hammer, every problem becomes a nail. Critics of the status quo assert that the increasingly capable and well-funded military has become the instrument of choice when action has to be taken to deal with any crisis anywhere in the world.

What is certainly true is that the military and its parent the Department of Defense have enjoyed resources far in excess of what the State Department enjoys. Ten times as much in fact. With resources comes capability. Although in recent years the Defense Department budget has been constrained, it has always been vastly greater than the budget of the civilian foreign affairs agencies including the State Department, the Agency for International Development, The Voice of America and others. The current administration intends to substantially increase funding for the military and to give it even greater capabilities to respond to looming crises in North Korea, Iran, Ukraine and the Middle East, to name only a few of the front burner crisis situations that are engrossing the attention of President Trump and his team. The military will get more hardware. Our nuclear capabilities will be substantially modernized.

At the same time Diplomacy is being marginalized. The State Department and American Diplomacy face radical reorganization and resource shortages, both in budgetary and human terms, which will surely mean dislocations and in the short term loss of operational effectiveness. In addition, The Trump administration has proposed a thirty percent cut in its budget. Foreign assistance is to be greatly reduced and USAID potentially abolished or folded into the State Department. In terms of personnel over one hundred of our most senior officers, both men and women have gone into retirement and several hundred more are being offered buyouts to persuade them to take early retirement. This hollowing out of the diplomatic capabilities of the United States can will not bring us closer to peace or a resolution of any of the most important crises which we face. Diplomacy, by its very nature, involves using the skills of imagination, information and engagement to create win-win solutions for all the participants. All of this requires training and years of experience in the field. For the military the outcome usually must be one-sided; victory for us, defeat for them.

What has all this meant in practical terms in terms of the Washington policy debate?

The Trump administration and to a large extent the Republican Party regard the eight years of the Obama administration as one in which America failed to exert its traditional leadership role. They were horrified when Obama was quoted during the Libyan crisis as saying that America would lead from behind; that is, behind our European allies. They criticized his decision to pull combat troops out of Iraq as premature and were critical when he seemed poised to do the same in Afghanistan. These were not trivial concerns. The State Department was seen to be the agent of a ‘spineless’ foreign policy, always ready to compromise even at the expense of vital American interests. Republicans saw the nuclear agreement with Iran as proof that diplomacy was an inadequate first line of defense for the United States. The State Department and its political allies in the Democratic party repeatedly called for greater use of diplomatic and soft power tools to advance American national interests.

The result is that for a substantial number of American voters the Democrats were seen as the party of weakness and withdrawal. President Trump’s call to “Make America Great Again” is a reflection of this view. His slogan also implies that for America to regain its traditional leadership role it will have to demonstrate that it has a more muscular foreign policy. The military will be needed as never before.

At the National Security Council, where foreign and security policies are coordinated and policy papers prepared for the President, the first of Trump’s national security advisors went out of his way to recruit active duty military officers to fill many of the key positions. He made it clear that what the President wanted was a policy staff with real world experience of war, who understood the importance and uses of hard power and who were capable of keeping at bay the limp-wristed forces of compromise of the State Department’s diplomats. It seemed that soft power was out and hard power in.

In all fairness it should be noted that the Democrats were not always champions of the Foreign Service. The numbers of political appointees to ambassadorial positions reached a record high towards the end of the Obama administration. The appointment of political appointees in the Department went down five or six levels in the bureaucracy in order to assure that the president’s priorities would be carried out. If Republicans tended to think that diplomats were limp-wristed and liberal, the Democrats often saw them as doctrinaire conservatives unwilling to move with the liberal currents of the time.

Ironically one of the greatest defenders of the Foreign Service was the last general to be Secretary of State, Colin Powell. He pushed through a diplomatic readiness initiative which substantially increased the number of Foreign Service Officers and for the first time created a ‘float’ that enabled more officer to receive training.

The overall situation, however, is not so clear. Two of America’s most distinguished diplomats Ryan Crocker and Nicholas Burns recently drew attention to the hollowing out of American diplomacy in an article earlier this week in the New York times. They pointed out that “the United States is facing an extraordinary set of national security challenges. While we count on our military ultimately to defend the country, our diplomats are with it on front lines and in dangerous places around the world. They are our lead negotiators as we work with our European allies in NATO to contain growing Russian power on the Continent. They are our lead negotiators seeking a peaceful end to the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Our diplomats are assembling the coalition of countries in East Asia to counter the irresponsible regime of the North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-un.”

They are almost certainly right.

The traditional view of decision-making is that civilians do policy creation and definition and to a large extent carry it out. Only in extreme situation is the military called in to execute the policy. But what happens when both the Secretary of Defense, traditionally a civilian, and the national Security Advisor are both military men. The danger is clearly that military values and capabilities will come to dominate the policy debate. This arrangement seems to imply that military men will seek military solutions to problems that need diplomatic solutions.

However, many experts point out that the military worldview is essentially conservative. Historically presidents have found it hard to persuade the military to take action. All too often the Pentagon raises issues of resources, timing, capabilities and emphasizes the difficulty of taking action rather than the desirability of rushing to engage. They will do what they are told to do, but they are surprisingly risk averse. The lessons of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan have not been lost on them. They shy away from options that require boots on the ground. Hence the paralysis of American policy in Syria.

Pulling in the opposite direction is the revolution in military capabilities and the more frequent use of remote technologies which put few American lives at risk. Stand-off weapons facilitated by satellite or drone control seem relatively safe and often are recommended to the President as appropriate means of punishing international malefactors and terrorists. These rapidly evolving technologies probably contribute more to the militarization of American foreign policy than the question of whether those in charge wear uniforms or not. President Trump’s use of cruise missiles again a single airfield in Syria was a sign of this trend.

The discussion of resources is, in fact, complex. The military establishment frequently complains that it lacks the resources, whether in terms of manpower or equipment to fulfill the many tasks which the President wants it to carry out, particularly when the time frame for action is short. Military doctrine calls for the capability to fight two major wars simultaneously. That, of course, requires an ability to deploy an extraordinary range of land, sea and air forces. That well may be beyond the current capabilities of U.S. forces.

Yet civilians and diplomats, ambassadors in particular, also complain bitterly about the dramatic shortage of resources available for diplomacy. The dramatic decline in morale in the State Department reflects the perception that the political elite does not value diplomatic skills or the expertise which diplomats bring to the table. One recently retired senior Foreign Service Officer told a group several weeks ago that the atmosphere inside the State Department was one of “chaos and fear”. Hiring freezes, budget cuts, politicization of the senior policy levels in the State Department all point to this decline in respect for the core skills of diplomacy. Diplomats are, as I have indicated, too often seen as politically biased and, in the present context viscerally hostile to the President. The fact that last year over one hundred retired Ambassadors signed a letter calling on the American people to vote against President Trump only deepened the perception of potential disloyalty. Several recent dissent memoranda about the withdrawal from the Paris climate accords and of the failure to list Burma, Iraq and Afghanistan on the list of countries employing child soldiers have further fueled the distrust of the Foreign Service.

Nonetheless the senior military leadership and the top civilians at the Pentagon continue to be outspoken in their support for more resources for the State Department. They, unlike their political leaders, see diplomacy as the first line of defense. The military knows that it will be called in only when diplomacy has failed.

In sum, we are not facing a militarization of American foreign policy but the marginalization of diplomacy as the effective alternative to military force. The denigration and dismissal of soft power, even when it is renamed smart power, has led to a perception of diplomatic weakness and the concomitant rise of military influence on the policy process. It is a sad reality that there are more and more hammers in the policy toolbox and fewer alternative weapons. The result may be that a president anxious to make America great again and to demonstrate the effectiveness of American leadership and power may look for a place of his choosing to demonstrate American power. President Trump does not seem temperamentally interested in the prolonged and protracted process of diplomacy. His recent tweet questioning the utility of Secretary Tillerson’s efforts to engage the North Koreans in dialogue is an example of this skepticism. In these circumstances we should not be surprised if the United States were to decide to choose a target of opportunity in Iran or North Korea or Syria to show off its military might. This will not reflect the institutional militarization of American foreign policy but rather the emotional need of many Americans, frustrated by our loss of global standing to demonstrate that America can indeed be great again. Neither a resourced military nor a marginalized diplomacy should want that to happen.

### AT: NB – AT: Leverage Link

#### No leverage link – prefer studies

Morton 18 Christopher A. Morton, Major, United States Marine Corps, MA candidate, Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, BSBA, Ohio State University, “How Does United States Security Assistance Affect Host Nation Democratization?” MA thesis, June 2018, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1060022.pdf> /GoGreen!

This thesis asked the question: How does United States security assistance affect host nation democratization in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility? Does it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on host nation democratization? I also investigated what U.S. security assistance (SA) is typically designed to accomplish, how those policies came about, and how influential U.S. SA is compared to other factors. I analyzed evidence from case studies on Lebanon and Pakistan to find supporting points and counterpoints for the three main hypotheses: U.S. SA supports host nation democratization, U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization, and U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors. I concluded that United States security assistance has minimal effect on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors, because it is designed and resourced primarily to accomplish security objectives, not to drive enduring institutional reform.

Generally speaking, there is significantly more support for the third hypothesis in the democratization literature. The case of Lebanon supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA supports host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. The case of Pakistan supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. It is evident that U.S. SA is capable of affecting host nation governance either positively or negatively, but U.S. SA is significantly less influential than the host nation’s local and regional actors. This is an important point, because a common argument throughout the literature is the belief that U.S. SA is capable of significantly impacting the host nation’s institutions, political culture, civil society, etc. My view is that the influence of U.S. SA on host nation governance is frequently over-stated; but if it was resourced more heavily and designed to emphasize institutional reform, then it could better support host nation democratization.

Does U.S. SA support host nation democratization? I argue that U.S. SA can help prevent democratic backsliding, but it does not actively support democratization in the way that it is typically designed and resourced. If the United States supported host nation democratization via its inspirational democratic example (e.g., protecting human rights and individual liberties), then U.S. SA was not the conduit for broadcasting the U.S. democratic example. The evidence showed that two spikes in U.S. SA (between 0.8% and 1.4% of host nation GDP) were quickly followed by increases in democratization, but the largest spike in U.S. SA (upwards of 1.52% of host nation GDP, and conditioned on democracy-related reforms) did not increase democratization. 590 If aid conditionality supports host nation democratization, then the case studies indicate that the threshold is between 0.25% and 0.60% of host nation GDP.591 The evidence in both cases supported the idea that U.S. SA reinforced host nation security, which helped prevent state collapse and democratic backsliding, though it did not increase democratization. If U.S. security sector assistance generally supports host nation security sector reform—which then improved its civil-military relations and democratic governance—then the case studies indicated the threshold is above 10.5% of annual U.S. SA to the host nation.592 Overall, the cases provided little evidence to support this argument and plenty of evidence to undermine it.

Does U.S. SA undermine host nation democratization? I argue that U.S. SA does not undermine democratization as it is currently designed and resourced, but it could have an anti-democratic influence under the same design with excessive funding. Does U.S. SA to oppressive authoritarians’ security apparatuses undermine democratization? The case of Pakistan revealed two increases in democracy shortly after large spikes in U.S. SA given to military dictators, and both of those SA packages lacked democratic conditionality.593 If this mechanism is generalizable, then the activation threshold is above 0.85% of host nation GDP.594 Pakistan’s positive public opinion of U.S. personal freedoms in the 2000s undermined the argument that a bad U.S. democratic example deters host nation democratization.595 Both cases undermined the argument that Western foreign policy created a resistance toward Western liberal democracy. Both gave ample evidence of domestic and regional factors that can explain different forms of host nation democracy. I found no evidence that either country feared a Western-sponsored democratic revolution.

The most compelling causal mechanism was that U.S. SA (especially when it lacks democratic conditionality) creates an aid dependency dynamic. If U.S. SA reinforces a rentier class in the host nation society, then it likely undermined democracy. Before 2008, U.S. SA to Pakistan was below 6.14% and was followed by democratization. 596 After the 2008 increase in democracy, Pakistan’s Freedom House rating stayed at 4.5 through 2017; and from 2010–2014, U.S. SA averaged 7.37% of Pakistan’s government revenue. 597 This causal mechanism may activate when U.S. SA is above 6.14% of host nation government revenue, but that assumes that Pakistan has a notable rentier dynamic. If Pakistan does have a rentier dynamic, then U.S. SA was a notable contributor to it. I found that Pakistan’s military economy predated U.S. SA, and so U.S. SA may have entrenched it slightly, but it did not alter the fundamental dynamic of state governance. In short, U.S. SA and other aid sources were insufficient to create a rentier dynamic that did not already exist.

I argue that U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to domestic and regional actors. It is designed to accomplish U.S. security objectives. The programs capable of driving institutional reform are a meager share of overall U.S. SA. U.S. SA is rarely integrated with a whole-of-government effort for supporting host nation democratization, and when one could argue it is, the quantity and duration of funding is inadequate to supersede the influence of domestic and regional actors. When the host nation’s security interests diverge from those of the United States (e.g., post-9/11 Pakistan), the resulting agency loss increases the threshold of U.S. SA necessary to have a significant influence. Despite the stated theme of democracy promotion in U.S. policy documents, U.S. SA was primarily designed to accomplish security objectives. By design it was not able to compete with domestic and regional actors, and by quantity it is not enough to significantly influence host nation democratization.

B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The United States can pursue its security objectives and democratization agenda somewhat independently in accordance with its typical design and resourcing of U.S. SA. There is a continual debate in U.S. foreign policy circles regarding whether or not to use aid conditionality to incentivize democratization or to allow U.S. SA to focus solely on security objectives without constraints relating to host nation governance.598 I found no evidence that democracy-related aid conditionality on “traditional” forms of U.S. SA influenced host nation democratization, which means that such conditionality should be applied for other purposes (e.g., to satisfy U.S. legal requirement or political sensitivities).

If the United States wants to decisively support host nation democratization, then U.S. SA should go to recipients with good democratic prospects in sufficient quantity for adequate duration. U.S. SA would need to be designed as part of a whole-of-government support package and implemented for a generation or more. It would need to exceed 1.52% of host nation GDP and increasingly emphasize defense institution building programs and other programs that bolster host nation civil-military relations. 599 Anything less is unlikely to support host nation democratization decisively. How would a head of state decide where to commit its resources to promote democracy if it cannot afford to take this approach worldwide? I concur with Ottaway that there are two basic choices. The United States can lower its democracy promotion policy ambitions and settle for sub-standard democracies, or it can abandon some countries in which democratic prospects are particularly dim and focus its resources on countries that are more likely to democratize.600 U.S. SA would go to states that largely share U.S. security interests (which reduces agency loss); have a high GDP, a history of democracy, and some form of civil society (which supports democratic consolidation); have neighboring democratic examples; have host nation elites willing to democratize; and have the institutional capacity to absorb the assistance.

#### DoS crowds themselves out anyway

Butler 17 Larry Butler, Ambassador (ret.), served nearly 38 years in the Foreign Service in the Balkans, Scandinavia, South America and the Middle East, former deputy assistant secretary of State for Iraq, U.S. ambassador in Macedonia, and acting chief of mission in the former Yugoslavia, “Creeping Foreign Policy Militarization or Creeping State Department Irrelevance?” The Foreign Service Journal, June 2017, <https://afsa.org/creeping-foreign-policy-militarization-or-creeping-state-department-irrelevance> /GoGreen!

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have seen a steady outpouring of books and articles lamenting the trend in Washington to see foreign policy through a military lens: Rosa Brooks’ How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, Lorelei Kelly’s Unbalanced Security: The Divide between State and Defense, and Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray’s Mission Creep—The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy, among others.

Why might one have this view? Is it that the Defense Department’s huge budget, personnel and other capabilities give it an advantage? Is it due to how the military is organized—with geographic combatant commands that have effective control over policy and activities across their areas of responsibility, whereas State’s regional bureaus are misaligned with military counterparts and assistant secretaries deal via turf-conscious bilateral ambassadors numbering up to 40 or more, and have little say over how USAID spends its money?

Has Foggy Bottom lost relevance in the foreign affairs arena by emphasizing soft-power social agendas (e.g., the creation of special envoys for various religions, LGBTQ, the Holocaust, global youth and global women’s affairs) that are distinctly American over hard-power national security interests (e.g., strong international security and healthy economic systems that protect allies and provide opportunities for American businesses)? Or is it, perhaps, simply that the Foreign Service is either late in arriving or missing from the field where the military is operating?

The answer, of course, is all of the above. But there are two broad aspects of the problem that I believe are fundamental: first, the proliferation of priorities at the State Department following the end of the Cold War; and second, the missed opportunities at State during the past 20 years of joint operations with the military to institutionalize the kind of professional and personal relationships that would enable the smaller Foreign Service to exert leadership in the foreign policy arena at home and abroad.

A Proliferation of Priorities

The end of the Cold War and the so-called “end of history” marked a shift for the State Department. We hired a more diverse Foreign Service that, in turn, took on a broader range of narrower activities that more resemble small-picture social engineering than traditional, big-picture diplomacy. At the same time, State reallocated existing resources to create an alphabet soup of new under secretaries, functional bureaus, offices and special envoys. At its peak during the Obama administration, there were more than 50 of the latter. As Ambassador Jim Jeffrey observes in a March 3 piece in Foreign Policy, neither the 2010 nor the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review focuses on “traditional” diplomacy. The department has diffused its energy too broadly to the neglect of fundamentals, and this, in turn, left a vacuum that the military has had to fill.

New State Department priorities include such things as this, for example. In Muslim-majority Indonesia in 2014 and 2015, not long before the deadly January 2016 extremist terrorist attack on Starbucks and other locations rocked the capital, Jakarta, our consulate in Surabaya produced impressive Hispanic heritage month YouTube videos of its celebrations, which included spending money to bring Los Angeles artists to paint murals on the walls of a local school and sponsor fun runs for local girls. Similarly, in March the U.S. embassy in Macedonia—a country with simmering interethnic tensions and endemic corruption that hasn’t had a government since elections in early December 2016—flew in a lawyer from the Office of the Special Counsel to lecture locals on the Hatch Act, even as refugees streamed north from Greece and European-born Islamic State group fighters returned from Syrian battlefields.

A solely military response is not sufficient. We want to increasingly involve other elements of the U.S. government and the international community, recognizing that it is only through a combination of capabilities that we will achieve and sustain our strongest deterrence posture.

—General Joseph Votel,

Commander, U.S. Central Command,

March 9, 2017

In religiously conservative Uganda, a U.S. Army commander there to train units in combating the Lord’s Resistance Army and al-Shabaab in Somalia had to deal with backlash from an angry counterpart when the U.S. embassy flew the rainbow flag high over Kampala in a righteous response to that country’s persecution of the LGBTQ community. That subsequently set back efforts to combat other forms of violent abuses of human rights in eastern Africa.

One general commented, “If everything is a priority for the State Department, nothing is.”

On its own, each example represents admirable commitment by the Foreign Service to human rights, social progress and good governance policy efforts. But collectively, that commitment ignores the opportunity cost of not prioritizing activities more immediate to countering violent extremism, promoting economic prosperity and strengthening the security necessary to address higher-order human rights and civic goals.

The proliferation of activities that pander to U.S. domestic special interests and divert resources from other work, and whose effectiveness cannot easily be measured, is one aspect of the creeping irrelevance of American diplomacy. This problem has been compounded by the Foreign Service’s apparent unwillingness or inability to work with the U.S. military when they need us the most.

### AT: NB – AT: Mission Creep Link

#### No mission creep link – DoD self-restrains – AND fiat solves anyway

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, <https://www.fpri.org/docs/Reveron_-_Call_the_Pentagon.pdf> /GoGreen! \*added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

With shared challenges of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and shared goals of development and protecting human security, there are unprecedented levels of international cooperation to share information, target terrorists, and provide governments the tools they need to confront national threats before they become regional ones. This is on display in Afghanistan where 50 countries operate under the ISAF flag, or in the Indian Ocean where 27 countries operate as Combined Maritime Forces. At the center of the coalitions is a U.S.-sponsored framework to enable partners to contribute to international security.

President Barack Obama intends to continue the American tradition of enabling partners throughout the globe. As he noted in his second inaugural address, “America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad. For no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation.” By training and equipping other militaries, the goal is to reduce U.S. American military presence internationally and allow others to provide for their own security. This has positive benefits not only for the U.S. defense budget (e.g., an Afghan soldier costs hundreds per month compared to an American soldier who costs thousands per month), but also for international security. While my earlier book Exporting Security explains why the United States assists governments from Afghanistan to Zambia, an overlooked area is security assistance provided to developed countries.

CAPACITY MATTERS

As France recently learned in Mali, while it has capable ground forces and aircraft, it has limited ability to sustain these forces just 2,000 miles from home. To support its foreign policy agenda, France needed the United States Air Force to fly its forces and refuel its attack aircraft. As the operation continues, the United States will probably provide intelligence for French and African forces as they shift to stability operations.

Counterterrorism can certainly explain U.S. intervention in Mali; however, enabling French success explains the timeline. More importantly, the case of U.S.-supported French intervention in Mali is illustrative of the role the United States plays in supporting developed countries. France is the latest developed country to need U.S. assistance, but requests like this are common. This is true for almost every one of the 50 countries serving in Afghanistan today, as it was true with European countries in the Balkans, Australian forces in East Timor, and British forces in West Africa. These examples highlight that the foreign policy goals of many developed countries exceed their military capacity, which requires them to rely on the U.S. military for assistance. As developed countries’ defense budgets fall further, reliance on the United States is going to increase. This remains a decades-old frustration. Most recently, the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, “There is a lower limit on how little we can spend on defense, while living up to our responsibilities."7

Pragmatically, the United States would like its partners to do more, but shared challenges and limited budgets will reinforce the value of American logistics, combat experience, and intelligence capacity. Further, American support of other countries reinforces the treaty arrangements with 27 NATO countries and five Asian countries. Twenty years ago, there seemed to be little relevance to these treaties and security arrangements, let alone a rationale for invoking them or expanding them. Yet, the opposite occurred. NATO increased its membership three times from 16 to 19 in 1999, again to 26 in 2006, and again to 28 in 2009. At the same time the number of NATO members increased, NATO changed from its traditional mission of territorial defense to one of global security engagement. With each expansion, new members require training and equipping to NATO standards. With each new operation, NATO countries require access to U.S. intelligence, critical technology, and global logistics.

In addition to formal treaties of alliance, an additional dozen countries are offered protection under the U.S. security umbrella either by law, such as the Taiwan Relations Act or by policy such as United States’ support for Israel.8 These protections include provisions to train and equip their militaries. Another dozen countries are offered special security provisions through Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status. MNNA does not confer a mutual defense relationship, but the largely symbolic act implies a close working relationship with another country's defense forces.9 It is more akin to a preferred buyer’s program allowing countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea access to advanced weapons systems. With weapons purchases also come long-term training and maintenance contracts. From a U.S. perspective, it has a comparative advantage in defense exports; strategically, programs like these are intended to overcome the free-rider problem the United States faces with its partners.10 For every Joint Strike Fighter Japan buys, the United States can deploy one less to northeast Asia.

Given the diplomatic nature of these security partnerships, the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs focuses these activities, regulates the defense trade and arms transfers to reinforce the military capabilities of friends, allies, and coalition partners, and ensures that the transfer of U.S.-origin defense equipment and technology supports U.S. national security interests. Further, the Bureau promotes regional security through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and dialogue, as well as through the provision of security assistance to friendly countries and international peacekeeping efforts. The overall goals of security assistance include creating favorable military balances of power (e.g., selling weapons and training to Saudi Arabia to balance Iran), advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements (e.g., collaborating with Japan on missile defense technology), building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations (e.g., South Korea), and preventing crisis and conflict (e.g., facilitating Colombia’s success against the decades-old FARC insurgency). Historically, Israel has been the largest recipient of security assistance and its neighbor Egypt benefited from its recognition of Israel and the Camp David Accords.11 Given its proximity to the United States and challenges with drug trafficking organizations, Mexico has recently emerged as a top recipient of security assistance. Given the history of American military interventions in Mexico, this has required new efforts to build trust to reassure the government that it seeks to strengthen it and not undermine it.12

One reason the United States concentrates assistance on just a few countries is to promote particular countries as regional leaders. In practice, this means that Jordan hosts an international special operations exercise, peace operations training center, and an international police training center. Or in Latin America, Colombia provides helicopter training for regional militaries and El Salvador hosts a regional peacekeeping institute, attracting military personnel from countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. Given the significant U.S. investment in Afghanistan’s military and police training infrastructure, it is likely that Afghanistan could eventually host regional training if the insurgency subsides to acceptable levels. This approach not only strengthens key partners, but it also reduces the need for American presence and the negative attention it sometimes generates. We see the benefits of this today where U.S.-trained Colombian pilots are training Mexican pilots in Colombia.

**[Table 1: Top Recipients of U.S. International Assistance (Account 150) OMITTED]**

In addition to the Department of State budget for security assistance, the Defense Department directly funds security assistance through section 1206/7 and other command funds such as Commander’s Emergency Response Program. This authority did provoke more concern about militarizing foreign policy; however, this only makes up about $1 billion annually, which is less than 15 percent of security assistance funded by the State Department. Further, U.S. ambassadors must approve all programs. Thus, the Department of State exerts considerable control of programs at both budgetary and implementation levels through the embassy country team.

CHANGING ROLE OF THE MILITARY

With national security focused on weak states and persistent security concerns among stable allies like South Korea, the U.S. military has been changing over the last 20 years from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The military has learned that partnership is better than clientism and is adapting its command structure once optimized for waging major combat to one that is focused on conflict prevention. There is still a tremendous warfighting capability in the U.S. military, but coalition warfare is the norm and developing compatible warfighting partners is a key goal of this cooperative strategy. In some sense, this turns the idea of militarization of foreign policy on its head; the Pentagon is being demilitarized and valued for its ability to impart military capabilities to U.S. partners.

Given the current structure of the international system and technological advances, the United States does not need partners in the same way as it did in the past where they provided direct benefits through coaling stations, maintenance facilities, or large bases. While the number of forward bases is still substantial, the number of forward deployed forces are greatly reduced. More importantly, the nature of the presence has changed; the United States aspires to create true partners that can confront their own threats to internal stability (e.g., assistance to Colombia’s military) or alleviate security dilemmas (e.g., future basing in Australia). It also seeks to foster independence by training and equipping militaries to support the global demand for peacekeepers.14 The United States certainly gets increased access to countries around the world through these programs, but given the overwhelming military dominance of the United States, it does not abuse these relationships or ignore seemingly insignificant states. Instead, it seeks to create partners where sovereignty is respected and all parties derive benefits. The latest example of this is U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as dictated by a U.S.-Iraqi agreement.

While the Defense Department’s capacity certainly explains why international assistance missions increasingly have a military face, it is also essential to understand that there is a global demand for U.S. security assistance. The Defense Department has recognized that there are limits to what it can do; the military wants and needs partners from across the government, allies and private organizations. Unfortunately, these ideas remain stunted [overlooked] in the broader foreign policy community that gets easily overwhelmed by the size of the Defense Department’s resources. For critics, U.S. military activities in permissive environments bring old memories of invasion or coup. For them, U.S. foreign policy is on a dangerous militarization path. While that part of U.S. military history is real and still resonates in many parts of the world, it is wrong to overlook the changes that have occurred over the last two decades. Further, it is wrong to overlook the significant demands developed countries place on the United States.

### AT: NB – AT: Turf Wars Link

#### No turf wars link – AND no impact to minor tensions

Reveron 7 Derek S. Reveron, professor at the U.S. Naval War College, PhD public policy analysis, MA political science, University of Illinois at Chicago, “Shaping and Military Diplomacy,” prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 8-30-2007, <http://www.faoa.org/resources/documents/apsa07_proceeding_210193.pdf> /GoGreen!

Setting this aside, the military’s active involvement in diplomacy does not preclude cooperation with the State Department. In fact, a combatant commander works extremely closely with his Political Advisor (POLAD) and the country teams where his engagement programs occur. With time-limited tours of duty, a combatant commander needs support from outside his military staff. Occasionally, there are tensions with strategic impact. “Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.”73 However, both U.S. ambassadors and combatant commanders understand they need each other’s cooperation. If done well, military shaping activities are coordinated with other interagency activities beginning at the national level where both the State Department and Office of Secretary of Defense derive priorities and guidance from the National Security Strategy, which in turn drives theater security cooperation plans and mission strategic plans. 74 Yet an ambassador’s focus on one country and a combatant commander’s focus on an entire region necessitate coordination. A combatant command can serve as a regional hub of not only coordination, but also interagency and combined planning.

#### BUT, even if there are, CP alone does NOT solve them – the logic of their “slippery slope” link means DoD will keep pushing regardless – AND DoS can’t and won’t try to stop them, even with more authority

House 16 Carole N. House, former Captain, U.S. Army, served in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, with the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division as assistant chief of operations and intelligence collection manager, graduate student, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, B.A. University of Georgia, “Proposal of an Unconventional Warfare Strategy to Dominate the Human Domain,” Small Wars Journal, 3-7-2016, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/proposal-of-an-unconventional-warfare-strategy-to-dominate-the-human-domain> /GoGreen!

Some broader changes necessary to support long-term strategic operations are more elusive to accomplish. Most government agencies and military leadership will resist working under to the State Department’s direction. U.S. leadership must engineer a transformation of the traditions of tension into a tradition of cooperation and respectful understanding of each element’s role in accomplishing the mission. Establishing a regular rotation of joint assignments among government agency and military personnel could support interagency understanding and repair relationships for the conduct of joint operations.[xvii] The State Department must also accept its role as the institution responsible for achieving all U.S. foreign policy objectives and the task of leadership within the government inherent in this responsibility. All of the other departments must embrace their critical role in supporting U.S. foreign policy with direction and expertise in political warfare provided by the OUW.

### AT: NB – AT: NATO Demo I/L

#### DoD’s more likely to solve NATO backsliding

McCarthy 19 Deborah A. McCarthy, Visiting Senior Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “The Militarization of US Foreign Policy,” FIIA Comment 13, November 2019, <https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/comment13_militarization-of-us-foreign-policy.pdf> /GoGreen!

Much has been written on the “militarization” of US foreign policy. Since 9/11, the Department of Defense expanded its non-combat activities into areas normally reserved for traditional diplomacy. In 2005, it was given a mandate to build “indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society”. While the initial focus was on Iraq and Afghanistan, it allowed the Department to do the same in other regions.

In 2009, the Department’s international mandate broadened to “strengthening governance and the rule of law and fostering economic stability and development”. Congress added new authorities, most recently allowing the US military to work with non-military security forces. The Defense Department now manages a greater portion of security assistance than the Department of State. The Trump Administration continues to favor the use of the US military over US diplomacy to address great-power competition. It has increased the defense budget while slashing that for diplomacy; for 2020, it requested a 4.9% increase for the Defense Department and proposed a 21% cut for the State Department. Today, the Department of Defense plays an important role in US foreign policy.

This expanded role is visible in Europe. Despite tirades by President Donald Trump on the value of NATO, and finger-pointing on member contributions, US military engagement with NATO and in Europe continues, with broad Congressional and public support. Through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), the US military has increased its forward presence and exercises with allies and partners. Through Operation Atlantic Resolve, the US European Command added US troop rotations across Eastern Europe and prepositioned equipment. The Defense Department also boosted training and assistance for Georgia and Ukraine. The increased US military presence in Europe was triggered by Russia’s invasion of Crimea and aimed at reassuring allies along Europe’s eastern frontier. Today, it is part of a broader US and NATO deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia.

The Defense Department has become involved in institution-building in the region, normally the purview of diplomacy. Examples include repairing schools, conducting anti-corruption workshops, and law enforcement training. The gray zone challenges in Europe, especially cyber and disinformation, are being addressed primarily by the Defense Department. Whereas the State Department eliminated the office of the Cyber Coordinator, the Defense Department broadened its networks and now includes civilian authorities in exercises. Whereas the State Department has very little funding to fight Russian disinformation, the Defense Department is expanding initiatives within EUCOM and with NATO.

The consequences of the increased militarization of US foreign policy for transatlantic relations are threefold.

First, US engagement in Europe appears more militarized. The addition of US forces and the increased tempo of exercises has meant that tens of thousands of US troops have moved across Europe visible to all civilians. A publicity campaign has been waged to highlight this commitment. New security agreements are being signed and celebrated, including the new letter on security cooperation between the US, Finland and Sweden. The increased US pressure on burden sharing, although not always well received, has meant even more defense discussions.

In contrast, US diplomatic engagement has decreased. President Trump’s negative rhetoric about Europe, the decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA), and friction on issues such as Nord Stream II have disrupted normal diplomatic discourse. There have been no US-EU Summits since President Trump took office and subgroups on energy and cyber have not met in several years.

Secondly, joint efforts to address threats to democracy in the region will likely be carried out or funded by the Defense Department. The State Department simply does not have the resources: for 2018, its budget for all of Europe and Eurasia was $1.2 billion. The budget for EDI alone was $4.5 billion.

Thirdly, beyond Europe, US-European cooperation is more likely to advance in military rather than in policy channels. On China, for example, where policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are unable to agree on a comprehensive approach, defense officials are working together to address China’s new military muscle in forums such as the US France Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue. In Africa, where US and EU policymakers have vastly different strategies, military cooperation continues to fight terrorism, crime and human trafficking.

The enhanced position of the Defense Department in US foreign policy is likely to continue. The US military has not sought this role. Indeed, US military leaders have repeatedly called for restoring balance between the use of military and diplomatic tools and for funding the State Department. Despite these appeals, the Trump Administration’s preference for using the US military will further increase the militarization of US foreign policy.

For Europe, leveraging defense ties can help balance diplomatic disconnects across the transatlantic. While there are challenges in defense policy, defense relations may prove to be the steadier foundation for transatlantic cooperation in the near future.

#### DoS’s heavy-handed conditionality backfires

Ellehuus 21 Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former principal director for European and NATO policy in the Pentagon; and Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow with CSIS’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, former deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division in the French foreign service; “NATO Should Finally Take Its Values Seriously,” War On The Rocks, 6-9-2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/nato-should-take-its-values-seriously/> /GoGreen! \*added [freezing]

The Price of Unity

Admittedly, pursuing a tougher course of action on values and principles comes with risks. Even measured steps could create serious rifts among allies, with the potential of paralyzing [freezing] the alliance. Because NATO operates by consensus, any punitive action on an ally could provoke retaliatory action on other NATO business. In reaction to Norway’s stark criticisms against the Portuguese and Greek regimes at a June 1971 foreign ministers meeting, then-NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio warned that “if we undermine our solidarity, we run the risk of undermining the substance of our alliance.”

Overcoming this dilemma between prioritizing values and preserving unity requires a graduated, collective, and dispassionate approach. First, NATO will need to be proportionate when dealing with an ally violating trans-Atlantic values. Allies should start with discussions behind closed doors rather than publicize the dispute. Open and frank dialogue among allies should always be the first step before adopting restrictive measures. If NATO moves too quickly or aggressively, it risks being counterproductive by widening divisions in the alliance. At the end of the day, this progressive approach should have a deterrent effect on NATO countries, especially on those that value their membership in the alliance and do not want to be singled out as “bad allies.”

Second, NATO’s response should be as collective and resolute as possible. If pressure is applied by only a few NATO countries, the ally in question may not take the warning seriously and could use the divisions among allies to avoid accountability. If enough allies agree to lean on a problematic NATO country, then accepting short-term disunity for the sake of preserving trans-Atlantic values could be worth it. In 2019, Turkey ultimately decided to lift its longstanding veto to the defense plans of Poland and the Baltic states because it was facing a growing and consistent pressure from numerous allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The unity of the members of the Quad was critical in that case and changed Ankara’s strategic calculus.

Last but not least, all allies must be subject to the same objective criteria and scrutiny. Otherwise, the backsliding ally will simply claim it is being singled out and dismiss the charges. The International Secretariat can be helpful here by conducting an impartial, evenhanded assessment. Strong involvement of NATO’s secretary general will also be key in preserving political cohesion through this thorny process. Recently, Secretary General Stoltenberg played an instrumental role in easing the tensions between Greece and Turkey through the establishment of a bilateral de-confliction mechanism in which he did not assess blame but merely facilitated dialogue to be informed by international rules and norms.

#### Democracy does NOT save NATO

Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/democracy-summit-china-russia/2021/12/03/d64d4544-537a-11ec-8769-2f4ecdf7a2ad_story.html> /GoGreen!

There are many good reasons to host such a gathering. It’s smart politics, fulfills a campaign commitment and counters the perception, fostered by President Donald Trump, that America is no longer interested in promoting democracy and human rights. But as a geopolitical instrument, drawing lines between democracies and autocracies is not only certain to disappoint — it’s also a deeply flawed organizing principle for America’s approach to the world.

China and Russia, which Biden has also singled out for criticism, are not the main causes of the weakening of democracies around the world. Most of the backsliding, according to a recent study, has been caused by erosion within the world’s democracies, including the United States and many of its allies. Indeed, the upcoming summit includes a number of countries — India, Brazil, the Philippines and Poland among them — marked by growing autocratic movements and infringements on freedom of expression and a free press. And pushing these and other countries to reform their political, electoral or judicial institutions from the outside is hard if not impossible.

Biden isn’t the first and won’t be the last American president to make democracy promotion central to his foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson wanted to make the world “safe for democracy”; Franklin Roosevelt promulgated the Atlantic Charter. The Clinton administration was present at the creation of the Community of Democracies. George W. Bush had his Freedom Agenda and talked about ridding the world of dictators. All found democracy promotion a useful tool to advance U.S. values and interests.

Biden seems to genuinely believe that democrats and dictators are in a do-or-die battle over who will own the 21st century. Though he insists that he doesn’t want a new cold war, some of his overcharged rhetoric belies this view. In March, Biden announced his intention “to invite an alliance of democracies to come here to discuss the future,” including holding “China accountable to follow the rules” on issues such as persecution of its Uyghur citizens and its territorial disputes with Taiwan. Biden has said of China’s President Xi Jinping that he “doesn’t have a democratic bone . . . in his body” and that Xi believes “democracy cannot keep up with” China.

It is simplistic to believe, however, that Chinese and Russian foreign policies are driven by the ideological impulse to spread autocracy. Both countries see the United States as their main geopolitical adversary and seek to undermine American influence and alliances wherever they can; the Chinese are also bent on outcompeting the United States in 21st-century technologies.

But the Russians don’t have an authoritarian model for export, and other autocratic-minded governments don’t need inspiration from Moscow to run kleptocratic, corrupt, repressive and misgoverned regimes. Putin’s overriding priority is self-preservation and the preservation of his regime. What evidence is there that he believes these objectives can be achieved only if the rest of the world looks like Russia?

Likewise, Xi’s main priority is maintaining his control and the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on power. He is all too happy to claim that the Chinese government is outperforming America’s dysfunctional system. But it is simply not the case that he thinks these goals require Beijing to actively spread authoritarianism with Chinese characteristics abroad. And China’s wealth and power, not to mention its social stability, depend on competing effectively within the interdependent global economic system, not toppling it.

Another flaw in the Biden administration’s approach is the presumption that all democracies think alike based on their shared commitment to democratic values. If only it were that simple. Values do shape a nation’s foreign policy, but history, geography, culture, political ideology and material interests also matter. It is precisely for these reasons that America’s democratic allies and partners do not see eye to eye on how to deal with China or Russia — and why they shouldn’t be forced to choose sides between the United States and the authoritarians.

#### US backsliding thumps

Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/democracy-summit-china-russia/2021/12/03/d64d4544-537a-11ec-8769-2f4ecdf7a2ad_story.html> /GoGreen!

There’s also the politically inconvenient question of whether the United States is best positioned to lead this effort. Rarely has America’s democracy crusade abroad contrasted more with its commitment to democratic practices at home — where the threats include Trump’s false claims that the presidential election was “stolen,” an insurrection to stop a democratic transition and efforts to restrict voting rights. America has a glass-house problem, and it needs to promote its democratic virtues with considerable humility. According to Freedom House’s annual country-by-country assessment of political and civil rights, the United States continued to experience erosion in democratic practices in 2020;over the past decade, America’s score dropped from 94 to 83 out of 100, among the steepest falls of any country during this period.

It is hard to take seriously the notion that the United States can restore its “soft power” by virtue of the example it is setting at home. A recent Pew Research Center study found that a median of only 17 percent of people in surveyed countries thought U.S. democracy worth emulating, while 23 percent said it had never offered a good example. It is also hard to quibble with the proposition that America’s influence abroad is waning primarily because of its domestic problems, rather than authoritarian muscle-flexing in Moscow or Beijing.

#### The US is irrelevant – other members and the EU either thump OR solve

Katz 18 Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, former deputy assistant administrator in the Europe and Eurasia bureau at USAID, former senior advisor to the assistant secretary in the International Organization Affairs Bureau at the U.S. Department of State; and Torrey Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, former foreign policy advisor in the German Bundestag and in the Transatlantic Division of the German Foreign Office; “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” 7-10-2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/> /GoGreen!

Regardless of U.S. leadership or support, other NATO states such as the Nordic countries, Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other members must play a role in prioritizing NATO’s core values at the Brussels Summit and strengthening democratic institutions. In speaking to diplomats from several member states, it is clear that they recognize the growing democracy deficit in the alliance, and that the United States will likely not lead the charge on championing democratic institutions. In response, officials from such member states can use bilateral meetings and sideline conversations with the Hungarians, Poles, and Turks to raise concerns. Already the European Union is pressing Poland on its violation of EU democratic principles with the threat of sanctions and suspension of voting privileges. The security implications of their transgressions give NATO a role in maintaining this pressure, too.

### AT: NB – AT: Global Demo I/L

#### No modelling

Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/democracy-summit-china-russia/2021/12/03/d64d4544-537a-11ec-8769-2f4ecdf7a2ad_story.html> /GoGreen!

It is simplistic to believe, however, that Chinese and Russian foreign policies are driven by the ideological impulse to spread autocracy. Both countries see the United States as their main geopolitical adversary and seek to undermine American influence and alliances wherever they can; the Chinese are also bent on outcompeting the United States in 21st-century technologies.

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### AT: NB – AT: Demo ! – DPT

#### No impact to democracy – confounding variables control

Doorenspleet ’19 [Renske; 2019; Political Science and International Studies Professor at Warwick University; Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, “Democracy and Interstate War,” Ch. 3]

This finding or ‘law’ has not only been recognized by scholars of international relations, but also found its way outside academia and has influenced foreign policies to promote peace and democracy, most prominently since the 1990s. However, my book will not draw conclusions based on ‘cherry-picking’ of specific studies showing how peaceful democracies are, but on a systematic overview of studies in this field. Therefore, this book relies on my own database with hundreds of different studies, which are relevant for each chapter; the articles had to engage directly with the chapter’s main research question. The next section will provide more detailed information around the selection criteria. This overview includes both highly cited and recent articles which were selected in a systematic way.

Based on analyses of statistical studies around this topic of democracy and war, it will become clear that the overall statistical support for the democratic peace hypothesis is not strong at all. In the rest of the chapter, I will spell out four reasons why democracy does not cause peace, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak: (1) most studies do not find a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level, and they show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, or even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one, (2) the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear, (3) democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive, and (4) the process of democratization is dangerous and living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country.

In my view, it is difficult—if not impossible—to support the democratic peace hypothesis without any reservations. The key caveats should not be ignored and certainly deserve more attention before we can confidently argue that democracies are more peaceful than other types of political systems. Please notice that I can already reveal that the assumed link between democracy and intrastate war is problematic as well, but this topic will be at the core of the next chapter (Chapter 4).

Selection of Articles: Democracy and War

The instrumental value of democracy cannot convincingly be found in democracy’s expected bond with peace. I have come to this conclusion on the basis of an analysis of statistical studies, which will be discussed in the rest of this chapter. So how did I select the articles for my database?4

For this chapter and Chapter 4, I selected the articles that focused on war and democracy. Using the online database Web of Science (formerly known as Web of Knowledge), I identified a total of almost 8000 articles published in the sampled journals until the end of 2015. I identifed them by entering ‘democr\*’ in the basic search field; this asterisk (\*)-based ‘wildcard’ allows searching for terms including ‘democratic’, ‘democracy’, and ‘democratization’ (in both British and American spellings) simultaneously, in the title, abstract and/or the keywords. As a next step, I excluded articles in which ‘democracy’ is used as synonym for state (e.g. analysis of the relationship between immigration policies and unemployment in European democracies) or a specific political party or movement (e.g. the ‘Democrats’ in the USA, or Uganda’s People’s Democratic Army) or a specifc country (e.g. the Democratic Republic of Congo). In addition, I identified them by entering ‘war\*’ in the basic search feld. The words democracy (democr\*) and war (war\*) need to be mentioned in title and/or abstract—and I also checked for equivalents of ‘war’ like ‘conflict’ and ‘dispute’ and ‘no peace’.5

As it is not feasible to analyse thousands of articles, it is necessary to take a next step in the selection process. I decided to select these articles, which will be part of the database for the third and fourth chapter, in three different ways. The first method is to choose the articles with the most citations. So, for example, in Chapter 3, the articles which are cited more than a hundred times are included in this first list. The article by Beck et al. (1998) has been cited more than 951 times, and as a consequence, this article is part of the database. But also articles with a much lower number of citations (such as Barbieri 1996, with 179 citations) are included in my analyses.

The second method is simply to include the most recent articles published in the past five years, so since beginning 2011 until end 2015. The most recent articles can easily be overlooked by applying the first method of most quoted articles. In my view, however, they still need to be included as they present the most recent findings and engage with the recent and innovative debates, which cannot be ignored in this book. For example, recent studies on democracy and interstate war (Chapter 3) have paid more attention to the mechanisms (see, e.g., Zeigler et al. 2014), and there is a growing attention for the impact of political institutions in recent studies on democracy and intrastate war (Chapter 4; see, e.g., Walter 2015). Those recent findings cannot be ignored in any systematic analysis of statistical studies on this theme.

The third method is the most subjective approach of selecting articles, as it is based on the ‘snowballing method’. So it includes articles which have not been selected by the first and second methods, but which have been quoted extensively and regularly by the previously selected articles. For example, the article by Bethany Lacina (2006) cannot be selected based on having high citations (the first method) and it cannot be included based on being a recent publication (the second method), but it has been mentioned by key studies and hence surfaces via the snowballing method (a third method). This article is important as it clearly distinguishes the determinants of conflict severity from those for conflict onset, and those determinants seem to be quite different, which is crucial information for Chapter 4.

In this way, my study presents and assesses the findings based on a big pool of statistical studies in the published literature. Based on this assessment, I will be able to draw clearer conclusions concerning the significance of the effects of democracy on interstate war (this chapter) and intrastate war (the next chapter). The Appendix shows more detailed information of the selected articles.

The Democratic Peace Hypothesis, Its Roots and Supporters

The democratic peace hypothesis6 states that democracies never or seldom go to war with one another. Where is this powerful idea of ‘democratic peace’ coming from? Before discussing the main findings of the statistical articles and before describing the four caveats of the ‘democratic peace paradigm’, we need to know a bit more around the background and the roots of this idea.

Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay Perpetual Peace has often been mentioned as the foundation for this hypothesis. Kant believed peace was difficult to achieve, since ‘the natural state is one of war’ (Kant 1795: 10). A state of peace must therefore be established for—in his view—it is certain that hostilities will be committed and people need to be protected from each other. In such a world, each may treat his neighbour, from whom he demands security, as an enemy. In a dictatorship where ‘the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasures of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like. He may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it’ (Kant 1795: 13).

In contrast, the situation is different in constitutional republics, according to Kant. He argued that the majority of the people in republics would never vote to go to war, except for pure self-defence. Therefore, a world with only republics would be peaceful, since there would be no aggressors. The republican constitution, which requires the consent of the citizens to start a war, gives the positive prospect of perpetual peace.

It is important to note that the ideas of Kant on the one hand and the modern democratic peace scholars on the other hand are not completely similar. For example, Kant talked about republics instead of democratic states as the ideal states to achieve peace. He defined republican states as states with representative governments, in which the legislature is separated from the executive. Not surprisingly—considering the epoch in which he lived—Kant did not include universal suffrage in his definition, which is now seen as an essential dimension of democracy, even of the most minimalist types of democracy (Dahl 1971; see also Chapter 2). Moreover, Kant argued that republics will be at peace in general, which means that such political systems are expected to be not only in peace with each other, but also with other non-republican systems. Nowadays, only few scholars would support this approach of a ‘monadic democratic peace’. As will become clear at the end of this chapter, there is not much evidence for the idea that democracies are more peaceful in general.

Since the 1960s, most statistical studies have not focused on the ‘monadic democratic peace hypothesis’ but on testing the ‘dyadic democratic peace hypothesis’. This dyadic hypothesis states that it is less likely that democracies fight with each other, compared to other ‘dyads’ or other pairs of different types of political systems. The sociologist Dean Babst was the first scholar who started to build on Kant’s old idea in the ‘dyadic’ way, and decided to test it in statistical studies (Babst 1964, 1972). He concluded that ‘no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective governments between 1789 and 1941’ (Babst 1972: 55). His study was not published in one of the journals in the field of international relations, but in a sociological journal and later in Industrial Research. Therefore, it was not read by international relations scholars, and initially, it did not get the attention it deserved in the field of international politics.

Babst’s work was, for example, not cited by Melvin Small and J. David Singer (1976), and their fndings seemed to contradict Babst’s study. However, Small and Singer did not compare the rates of war proneness for democracies and dictatorships, but instead they focused on the question whether wars involving democratic states have historically been significantly different in length or in degree of violence compared to wars involving only dictatorships. For length and degree of violence during the wars, they did not find a difference between democracies and dictatorships, so they concluded that types of political systems did not matter.7 A few years later, Rudolph J. Rummel did cite Babst’s work and replicated Babst’s idea in statistical tests, which were described in the fourth book of his five-volume Understanding Confict and War (1975– 1981). He found clear support for his eleventh (of the 33) propositions about causes and conditions of conflict, which stated that ‘Libertarian systems mutually preclude violence’ (Rummel 1979: 279).

Eventually, those innovative studies from the 1970s helped to evoke the interest in the democratic peace proposition, and in the expected peaceful nature of relationships among democratic states. Since the 1980s, the number of quantitative studies has increased considerably, accumulating into an impressive field of research in international relations with its own ‘empirical law’ of democratic peace (Levy 1989: 270; see also Ray 1998).

This democratic peace hypothesis has not only received support from political scientists, but also from politicians and policy makers. Particularly since 1993, the idea of a democratic peace has inspired American foreign policies aimed at the promotion of peace and democracy. As the 42nd president of the USA (1993–2001), Bill Clinton was the first politician who explicitly bridged the gap between these findings in international relations on the one hand, and his foreign policy strategy on the other hand, at least rhetorically. Anthony Lake, who was Clinton’s National Security Adviser, stated in 1993 that in order to cope with America’s foreign policy challenges, the expansion of democratic states around the world would be essential because ‘it protects our [U.S.] interests and security’ (see Henderson 2002: 20). In his 1994 State of the Union, Clinton declared that ‘Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other’.8 Findings from research in the field of international relations seemed to have a direct impact on policy making, and this move of the Clinton administration can be seen as ‘a textbook case of arbitrage between the ivory tower and the real world’ (Gowa 1999: 109).

Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, went one big step further in his faith that democratic peace holds. He argued that efforts to turn Iraq into a democratic country would have positive effects on Iraqi’s neighbours. The authoritarian regimes in the region would fall as domino stones and follow the Iraqi example. They would start democratizing as soon as they could, which would then result in achieving a peaceful and stable the Middle East. The real motives for attacking Iraq may have been different, but ‘regime change’ was at the heart of Washington’s rhetoric when the USA started to bomb Baghdad in March 2003. The rhetoric of the Bush administration focused on toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime, and replacing the entire underlying dictatorial system with a democracy.

Moreover, George W. Bush used the democratic peace idea to justify the war in Iraq, declaring, ‘The reason why I’m so strong on democracy is democracies don’t go to war with each other…I’ve got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that’s why I’m such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy’.9 In 2004, the 43rd President of the USA said: ‘If you think you can have peace without democracy – again - I think you’ll find that - I can only speak for myself, that I will be extremely doubtful that it will ever happen’.10 In his second inaugural address, he stated that ‘the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world’.

Again, these are just words from speeches and can hence be seen as rhetoric to defend military intervention (cf. Jervis 2003; Kaufmann 2004; Daalder and Lindsay 2005; Owen 2005; Lieberfeld 2005; Schmidt and Williams 2008). Still, in the end, politicians have rationalized their political decisions based on one of the most powerful ideas taken from studies in the field of international relations, clearly showing the influence of this academic idea in political practice.

Hence, the field of international relations seems to have its own law: democracies rarely fight with each other. It cannot be denied that the evidence supporting the democratic peace proposition is quite diverse in character (see Ray 1998): the evidence has been epistemological (Rummel 1975), philosophical (Doyle 1986), formal (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), historical (Weart 1994; Ray 1995; Owen 1994), experimental (Mintz and Geva 1993), anthropological (Ember et al. 1992; Crawford 1994), psychological (Kegley and Hermann 1995), economic (Brawley 1993; Weede 1996) and political (Gaubatz 1991). Still, there have been numerous critical studies (see, i.e., Hayes 2011), and the general picture is unclear. We do not yet know much about the overall findings from statistical studies.

So far, it seems as if some quantitative studies—mainly within the field of international relations—have found strong and robust evidence which supports the ‘democratic peace hypothesis’. Those studies show that democracy has had a positive influence on international peace (see, i.e., Rummel 1979; Ray and Russett 1996). In this sense, the idea of a democratic peace seems to be confirmed. Political scientists such as James Lee Ray are passionate supporters: ‘No scientific evidence is entirely definitive’ but ‘based on all the empirical evidence so far’ the more defensible of the two possible definitive answers to the question “Does democracy cause peace?” is “Yes” (Ray 1998: 43). However, based on my own analyses of the empirical studies with statistical evidence, I cannot be as enthusiastic as those scholars; to the contrary, I whole-heartily disagree with them, as a more systematic analysis of the articles shows that there are four important weaknesses, which seriously undermines the idea that peace is one of democracy’s instrumental values.

Caveat 1: It’s Not (Just) Democracy

While analysing the selected articles, the first remarkable finding is that only a relatively small number of studies have actually tested the democratic peace hypothesis. Most of the studies have focused on the mechanisms (see next section, caveat 2), and hence seem to assume that there is a correlation between democracy and war. In this way, the majority of the studies—often unintentionally—reinforce the idea that democratic peace actually exists without testing this proposition. However, none of the studies that directly test the democratic peace hypothesis found strong evidence that democracy is the most important factor when explaining interstate war. All democratic peace studies have controlled for many possible alternative causes of the peace, such as economic development and growth, geographic distance and contiguity, power status, alliance ties, militarization and political stability. The findings show that it is not just democracy which explains war, not at all. Within this group of studies, which explicitly test the democratic peace hypothesis, four different types of findings can be detected. I will discuss those results more in-depth in the rest of this section.

First Result: There Is Correlation, but Other Explanations Are Significant Too

The first subgroup consists of scholars who stress the importance of democratic peace, despite the fact their own analyses have shown that other factors are statistically significant as well (Maoz and Russett 1993; Rousseau et al. 1996; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Beck et al. 1998; Ray 2013). For example, some studies (e.g. Rousseau et al. 1996) included alternative independent variables in order to test realist arguments. They tested whether the distribution of power determines decisions to use force, and measures each state’s military capabilities relative to its opponent. A state’s military capability is the average of three elements: number of troops, military expenditures and military expenditures per soldier. They found that this realist variable was strong, positive and statistically significant at the 0.001 level in their analyses (see, e.g., Rousseau et al. 1996: 522, Table 2). However, not only a state’s military capabilities appeared to be an important explanation for peace. In addition, wealth, growth, alliances and contiguity played a crucial role when explaining interstate war (see, e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993: 632, Table 1).11 Moreover, when other factors are included, the impact of democracy on the likelihood of international crises is even spurious (Maoz and Russett 1993: 632; Henderson 2002: 141, see also p. 3).12 Still, scholars in this group keep defending the democratic peace idea, despite the fact that their own analyses showed the significance of alternative explanations.

Second Result: Initially There Is Correlation, but the Impact of Democracy Is Spurious When Other Explanatory Factors Are Included in the Models

The second subgroup of scholars is far more radical. Based on their own analyses, this group concludes that the democratic peace link is a spurious one (Weede 1984, 1996; Barbieri 1996; Mousseau 2013; Gartzke and Weisiger 2014).13 Typically, efforts to demonstrate the spuriousness of the statistical democratic peace pointed to other factors that, when accounted for ‘properly’, eliminated or dramatically reduced the statistical significance of shared democracy. Hence, the studies in this second group did not find strong evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis anymore, once other explanatory factors were included in the models.14

One of the most convincing alternative explanations of peace between countries is that there is no democratic peace, but a capitalist peace instead. The settlement in Germany and Japan succeeded because of the establishment of capitalist peace. Because of economic support by the Americans, who encouraged free trade and offered trade opportunities in practice as well, the poorer economies in Europe and Japan would gain economically, resulting in ‘economic growth, prosperity, and, ultimately, free trade among most of the more technologically advanced economies’ (Rasler and Thompson 2005: 232). By establishing and expanding free trade, the incentives for war would quickly decrease among trading states, according to this approach. To prevent new interstate wars after World War II, the capitalist peace was a far more important factor than the American promotion of democracy and its political institutions.

The capitalist peace, or capitalist peace theory, also states that economic development accounts for both democracy and the peace among democratic nations. Economic development is a key factor to explain democracy (Lipset 1959; see also Hegre 2003; Weede 2004).15 Moreover, economic development also plays a role when explaining peace, and the presence of market-oriented economies in countries have a positive impact on both democracy in those countries and peace between them (Mousseau 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2013; see also Hegre 2014). Democratic peace only exists when both democracies have high levels of economic development, when economic development is well above the global median.

In fact, the poorest 21% of the democracies studied, and the poorest 4–5% of current democracies, are significantly more likely than other kinds of political systems to fight each other (see, e.g., Mousseau 2005). Moreover, if at least one of the democracies involved has a very low level of economic development, then democracy cannot prevent war.16 Still, there is a pacifying effect of free trade and economic interdependence, which is more important than the effect of democracy, because the former affects peace both directly and indirectly, by producing economic development and ultimately, democracy (see Weede 2004).17

Capitalist peace is not the only alternative explanation. Shared interests in general, and political similarities in specific, can also be seen as an important second alternative explanation for war and peace between countries (Farber and Gowa 1995, 1997; Gartzke 2007; Gowa 1999; Henderson 2002). Democracies are not peaceful to each other because they are democratic, but rather because they are similar. So the difference of the scores of both countries also contributes to the conflict proneness of the dyad. If the difference in levels of democracy is big, then the chance of conflict is higher (cf. Oneal and Russett 1997: 281–282).

Many researchers have conflated both the conflict-dampening impact of joined democracy and the confict-exacerbating impact of political distance in the variables focusing on political systems, but as Errol A. Henderson (2002: 32) convincingly argued: ‘Fusing these two contrasting attributes in a single variable makes it difficult to distinguish between the competing processes’. Therefore, it is better to include an additional variable of ‘political dissimilarity’ in the model. Henderson (2002) was one of the first scholars who included this variable and measured it by taking the absolute value of the difference between the two states’ scores. His main variables were not only political similarity, but also geographic distance and economic interdependence, and he concluded that democratic peace is a statistical artefact which disappears when those other variables are taken into account. Political similarity clearly has a pacifying effect18 (see Werner 2000; Henderson 2002; Beck et al. 2004), and it is not democracy per se which is the decisive factor.19

Hence, the benefits of trade and trade interdependence are essential explanations, while democracy is spurious or at least subordinate (see also Rosecrance 1986; Weede 1984, 1996; Hegre 2000, 2014; Jervis 2002; Souva 2003; Rasler and Thompson 2005: 235; Mousseau 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005). Based on those studies, it is safe to conclude that democracy, on its own, is an unlikely cause of the democratic peace.

Third Result: There Is Correlation, but Other Explanations Are Much Stronger

This same point that democracy is just one of the explanations for peace (and not even a very important one) is also at the core of studies in the third subgroup. Scholars of this group keep arguing that there is support for the democratic peace hypothesis, and that the link is not spurious. In this sense, they are less radical than the second group of scholars, as they do not completely reject the value of democracy for peace. On the other hand, their own analyses have clearly shown that alternative factors—hence other factors than democracy or type of political system— are not only statistically significant but also more important when trying to explain interstate war (Bremer 1992; Gelpi 1997; Oneal and Russett 1999a, b; Reiter and Stam 2002; Peterson 2013; Caselli et al. 2015).

Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest that democracy is not the most important factor, while war is more likely to occur between states that are geographically proximate, approximately equal in power, major powers, allied, economically advanced and highly militarized than between those that are not. Bivariate analyses of these factors in relation to the onset of interstate war over all pairs of states in the period from 1816 to 1965 have generally supported these associations. However, multivariate analyses revealed some differences. Stuart Bremer (1992), for example, showed that some factors are far more important than others. The existence of a dangerous, war-prone dyad can be best explained by the presence of contiguity, the absence of an alliance and the absence of more advanced economy. The absence of democratic polity and other factors (absence of overwhelming preponderance, and presence of major power) are less powerful. Overall, these findings suggest that our research priorities may be seriously distorted and that we should not focus too much on the perceived positive impact of democracy, but on other factors (such as alliances and economic factors) instead.

Fourth Result: There Is Correlation, but Only Under Certain Specific Conditions

The final subgroup of scholars argues that we cannot unconditionally accept the idea that democratic peace exists in general, so always and everywhere. Their statistical studies clearly showed that support for this hypothesis heavily depends on other factors. The chance of democratic peace depends not just on the specific historical period (Cold War or not; Gibler and Sarkees 2004; Siverson and Emmons 1991; Weede 1984), but also the stage of the conflict (beginning, duration or severity; see Bremer 1993; Bennett and Stam 1996; Reed 2000), and on the neighbourhood instability (extent of confict in the region; see Gibler and Braithwaite 2013; Gibler and Miller 2013). Despite the differences between the studies, there is one common finding in all studies: when explaining interstate war, we cannot just rely on the impact of democracy, as it is too much dependent on other factors.

Several scholars found strong evidence for the idea that democratic peace exists, but only during some specific historical periods. Based on this evidence, they concluded that democratic peace is simply a statistical artefact of the Cold War. For example, Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa (1995) found statistical support for the idea that peace between democracies is an artefact of the Cold War, when the threat from the communist states forced democracies to ally with one another (see also Mearsheimer 1990). Sebastian Rosato (2003) also argued that most of the significant evidence for democratic peace has been observed after World War II; and that it has happened within a broad alliance, which can be identified with NATO and its satellite nations, imposed and maintained by American dominance.

Since the Second World War, war has become a very costly affair. Scholars discovered that only a handful of states are ‘capable of engaging in major power warfare. That process of elimination has not yet extinguished the possibility of major power warfare, but it has lowered its probability immensely’ (Rasler and Thompson 2005: 219). The chance to achieve something in a war is low in general, and even lower in a bipolar world with two big power players risking high nuclear war costs (Jervis 2002). While war became more costly, trade became less costly; as a consequence, the war/trade costs increased during the Cold War (Rosecrance 1986; see also Jervis 2002). In such a world, war and conflict have become less attractive, while trade and cooperation have become more appealing (Rasler and Thompson 2005: 219). Hence, more states decided to adopt trading strategies in order to prevent confict and war as much as possible. In the end, democracy was part of the story, but only a very small part with a subordinated role next to the power dynamics during the Cold War, the costs of warfare and the benefits of trade.

Some scholars found evidence that the democratic peace still exists in the post-Cold War period (Park 2013) which weakens this argument. However, most analyses showed that dyadic dispute rates have converged after the Cold War (see, e.g., Gowa 2011). Moreover, jointly democratic dyads are likely to be allied only after 1945 (see Gibler and Sarkees 2004); during the 1816–1944 time period, there is even a negative relationship between democratic dyads and alliance formation.20 These findings cast serious doubts on the idea of a general existence of democratic peace.

Not only the historical period, but also the *stage* of the conflict is crucial. Some scholars in this group provided evidence that democratic peace is not universal, but that it depends on the stage and whether we focus on the beginning, duration or severity of the conflict. Although joint democracy has some pacifying effects on the onset of conflict, the results suggest that they are unrelated to the escalation of disputes to war (see Reed 2000). Moreover, democratic peace is dependent on the neighbourhood instability. Democracies often have few territorial issues over which to contend, as they tend to be part of a stable region. Democracies only seldom have territorial disputes with their neighbours, and therefore they can more easily choose favourable conflicts to escalate. The type of political system does not predict conflict selection or victory once controls are added for issue salience (Gibler and Miller 2013; see also Park and James 2015). There is an interaction between joint democracy and regional instability, which confirms the idea that the effects of type of political system on continued conflict apply mostly to dyads in peaceful regions (Gibler and Braithwaite 2013; see also Park and James 2015). Very democratic countries might even become more aggressive and faster than other political systems, once the region becomes more hostile (see, e.g., Baliga et al. 2011).

The General Lesson from the Results in a Nutshell (Caveat 1)

In short, regardless of the differences between the statistical studies on democratic peace, all findings have indicated that other explanations are important as well. It is clear that democracy is just one of the explanations, and certainly not the most important one,21 sometimes even spurious and often heavily dependent on other factors. It is not (just) democracy to be preoccupied with, when trying to prevent war between countries (Table 3.1).

Caveat 2: What Are the Causal Mechanisms?

Most of the statistical studies on democratic peace seem to assume that there is a correlation between democracy and war; based on this assumption, they then decide to focus on the mechanisms. This is problematic as none of the democratic peace studies found strong evidence that democracy is the most important factor when explaining interstate war (see the previous section). As a consequence, the next step of looking for mechanisms is quite irrelevant and not necessary in my view, but most studies nevertheless argue that the field lacks strong theoretical foundations and robust empirical evidence that can reveal convincing causal mechanisms.22 Those studies seem to accept the correlation between dyadic democracy and peace, and then start questioning whether democracy really causes peace before investigating potential mechanisms.

Table 3.1 Statistical studies on democracy and interstate war (dyadic level)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Caveat 1: It’s Not (Just) Democracy | Studies |
| ‘It’s just democracy; democracy is most important explanation for peace between countries’ | No studies found |
| ‘There is correlation, but other explanations are significant too’ | Beck et al. (1998), Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), Maoz and Russett (1993), Ray (2013), and Rousseau et al. (1996) |
| ‘Initially there is correlation, but the impact of democracy is spurious when other explanatory factors are included in the models’ | Barbieri (1996), Beck et al. (2004), Farber and Gowa (1997), Gartzke (2007), Gartzke and Weisiger (2014), Gowa (1999), Hegre (2000, 2003, 2014, Jervis (2002), Mousseau (2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2013), Oneal and Russett (1997), Rasler and Thompson (2005), Rosecrance (1986), Souva (2003), Weede (1984, 2004), and Werner (2000) |
| ‘There is correlation, but other explanations are much stronger’ | Bremer (1992), Caselli et al. (2015), Gelpi (1997), Oneal and Russett (1999a, b), and Peterson (2013) |
| ‘There is correlation, but only under certain specific conditions’ | Baliga et al. (2011), Bremer (1993), Bennett and Stam (1996), Farber and Gowa (1995), Gibler and Braithwaite (2013), Gibler and Miller (2013), Gibler and Sarkees (2004), Gowa (2011), Jervis (2002), Mearsheimer (1990), Park (2013), Park and James (2015), Rasler and Thompson (2005), Reed (2000), Rosato (2003), Rosecrance (1986), Gibler and Sarkees (2004), Siverson and Emmons (1991), and Weede (1984) |

### AT: NB – AT: Demo ! – Collective Action

#### Democracy fails to overcome collective action problems – populism and other self-defeating aspects are endemic, NOT backsliding

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VI. THE INTERLOCKING CRISES

In this Part, we highlight how the vulnerabilities of democracy are made salient as well as exacerbated by climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene. We also emphasize how climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene place democracies that attempt to navigate them in a particularly impervious Scylla and Charybdis-like situation.173 The Scylla is ineffective policy; the Charybdis is some relaxation of the core democratic principle of popular sovereignty. Both options seem nearly guaranteed to trigger significant legitimacy challenges to liberal democratic systems.

Traditionally, two important sources of democratic legitimacy have been beneficial consequences, in the utilitarian tradition, and consent, in the social contract tradition.174 Whatever else may count as beneficial consequences, the capacity to solve problems that threaten the physical and social security of citizens is a central and important source of democratic legitimacy.175 Call this the “public utility” view of democratic legitimacy. And whatever else may count as consent, surely the fact that the majority of citizens have expressed their preference for a certain candidate, law, or policy is an important source of democratic legitimacy as well.176 Call this the “expressed preference” view of democratic legitimacy.

Consider public utility first. As we have pointed out, most contemporary democracies have thus far failed to address the emerging problems of the Anthropocene.177 Consequently, the sense of physical and social insecurity grows more acute amongst citizens as the problems mount and compound.178 The legitimacy of these democracies, and the supranational institutions they have created, such as the European Union and the United Nations, is thus compromised on public utility grounds.

Now consider expressed preference. The global scope, long-term reach, unprecedented features, and highly complex nature of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene require democracies to make robust commitments to multilateral cooperation, long-term planning, significant deviations from the status quo, and increased reliance on expert knowledge if they are to succeed in managing these problems. 179 Citizens’ expressed preferences may be quite distant from this network of commitments and activities,180 since the benefits of successfully managing a problem like climate change would mostly accrue not to these citizens, but to spatiotemporally distant people (i.e., the global poor and future generations) and genetically distant (non-human) nature. 181 Attempting to force such commitments, especially at a time when democracies are already being accused of not being responsive enough to their citizens, can further compromise legitimacy.182

We thus face an apparent dilemma: if democracies fail to successfully address climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, their legitimacy will be challenged on public utility grounds. If they aggressively attempt to address them, their legitimacy will likely be challenged on expressed preference grounds. Either way, we can expect the power of populist figures and movements to grow.

The remainder of this Part illuminates this dilemma by discussing how climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene interact with some further democratic vulnerabilities: weak multilateralism, short-termism, the profusion of veto players, the contested role of experts, and self-referring decision making.

A. Weak Multilateralism

Climate change cannot be successfully managed without a strong commitment to international cooperation.183 For a climate regime to succeed, it must be effective, perceived as at least not unfair by all parties, and otherwise acceptable to each party.184 At various times, the attempt to create a regime has foundered on each of these three considerations.185

From the beginning of the negotiations that led to the adoption of the FCCC in 1992 and in subsequent negotiations under the Convention, the question of fairness has been unavoidable.186 When agreements have been structured in ways that are acceptable to developing countries (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) they have been perceived as unfair by the United States.187 This has led to the weakening of commitments and to a regime whose effectiveness is in question.188 The Paris Agreement, by putting voluntary pledges at the center, was designed to avoid the problem of perceived unfairness.189 It was reasonably thought that no party could say that they had been unfairly treated when they have agreed to be measured in relation to a commitment that they have voluntarily undertaken and to which no sanctions are attached for non-compliance. 190 Nevertheless, that was exactly the claim made by President Trump in announcing his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement.191 Moreover, the cost of creating an agreement to which no one could reasonably object was to create an Agreement whose effectiveness was in question even before the United States announced its intention to withdraw.192

While climate change is its own “full tragedy and weird comedy,” 193 there are structural issues at work.194 As the world order attempts to adjust to shifting power distributions following the emergence of new giants such as China and India, when it comes to problems such as climate change the cooperation of such countries is no longer just desirable but essential.195 As their collaboration becomes more valuable, the price for obtaining it rises accordingly.196 This complicates negotiations, and the problem seems only destined to worsen because this logic applies not only to presently emerging world powers, but also to those that have already emerged and those that will emerge in the future. As we observed in an earlier paper, “[g]lobal governance in the Anthropocene is cooperation-hungry, and this increases the price of obtaining cooperation from every country.”197

In addition, democracies have their own particular problems when it comes to multilateral agreements. Except in the rare case where they are able to steer multilateral agreements in the way they prefer, democratic governments “often seek to avoid compliance with binding multilateral decisions if this weakens their relationship to their electorate.”198 This is in fact what happened in the case of President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement.199 The stated reason was the agreement’s unfairness to the United States.200 However, the deeper reason was that the Obama administration’s decision to join, although admittedly an act of national self-determination, was not in fact an authentic deliverance of American popular sovereignty, at least in the eyes of Trump and his supporters.201 According to Trump,

[t]he Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers – who [sic] I love – and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production.202

In the same speech Trump reminded his audience that “I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.”203

In democracies, it is ultimately citizens who empower their representatives to bargain and strike terms of international cooperation.204 Successfully addressing the problems of the Anthropocene is likely to require unprecedented levels of multilateralism.205 Democratic states that attempt to rise to the challenge are likely to face legitimacy challenges on expressed preference grounds. Those that do not may face legitimacy challenges on public utility grounds.

B. Short-termism

Short-termism can be defined as “the priority given to present net benefits at the cost of future ones.”206 Short-termism is a problem whenever policy domains have an extended timeframe, as is the case with climate change and other systemic problems of the Anthropocene.207 In these cases, present net benefits may need to be curtailed (through increases in taxes and regulations, for example) for the sake of benefits that might materialize in the distant future. These future benefits will then mostly advantage people other than those who have borne the costs. Reasons for privileging the present in these cases include pure time preference, uncertainty, and diminished or even null moral concern for those who might benefit in the future.208 The temptation, then, is to eschew the costs of the required policies and “pass the buck” to future generations.209

Short-termism is not always irrational nor morally wrong.210 It has been argued, however, that short-termism is both irrational and morally wrong in the case of climate change.211 The sources of short-termism are rooted in human psychology and can manifest in any kind of political regime.212 However, it has been argued that democracies are particularly vulnerable to short-termism.213

One important reason for the short-termism of democratic political regimes is that these regimes inherit, via voting and other forms of popular influence, their citizens’ biases in favor of the present. Policies may also reflect citizens’ misinformation about, or unawareness of, long-term processes, risks, policy aims, and possible outcomes.214 To counter these tendencies, liberal democracies typically filter their citizens’ inter-temporal biases, misinformation, and unawareness through such mechanisms as constitutions and reliance on expert bodies.215 Yet the more filtering they do, the more likely they are to incur legitimacy challenges on expressed preference grounds.216 This is a problem of intra-generational legitimacy.217

There are also problems of inter-generational legitimacy.218 There is no guarantee that long-term policies, if enacted, will achieve the anticipated aims, or that they will indeed make future people better off by achieving these aims.219 If things do not work out, these policies might be deemed illegitimate on public utility grounds by the very future people that they were supposed to benefit.220 In addition, such policies may be deemed illegitimate by future people on expressed preference grounds.221 Legitimacy on expressed preference grounds typically requires some form of authorization by those who are affected by policies, yet future people who will be affected by past policies never authorize them, nor can they hold anyone accountable.222

Another reason for democracies’ short-termism is the scheduling of participatory events.223 Democracy requires elections, which must be relatively frequent in order to ensure that people can regularly express their will, vote out politicians who are judged to have failed in some important ways, and prevent rent-seeking behavior by not giving politicians enough time to set up camp within institutions.224 However, the relatively short duration of electoral cycles ensures that politicians are constantly concerned with their own reelection, and this may prevent them from taking hard policy decisions that require a great deal of political capital and do not produce appreciable outcomes in time for the next election.225 Because most of the impacts of climate change will largely materialize in the future and be felt by future generations, efforts at their alleviation must obey a clock that is not in sync with the electoral clock.

Note that there is no need to assume that politicians are always and necessarily motivated by only a thirst for power.226 In a democ- racy, even politicians who are exclusively motivated by the aspiration to make good long-term policy need to be elected or re-elected to do so.227 In order to be elected, they need to harness the votes of the current electorate.228 So, the problem of short-termism goes beyond a lack of conscientious far-sightedness on the side of politicians: it is structurally connected to the very fact of popular sovereignty—at least as long as the majority of people discount the future.229

C. Veto Players

Any political system (with the possible exclusion of some forms of anarchy) accords veto powers to some agent: a monarchy to the king, an aristocracy to the nobility, a technocracy to the experts, a theocracy to the religious leader, and so on.230 A veto player in a political system can be understood as an agent who can prevent a departure from the status quo.231 In democracies, veto players can be specified by constitutions (e.g., the President and the Congress in the United States), emerge from the political system (e.g., the Supreme Court in the United States, political parties that are members of a government coalition in Western Europe), or from civil society (e.g., powerful industries, unions or other interest groups in many countries).232

In a democracy, veto players can protect minority interests, prevent destabilizing change, and preserve important values and policies through periods in which they are unpopular.233 More generally, veto players prevent a democratic system from being excessively fluid and flexible.234 This is attractive when the status quo is desirable or an exogenous shock is beneficial; however, when the status quo is undesirable or an exogenous shock disturbs a desirable status quo, fluidity and flexibility are needed in order to respond quickly

and decisively.235 This is arguably the situation in the case of climate

change, which demands nimble political responses to which veto

players would have to acquiesce.

The presence of many veto players threatens to delay or even block the formulation and implementation of policy.236 Liberal democracies, with their reliance on checks and balances generated by institutional architecture or by competition among interest groups, seem particularly vulnerable to such threats—and the more veto players in a democracy the greater the degree of vulnerability.237

An especially high concentration of veto players helps to explain why a powerful, rich, technological leader like the United States is uncannily slow to address consequential public issues such as the politics of distribution, racial equality, immigration, the proper balance between liberty and national security, and of course climate change.238 The United States Constitution separates powers in the federal government, reserves a broad range of powers to states and includes a bill of rights that can be viewed as effectively giving veto powers to individuals in some circumstances. Practices have also developed through time that inhibit action, such as requiring supermajorities for some political decisions.

The profusion of veto players may be extreme in the United States, but it is a feature common to many liberal democracies that often makes political action elusive even on relatively minor policy issues.239 For every possible policy change, there is always a “do-nothing” alternative (sometimes more respectably presented as a “wait and see” alternative) that is invariably attractive to some veto player.240

“Do-nothing” alternatives may sometimes be justified on grounds of rational choice considerations relating to transition costs and uncertainty about both the process of transition and the final pay-off structure.241 Veto players give voice to such considerations, as well as other considerations that we have already noted.242 But veto players may also give voice to less rational tendencies, which are inevitably present and, in democracies, are crystallized in votes. Among these tendencies may be disproportionate attention to sunk costs, finding refuge in “what has always worked,” fear of regretting the changes made, the desire to maintain and transmit a sense of control by not acceding to the demands of new circumstances, and lack of trust in those who are proposing the changes.243

Veto players tend to slow down or block deviations from the status quo, and this makes it difficult to tackle climate change and other similar problems of the Anthropocene.244 But veto players also reflect and configure real structures of power, and protect and promote the needs and interests of actual people.245 When the number of veto players or the importance of specific veto players is altered, new power structures emerge and this can raise legitimacy challenges on both utility and expressed preference grounds.246 It is not obvious what veto players should be eliminated or demoted in order to produce more nimble and effective climate policy, and which ones should be given additional power instead. Nor is it obvious who should decide the answers to these questions (if not the people) and on what grounds (if not majority rule).

Veto players configure systems of checks and balances, filters and buffers, which are only partially exposed to popular influence.247 This anti-majoritarian service is particularly precious to liberal democracies, which rely on veto players to protect and promote the rights of individuals and minorities—and, with that, the core liberal principles of individual liberty and human rights. However, as a consequence, if a majority exists that is overwhelmingly convinced by climate science, totally in favor of leaving all remaining fossil energy sources in the ground, and ready to embark on ambitious renewable energy programs, this majority may still find it difficult to act. Liberal democracies protect minorities of various kinds in varying degrees, and these include climate change denialists and those who profit from fossil fuels. Economically powerful and en- trenched economic minorities (the “1%”) are often extremely effective veto players.248 This can prevent action that would benefit most people, thus increasing the risks of legitimacy challenges.

D. Contested Role of Experts

Climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene are unprecedented phenomena whose complexity and implications are only beginning to be understood by scientists and other experts. Climate change is a multidimensional problem that concerns and connects ecology, demography, development, production, consumption, resource use, trade rules, health, security, urban planning, mobility, migration, and more, in novel ways.249 It poses threats that are multi-scalar, probabilistic, indirect, often invisible, spatiotemporally unbound, and potentially catastrophic. These threats challenge our reason, emotions, and imagination.250 If there were ever a complex problem that required expert knowledge, it is climate change.

Liberal democracies make significant use of expert knowledge in policymaking in various ways to protect liberal values, and to boost their efficiency, equity, and political stability.251 Expert knowledge is distinguished from non-expert opinion through such criteria as experience, professional and educational qualifications, peer-review, and rules of evidence.252

Still, in a democracy, differences in expertise do not translate to differences in political authority, for much the same reason why differences in lineage do not translate in this way. A democratic citizen can recognize expertise and accept the science of, say, climate change, and still object to the expert who counsels some course of action: “You may be right, but who made you boss?”253 In a democracy, expertise is always subservient to the voice of the people (pace Plato, philosophers cannot be kings).254

For this reason, the relationships between experts and ordinary citizens are always potentially fraught in a democracy. These relationships vary from country to country, time to time, and issue to issue. Often, the relationships are placid in good times and rocky in hard times. Major policy failures, such as the global financial crisis of 2008 and the spreading of terrorist radicalization in many European Union countries, can lead citizens to question experts’ knowledge and see them as just another interest group seeking rents at people’s expense.255

In the case of climate change, an additional element makes the role of experts potentially unpopular. Climate science, in our present social context, inevitably provokes fundamental questions about how we ought to live and organize our societies, throwing doubt on the ways in which we do so now. A particularly powerful and widespread attempt to avoid cognitive dissonance through various forms of rationalization may thus come into play. After all, if something potentially catastrophic such as climate change can result from the very ways in which we live our everyday lives—how we dwell, how we eat, how we make things, how we move around—the nagging thought is that there might be something fundamentally wrong about the ways in which we live. These are not comfortable thoughts and can lead to resentment or worse towards those who bear the message.

The incipient conflict and simmering resentment has been exploited by powerful interests who look to be the immediate losers from a transition to a more sustainable way of life. They stoke the dissonance and encourage denialism. The most obvious manifestation of this is the climate change denial campaign, directed towards preventing the formation of a consensus for political action on climate change.256

The main strategy of climate change denialists has been to suppress both belief in the science and belief that there is a scientific consensus on the existence, anthropogenic nature, and dangerousness of climate change.257 In its aims and strategies, climate change denialism has replicated earlier forms of denialism involving tobacco smoking, acid rain, DDT, and ozone depletion. 258

The rhetorical techniques adopted by climate change denialism have also not been particularly original: versions of these techniques were used in all the other cases mentioned above. These techniques include attacking sources rather than discussing evidence, “moving the goalpost” by requesting ever larger amounts of evidence, submitting false evidence, suggesting false equivalences or analogies, confusing ignorance about mechanisms or processes with ignorance about facts or outcomes, cherry-picking anomalies, selective skepticism, quote mining, and the so-called “Gish gallop”—overwhelming discussants or audiences with unscientific claims to make it difficult to counter all the misinformation at once.259

What is new about denialism in the Anthropocene is not its strategies or tactics, but its amplification. Expertise denialism now travels through social media, which allows for unfiltered instant communication among citizens and between citizens and representatives. Traditional intermediaries—political parties, intellectuals, and the professional press—are increasingly made redundant by these technologies. Indeed, to maintain their relevance (and market share), these traditional intermediaries often seek to replicate the immediacy and excitement of social media, compromising their own claims to epistemological or institutional privilege.

One effect of the speed and directness with which political communication occurs through social media is an increased tendency to brand political ideas and policy proposals and to market them as products.260 The need to engage audiences with arguments and relevant facts—and even to maintain consistency in one’s opinions— decreases, while the need for a good, resonant, quick-win pitch increases. With that, the importance of expert knowledge is downplayed to the advantage of skilled branding and marketing.

Another effect of the speed and directness with which political communication occurs through social media is a polarizing fragmentation, not just at the level of policy judgments, but also regarding the sets of facts to which different individuals and groups make reference. Social media allows for networked, yet highly fragmented, political communication, making it harder to individuate and even debate a common story.261

Much empirical work in psychology, economics, political science, sociology, and communications has gone into trying to explain how and why disagreement about facts can occur.262 The explanation seems to be some sort of “biased assimilation,” whereby people adjust their view of facts with reference to their self-defining values, social identities, and partisan allegiances.263 Experiments on reception suggest that individuals selectively credit or dismiss information in a manner that reinforces beliefs congenial to their values.264 These experiments found that subjects were substantially more likely to count a scientist as an authoritative “expert” when the scientist was depicted as taking a position consistent with the subjects’ cultural predispositions, than when that scientist took a contrary position.265 Interestingly, these tendencies seem to be directly, rather than inversely, related to levels of science literacy and general education of experimental subjects: the more equipped people are to know and understand the facts, the more they disagree on them.266

In times of social media, these tendencies may be amplified, insofar as individuals tend to gravitate towards and engage mostly with resonant networks of “like-me’s” that by and large reaffirm their own values and perspectives.267 This may tribalize positions and impede constructive democratic engagement and debate from ever taking off on many contested issues. In addition, one can expect increasing polarization to also be fomented by individuals and groups trying to secure loyalty to their branded political ideas and policy proposals in this way.

The internet and other media, with their seemingly endless resources, create the impression that expertise can be picked and chosen at will, thereby feeding the perception of public life as a spectacle.268 Public discussions, unfiltered by “moderators,” unfold in a denuded space stripped of epistemological norms.269 In the United States at least, this has morphed into a generalized atmosphere of expertise denialism writ large. Denialism about evolution, vaccines, economics, and more has become commonplace.270

It is not an exaggeration to say that we are on the verge of adopting epistemological nihilism as a public epistemology.271 No commitment to facts, in the traditional sense, or even consistency of opinion, is required.272 Truth is what the speaker says it is, here and now. In a moment it may be different, depending on what the speaker can get away with. In a democracy, it is up to elections or approval ratings to resolve disagreements. It is a short step from here to other exercises of power.

The nihilistic turn in public epistemology threatens the legitimacy of democracy, for democracy cannot solve the problems it faces without mobilizing epistemological authority that is itself hostage to popular vote. As difficult as this challenge may be in favorable times, it is greatly magnified in the face of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene.

E. Self-referring Decision-making

What we have elsewhere called the “agency presupposition” is deeply entrenched in modern democratic theory. This presupposition holds “that the political community is constituted by agents who initiate and conduct political action, and who themselves, and their interests and welfare, are what matter politically.”273 The agency presupposition arose at a time in which democratic principles, norms and institutions were being developed to govern relations between agents who lived in close proximity to one another in space and time, and whose decisions and actions had relatively direct impacts on each other. However, around 1950, a profound change occurred from a world of discrete but interdependent states to a world of shared social space in which distant events have localized impacts and vice-versa. In this globalized world, the fates of nation-states and their peoples became not just effectively interdependent, but also structurally interconnected, with social, political, and economic activities, interactions, and infrastructures stretching beyond political frontiers, leading to a deepening enmeshment of the local and the global.274 Political decisions and actions taken locally (in selected powerful countries, many of which were democratic) now systematically had planetary implications, impacting for better or worse the welfare and interests of people in all corners of the world.

With the Anthropocene disruption of earth’s fundamental ecological systems, including those that govern climate, political agents (living humans who can initiate and conduct political action) have gained unprecedented power over a vast universe of non-agents that comprises animate and inanimate nature as well as those living on the periphery of both space and time.275 The circle of affected nonagents has expanded beyond cultural, genetic, and spatiotemporal boundaries to include virtually everything on the planet, now extended indefinitely in time.276 This establishes an enormous asymmetry of power. Those on the periphery, and nature, cannot initiate and conduct political action: they cannot reciprocate, they cannot participate, they cannot protest, they cannot retaliate.277 In democratic terms, they do not matter—or only matter derivatively, if political agents care about their fate. And it is as undemocratic as can be, particularly if the democracy in question is a liberal democracy, to force political agents to care if they do not.278

A phenomenon like climate change creates ubiquitous tensions and trade-offs between agents and non-agents—those who are governed, and those who are affected.279 The latter will suffer most from climate change, but a democracy responsive to the claims of future generations (or those living beyond its borders, or nonhuman nature) may often have to forgo opportunities for bringing beneficial consequences to those who empower it with their votes.280 Instead, democratic leaders would have to enact policies favoring the interests of those who do not vote because they do not yet exist (or live in different countries or are not human).

Democracies making policies that favor non-agents will expose themselves to intra-generational legitimacy challenges on both public utility grounds and expressed preference grounds.281 Even if the expected benefits to non-agents were great, such non-agent-oriented policies might not win the hearts, minds, and guts of living human agents who may express their preference for themselves instead— particularly in democracies that are already being accused of not being responsive enough to their citizens.282 Many believe that ignoring or heavily discounting the welfare and interests of non-agents is morally wrong, but if expressed preference is important, it may be a wrong that democracies cannot avoid committing.283

The agency presupposition makes government responsive to those who are governed but not to those who are affected beyond borders in space, time, citizenship, or genetic make-up. A basic presupposition of liberal democracy appears to be threatened by the very actions that would have to be taken to express concern for all those affected by the climate-changing and eco-altering actions of its citizens.

VII. CONCLUSION

We began this Article by explaining the notion of the Anthropocene and briefly telling the story of failed responses to climate change. We went on to discuss the uneasy relationship between climate change and democracy, focusing on liberal democracy in particular. We presented some basic aspects of democratic theory and practice, and discussed some of democracy’s main vulnerabilities. We showed how in the Anthropocene these vulnerabilities can magnify, leading to legitimacy challenges.

These legitimacy challenges are not new. Democracy has always been haunted by anxiety about its future. Some political theorists have argued that democracy is the only form of political organization that underwrites the seeds of its own destruction.284 Demagogues and extremists who wish to blow up the state are allowed the same freedoms as those who seek to manage it more fairly and effectively. The risk of a democratically enabled democide is not an abstract or counterfactual risk: the executioners of German democracy came to power through the rules and procedures of the Weimar Republic.285 If we open our eyes, we may see these stories going on around us today.

Modern democracy is, in many respects, the most sophisticated articulation of the human capacity for social organization. It is also the most hospitable environment for the expression of human values that, through centuries of emancipatory struggles, have come to be regarded as fundamental, such as individual liberty and political equality.286 Our objective in this Article is not to write a requiem for democracy, but rather to chart the seas that democratic theory and practice will have to navigate in order to successfully address climate change and survive the challenges of the Anthropocene. We have highlighted the vulnerabilities of democracy in order to throw in sharp relief the many challenges entailed by the voyage, not to discourage it. Democracy has shown itself to be remarkably resilient in the past, and it may well succeed in rising to these challenges as well. There are those who think that democracy doesn’t stand a chance.287 But many still believe that the only solution to the problems of the Anthropocene lies in more, better, or different democracy.288 And there are those who think that even if democracy fails these challenges, democracy itself will not have failed. For they see its value as intrinsic, and not just as a means to better or more effective governance.289

It is difficult to sketch the nature of possible democratic solutions to some of the issues that we have raised, and we will not try to do so here. Instead, we will close with a summary of what seems to be the main challenge ahead. The existing democratic deficits in liberal countries will generally have to be reduced. Yet, in the case of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, liberal democratic countries will have to muster both the internal coherence and strength to better resist populism, and the external coherence and strength to be more cooperative partners within the framework of supranational institutions. This is necessary because, in the Anthropocene, the global spills into the domestic and vice-versa: a globally changing climate may have pernicious local impacts on the territory and population of any given country, while political dysfunction in one country can cripple [halt] efforts at global governance.

The democracies of the Anthropocene will have to work at multiple scales in both space and time, incorporating the interests of the global with those of the local, and those of the future with those of the present. This seems to suggest, perhaps paradoxically, that the democracies of the Anthropocene will have to be more democratic in some respects and less democratic in others. The relation between popular sovereignty and institutions that limit popular sovereignty while respecting it is a tug-of-war in democratic theory and practice that has been going on for millennia, and is now being put to unprecedented tests.

Liberal democracies, in particular, have an enormous amount at stake. Liberal political theory has always recognized the right to resist and even overthrow illegitimate political power.290 This right has been used to justify historical events that liberals typically applaud, including the Glorious Revolution, the French Revolution, and the American Revolution.291 Despite their failures and excesses, these revolutions forwarded liberal values and helped to entrench them in institutions. Unable to find consistent responses to challenges to their own legitimacy in the Anthropocene, liberal democracies may be in danger of warranting revolutions against themselves and the very institutions that should realize their values. They may become the ancient regime.

### AT: NB – AT: Terror !

#### No nuclear terror and no impact

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The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists—for an annual fatality rate of about one in 50 million for the period.

This might be taken to suggest, as one writer has characterized it, that “terrorism is such a minor threat to American life and limb that it’s simply bizarre—just stupefyingly irrational and intellectually unserious—to suppose that it could even begin to justify the abolition of privacy rights as they have been traditionally understood in favour of the installation of a panoptic surveillance state.” 1 And terrorism specialist Marc Sageman characterizes the threat terrorists present in the United States as “rather negligible.” 2 The vast majority of what is commonly tallied as terrorism has occurred in war zones, and this is especially true for fatalities.3 But even this has been exaggerated by conflating terrorism with war: civil war violence that would previously have been seen to be acts of insurgency are now often labeled terrorism.4

In order to put the numbers in some context, it has often been pointed out that far more Americans are killed each year not only by such highly destructive hazards as drug overdoses or automobile accidents, but even by such comparatively minor ones as lightning, accident-causing deer, peanut allergies, or drowning in bathtubs. Some comparisons are arrayed in Table 1.

In recent years, however, critics have attacked what they call “the bathtub fallacy.” 5

First, they stress that it is important to keep in mind that bathtubs are not out to kill you while terrorism is a willful act carried out by diabolical, dedicated, and clever human beings. Thus, although the number of people Islamist terrorists have been able to kill in the West since 9/11 has thus far been quite limited, those terrorists, as they plot and plan and learn from experience, may very well become far more destructive in the future.

Second, the critics charge that the comparison of terrorism with bathtub drownings is incomplete in that it doesn’t consider the possibility that the incidence of terrorist destruction is low precisely because counterterrorism measures are so effective.

Third, it is argued that, unlike bathtub drownings, terrorism exacts costs far beyond those entailed in the event itself. It damagingly sows terror, fear, and anxiety; disturbs our

Table

Description automatically generated

psychological well-being; undermines trust and openness within the society; and reduces our sense of intrinsic moral worth even as it increases a sense of helplessness. They maintain, fourth, that the comparison is invalid because, unlike terrorism, bathtubs provide benefit.

And finally, they contend that terrorism costs are peculiarly high, particularly in a democratic society, because the fears it generates will necessarily need to be serviced by policy makers, and this pressure forces, or inspires, them to adopt countermeasures, both foreign and domestic, that are costly and sometimes even excessive.

In this article, we examine these five propositions and find all of them to be wanting. In the process, we conclude that terrorism is rare outside war zones because, to a substantial degree, terrorists don’t exist there. In general, as with rare diseases that kill few, it makes more policy sense to expend limited funds on hazards that inflict far more damage.

Terrorism is willed and may well become more destructive

Journalist Jeffrey Goldberg has suggested that “the fear of terrorism isn’t motivated solely by what terrorists have done, but what terrorists hope to do.” Bathtubs are simply not “engaged in a conspiracy with other bathtubs to murder ever-larger numbers of Americans.” However, terrorists “in the Islamist orbit,” he insists, “seek unconventional weapons that would allow them to kill a far-larger number of Americans than died on Sept. 11.” 6 Or as Janan Ganesh of the Financial Times puts it, “Bathroom deaths could multiply by 50 without a threat to civil order. The incidence of terror could not.” 7

Thus far, 9/11 stands out as an extreme outlier: scarcely any terrorist act, before or after, in war zones or outside them, has inflicted even one-tenth as much total destruction. That is, contrary to common expectations, the attack has thus far been an aberration, not a harbinger.8 And al-Qaeda central, the group responsible for the attack, has, in some respects at least, proved to resemble President John Kennedy’s assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald—an entity of almost trivial proportions that got horribly lucky once. The tiny group of perhaps 100 or so does appear to have served as something of an inspiration to some Muslim extremists. They may have done some training, may have contributed a bit to the Taliban’s far larger insurgency in Afghanistan, and may have participated in a few terrorist acts in Pakistan. In his examination of the major terrorist plots against the West since 9/11, Mitchell Silber finds only two—the shoe bomber attempt of 2001 and the effort to blow up transatlantic airliners with liquid bombs in 2006—that could be said to be under the “command and control” of al-Qaeda central (as opposed to ones suggested, endorsed, or inspired by the organization), and there are questions about how full its control was even in these two instances, both of which, as it happens, failed miserably.9 And, although some al-Qaeda affiliates have committed substantial damage in the Middle East, usually in the context of civil wars, their efforts to carry out terrorism in the West have been rare and completely ineffective.10 Even under siege, it is difficult to see why al-Qaeda could not have carried out attacks at least as costly and shocking as the shooting rampages (organized by other groups) that took place in Mumbai in 2008 or at a shopping center in Kenya in 2013. Neither took huge resources, presented major logistical challenges, required the organization of a large number of perpetrators, or needed extensive planning.

However, there is of course no guarantee that things will remain that way, and the 9/11 attacks inspired the remarkable extrapolation that, because the terrorists were successful with box cutters, they might soon be able to turn out weapons of mass destruction— particularly nuclear ones—and then detonate them in an American city. For example, in his influential 2004 book, Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard’s Graham Allison relayed his “considered judgment” that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.” 11 Allison has had a great deal of company in his alarming pronouncements. In 2007, the distinguished physicist Richard Garwin put the likelihood of a nuclear explosion on an American or European city by terrorist or other means at 20 percent per year, which would work out to 91 percent over the elevenyear period to 2018.12

Allison’s time is up, and so is Garwin’s. These oft-repeated warnings have proven to be empty. And it is important to point out that not only have terrorists failed to go nuclear, but as William Langewiesche, who has assessed the process in detail, put it in 2007, “The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists.” 13 That process requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders.

Nor have terrorist groups been able to steal existing nuclear weapons—characteristically burdened with multiple safety devices and often stored in pieces at separate secure locales—from existing arsenals as was once much feared. And they certainly have not been able to cajole leaders in nuclear states to palm one off to them—though a war inflicting more death than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined was launched against Iraq in 2003 in major part under the spell of fantasies about such a handover.14

More generally, the actual terrorist “adversaries” in the West scarcely deserve accolades for either dedication or prowess. It is true, of course, that sometimes even incompetents can get lucky, but such instances, however tragic, are rare. For the most part, terrorists in the United States are a confused, inadequate, incompetent, blundering, and gullible bunch, only occasionally able to get their act together. Most seem to be far better at frenetic and often self-deluded scheming than at actual execution. A summary assessment by RAND’s Brian Jenkins is apt: “their numbers remain small, their determination limp, and their competence poor.” 15 And much the same holds for Europe and the rest of the developed world.16 Also working against terrorist success in the West is the fact that almost all are amateurs: they have never before tried to do something like this. Unlike criminals they have not been able to develop street smarts.

Except perhaps for the use of vehicles to deliver mayhem (though this idea is by no means new in the history of terrorism), there has been remarkably little innovation in terrorist weaponry or methodology since 9/11.17 Like their predecessors, they have continued to rely on bombs (many of which fail to detonate or do much damage) and bullets.18

#### No motive, no opportunity

--CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons

Koblentz 20 Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government; “Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism;” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, 06-16-2020, Issue 2, Accessed through T&F, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1770969> /GoGreen!

Cautions and Caveats

It is important to note that scientific advances and the emergence of new technologies are not the only, or even the most important, factors influencing the likelihood of terrorist groups acquiring and using CBRN weapons. Thankfully, the number of terrorist groups motivated to acquire these weapons has been limited, despite many that have the requisite technical and financial resources.60 The vast majority of terrorist groups have been satisfied with conventional weapons such as guns and bombs. The surprising rise of the Islamic State and their repeated use of chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria, however, serve as a reminder that it only takes one group with the intent and capability to acquire and use CBRN weapons to pose a threat to international security.61

In addition, the ability of a terrorist group to convert CBRN-related material into a weapon depends on intangible factors such as tacit knowledge (the unarticulated knowledge that can only be gained through hands-on, trial-and-error experience or mentorship), the ability of the group to create and share such knowledge, and its ability to assemble and successfully manage interdisciplinary teams.62 Terrorist groups, especially those facing pressure from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, have had difficulties recruiting, retaining, and effectively utilizing individuals with the right combination of scientific, technical, and organizational skills to develop effective CBRN weapons.

Developing a CBRN weapon capable of causing mass casualties is also a very complex process. A scientific breakthrough that makes developing or acquiring one component of a weapon easier might not have any impact on the other stages in the weaponization process. Thus, the impact of a single scientific breakthrough or a novel technology on the acquisition of a CBRN weapon should not be exaggerated. For example, synthetic biology might make it easier for a non-state actor to create a pathogen, but that technology does not help terrorists improve their ability to disseminate the pathogen on a large scale.63

Likewise, it is important to assess the specific contributions that a particular technology can make to a specific aspect of the CBRN threat in practice, not just in theory. In the case of 3D printing, this manufacturing technology is not appropriate for working with metals that are toxic or radioactive. While microreactors are well-suited to covertly producing small quantities of highly pure chemicals, they are not well-suited to the production of most chemical warfare agents and precursors due to excessive heat generated by their synthesis and by the production of solid byproducts that would clog the microfluidic channels at the heart of this technology.64

Finally, advances in science and technology represent not just threats, but also opportunities to make it harder for terrorist groups to acquire CBRN weapons. Unmanned aerial and ground vehicles can be used for border security, CBRN weapon detection, and bomb disposal. For example, the EU is sponsoring the development of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles to investigate CBRN crime scenes under the ROCSAFE project.65 Biometrics and radio frequency ID chips can be used to improve physical security measures and inventory control to prevent unauthorized access to CBRN materials. Advances in science and technology are also leading to improved sensors that can be used to detect the production, transportation, and use of CBRN weapons. The development of dedicated laboratories and new techniques to analyze CBRN materials has also contributed to impressive advances in nuclear, biological, and chemical forensics, which are crucial for attribution.66

### AT: NB – AT: Miscalc !

#### No risk of miscalc

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, <https://www.fpri.org/docs/Reveron_-_Call_the_Pentagon.pdf> /GoGreen! \*added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

With shared challenges of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and shared goals of development and protecting human security, there are unprecedented levels of international cooperation to share information, target terrorists, and provide governments the tools they need to confront national threats before they become regional ones. This is on display in Afghanistan where 50 countries operate under the ISAF flag, or in the Indian Ocean where 27 countries operate as Combined Maritime Forces. At the center of the coalitions is a U.S.-sponsored framework to enable partners to contribute to international security.

President Barack Obama intends to continue the American tradition of enabling partners throughout the globe. As he noted in his second inaugural address, “America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad. For no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation.” By training and equipping other militaries, the goal is to reduce U.S. American military presence internationally and allow others to provide for their own security. This has positive benefits not only for the U.S. defense budget (e.g., an Afghan soldier costs hundreds per month compared to an American soldier who costs thousands per month), but also for international security. While my earlier book Exporting Security explains why the United States assists governments from Afghanistan to Zambia, an overlooked area is security assistance provided to developed countries.

CAPACITY MATTERS

As France recently learned in Mali, while it has capable ground forces and aircraft, it has limited ability to sustain these forces just 2,000 miles from home. To support its foreign policy agenda, France needed the United States Air Force to fly its forces and refuel its attack aircraft. As the operation continues, the United States will probably provide intelligence for French and African forces as they shift to stability operations.

Counterterrorism can certainly explain U.S. intervention in Mali; however, enabling French success explains the timeline. More importantly, the case of U.S.-supported French intervention in Mali is illustrative of the role the United States plays in supporting developed countries. France is the latest developed country to need U.S. assistance, but requests like this are common. This is true for almost every one of the 50 countries serving in Afghanistan today, as it was true with European countries in the Balkans, Australian forces in East Timor, and British forces in West Africa. These examples highlight that the foreign policy goals of many developed countries exceed their military capacity, which requires them to rely on the U.S. military for assistance. As developed countries’ defense budgets fall further, reliance on the United States is going to increase. This remains a decades-old frustration. Most recently, the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, “There is a lower limit on how little we can spend on defense, while living up to our responsibilities."7

Pragmatically, the United States would like its partners to do more, but shared challenges and limited budgets will reinforce the value of American logistics, combat experience, and intelligence capacity. Further, American support of other countries reinforces the treaty arrangements with 27 NATO countries and five Asian countries. Twenty years ago, there seemed to be little relevance to these treaties and security arrangements, let alone a rationale for invoking them or expanding them. Yet, the opposite occurred. NATO increased its membership three times from 16 to 19 in 1999, again to 26 in 2006, and again to 28 in 2009. At the same time the number of NATO members increased, NATO changed from its traditional mission of territorial defense to one of global security engagement. With each expansion, new members require training and equipping to NATO standards. With each new operation, NATO countries require access to U.S. intelligence, critical technology, and global logistics.

In addition to formal treaties of alliance, an additional dozen countries are offered protection under the U.S. security umbrella either by law, such as the Taiwan Relations Act or by policy such as United States’ support for Israel.8 These protections include provisions to train and equip their militaries. Another dozen countries are offered special security provisions through Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status. MNNA does not confer a mutual defense relationship, but the largely symbolic act implies a close working relationship with another country's defense forces.9 It is more akin to a preferred buyer’s program allowing countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea access to advanced weapons systems. With weapons purchases also come long-term training and maintenance contracts. From a U.S. perspective, it has a comparative advantage in defense exports; strategically, programs like these are intended to overcome the free-rider problem the United States faces with its partners.10 For every Joint Strike Fighter Japan buys, the United States can deploy one less to northeast Asia.

Given the diplomatic nature of these security partnerships, the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs focuses these activities, regulates the defense trade and arms transfers to reinforce the military capabilities of friends, allies, and coalition partners, and ensures that the transfer of U.S.-origin defense equipment and technology supports U.S. national security interests. Further, the Bureau promotes regional security through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and dialogue, as well as through the provision of security assistance to friendly countries and international peacekeeping efforts. The overall goals of security assistance include creating favorable military balances of power (e.g., selling weapons and training to Saudi Arabia to balance Iran), advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements (e.g., collaborating with Japan on missile defense technology), building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations (e.g., South Korea), and preventing crisis and conflict (e.g., facilitating Colombia’s success against the decades-old FARC insurgency). Historically, Israel has been the largest recipient of security assistance and its neighbor Egypt benefited from its recognition of Israel and the Camp David Accords.11 Given its proximity to the United States and challenges with drug trafficking organizations, Mexico has recently emerged as a top recipient of security assistance. Given the history of American military interventions in Mexico, this has required new efforts to build trust to reassure the government that it seeks to strengthen it and not undermine it.12

One reason the United States concentrates assistance on just a few countries is to promote particular countries as regional leaders. In practice, this means that Jordan hosts an international special operations exercise, peace operations training center, and an international police training center. Or in Latin America, Colombia provides helicopter training for regional militaries and El Salvador hosts a regional peacekeeping institute, attracting military personnel from countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. Given the significant U.S. investment in Afghanistan’s military and police training infrastructure, it is likely that Afghanistan could eventually host regional training if the insurgency subsides to acceptable levels. This approach not only strengthens key partners, but it also reduces the need for American presence and the negative attention it sometimes generates. We see the benefits of this today where U.S.-trained Colombian pilots are training Mexican pilots in Colombia.

**[Table 1: Top Recipients of U.S. International Assistance (Account 150) OMITTED]**

In addition to the Department of State budget for security assistance, the Defense Department directly funds security assistance through section 1206/7 and other command funds such as Commander’s Emergency Response Program. This authority did provoke more concern about militarizing foreign policy; however, this only makes up about $1 billion annually, which is less than 15 percent of security assistance funded by the State Department. Further, U.S. ambassadors must approve all programs. Thus, the Department of State exerts considerable control of programs at both budgetary and implementation levels through the embassy country team.

CHANGING ROLE OF THE MILITARY

With national security focused on weak states and persistent security concerns among stable allies like South Korea, the U.S. military has been changing over the last 20 years from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The military has learned that partnership is better than clientism and is adapting its command structure once optimized for waging major combat to one that is focused on conflict prevention. There is still a tremendous warfighting capability in the U.S. military, but coalition warfare is the norm and developing compatible warfighting partners is a key goal of this cooperative strategy. In some sense, this turns the idea of militarization of foreign policy on its head; the Pentagon is being demilitarized and valued for its ability to impart military capabilities to U.S. partners.

Given the current structure of the international system and technological advances, the United States does not need partners in the same way as it did in the past where they provided direct benefits through coaling stations, maintenance facilities, or large bases. While the number of forward bases is still substantial, the number of forward deployed forces are greatly reduced. More importantly, the nature of the presence has changed; the United States aspires to create true partners that can confront their own threats to internal stability (e.g., assistance to Colombia’s military) or alleviate security dilemmas (e.g., future basing in Australia). It also seeks to foster independence by training and equipping militaries to support the global demand for peacekeepers.14 The United States certainly gets increased access to countries around the world through these programs, but given the overwhelming military dominance of the United States, it does not abuse these relationships or ignore seemingly insignificant states. Instead, it seeks to create partners where sovereignty is respected and all parties derive benefits. The latest example of this is U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as dictated by a U.S.-Iraqi agreement.

While the Defense Department’s capacity certainly explains why international assistance missions increasingly have a military face, it is also essential to understand that there is a global demand for U.S. security assistance. The Defense Department has recognized that there are limits to what it can do; the military wants and needs partners from across the government, allies and private organizations. Unfortunately, these ideas remain stunted [overlooked] in the broader foreign policy community that gets easily overwhelmed by the size of the Defense Department’s resources. For critics, U.S. military activities in permissive environments bring old memories of invasion or coup. For them, U.S. foreign policy is on a dangerous militarization path. While that part of U.S. military history is real and still resonates in many parts of the world, it is wrong to overlook the changes that have occurred over the last two decades. Further, it is wrong to overlook the significant demands developed countries place on the United States.

#### No impact – wouldn’t escalate

Quinlan 9 Michael Quinlan, former British defence strategist and former Permanent Under-Secretary of State, *Thinking About Nuclear Weapons*, 2009, p.63-69 /GoGreen!

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear-weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesis, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. 11 vital interests have been defined in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is 'If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it to a tolerable outcome—the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor who wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements—it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

### AT: NB – AT: Readiness !

#### No readiness decline

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, <https://www.fpri.org/docs/Reveron_-_Call_the_Pentagon.pdf> /GoGreen! \*added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

With shared challenges of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and shared goals of development and protecting human security, there are unprecedented levels of international cooperation to share information, target terrorists, and provide governments the tools they need to confront national threats before they become regional ones. This is on display in Afghanistan where 50 countries operate under the ISAF flag, or in the Indian Ocean where 27 countries operate as Combined Maritime Forces. At the center of the coalitions is a U.S.-sponsored framework to enable partners to contribute to international security.

President Barack Obama intends to continue the American tradition of enabling partners throughout the globe. As he noted in his second inaugural address, “America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad. For no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation.” By training and equipping other militaries, the goal is to reduce U.S. American military presence internationally and allow others to provide for their own security. This has positive benefits not only for the U.S. defense budget (e.g., an Afghan soldier costs hundreds per month compared to an American soldier who costs thousands per month), but also for international security. While my earlier book Exporting Security explains why the United States assists governments from Afghanistan to Zambia, an overlooked area is security assistance provided to developed countries.

CAPACITY MATTERS

As France recently learned in Mali, while it has capable ground forces and aircraft, it has limited ability to sustain these forces just 2,000 miles from home. To support its foreign policy agenda, France needed the United States Air Force to fly its forces and refuel its attack aircraft. As the operation continues, the United States will probably provide intelligence for French and African forces as they shift to stability operations.

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While the Defense Department’s capacity certainly explains why international assistance missions increasingly have a military face, it is also essential to understand that there is a global demand for U.S. security assistance. The Defense Department has recognized that there are limits to what it can do; the military wants and needs partners from across the government, allies and private organizations. Unfortunately, these ideas remain stunted [overlooked] in the broader foreign policy community that gets easily overwhelmed by the size of the Defense Department’s resources. For critics, U.S. military activities in permissive environments bring old memories of invasion or coup. For them, U.S. foreign policy is on a dangerous militarization path. While that part of U.S. military history is real and still resonates in many parts of the world, it is wrong to overlook the changes that have occurred over the last two decades. Further, it is wrong to overlook the significant demands developed countries place on the United States.

#### No impact to readiness

George 99 James L. George, former congressional professional staff member for national security affairs, “Is Military Readiness Overrated?” CATO, 5-27-1999, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/is-military-readiness-overrated> /GoGreen!

Military readiness promises to be a major issue when Congress marks up a defense bill later this year. Some members of Congress are already using readiness as a reason to increase funding in the emergency spending bill for the war in Yugoslavia. Most experts cite the initial stages of the Korean War and the Hollow Force of the late 1970s as cautionary examples of being ill-prepared. A closer look at both those examples, however, shows that they really had little to do with readiness. Moreover, the current crisis in Yugoslavia illustrates once again why readiness may be overrated and the funds better spent elsewhere. Although often used as a generic term for all military capabilities, readiness—defined as the ability to respond with appropriate force with little or no warning—is only one of four pillars of military preparedness. The other pillars are force structure, modernization and sustainability. Thus, an effective military force depends on much more than just readiness. Interestingly, the two favorite examples cited by readiness alarmists fail to prove their case. The performance of Task Force Smith, an ill-prepared battalion quickly sent to the front and fairly easily routed by the North Koreans during the initial days of the Korean War, is often cited as the worst case. “No More Task Force Smiths” has become a mantra for the Army. However, critics of Task Force Smith fail to point out that U.S. commanders made the most basic of military mistakes—including grossly underestimating the enemy and sending TFS to an exposed position. When such blunders occur, the end result will be the same whether it is an ill-trained Task Force Smith in Korea or well-trained Marines in Beirut or elite Rangers in Somalia. Moreover, critics also fail to mention that barely a month later the United States stabilized the situation in South Korea, and in another month the Marines conducted their famous Inchon Landing. In fact, without the Chinese intervention, the United States would have won the Korean War a few months after it began. Not bad for a U.S. force that was supposedly ill-prepared. Similarly, the Hollow Force of the late 1970s was not primarily a readiness problem but a combination of many factors—including a military characterized by low morale after Vietnam, serious drug and racial problems, the erroneous induction of too many mentally substandard recruits and low pay eroded further by high inflation. At the same time, major structural changes were transforming the U.S. military, including the introduction of women into the regular forces, the switch from a draft to an all-volunteer force and the initiation of the Total Force Concept that placed more reliance on the Reserves. Given all of that turbulence, no wonder we had a Hollow Force. Often overlooked, however, is how quickly those problems were solved. In some cases, solutions were found without spending a dime. For example, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas Hayward instituted his “Not in my Navy” program of zero tolerance for drugs. The drug problem was solved almost overnight. The induction of too many mentally substandard recruits by mistake which had lowered standards, was identified and corrected. That correction solved most other personnel problems (and should be a warning to people who want to lower standards today). Some members of Congress are now using the crisis in Yugoslavia to get more funds for readiness by arguing that the military is now stretched “too thin.” (Congress doubled President Clinton’s request for $6 billion in emergency spending for the war.) In fact, the situation is quite the opposite. Leaving aside the question of whether the United States should even be involved in Yugoslavia, the new Clinton Doctrine, which does not plan to use ground troops ( a position that is supported by many Republicans), limits the stress placed on the military. Those decisions are all deliberate political actions that have absolutely nothing to do with readiness. Under a well-conceived strategy, even a modestly capable force will probably perform well; but under a poorly conceived strategy, even a force with the highest degree of readiness will probably have serious problems. The experiences of Task Force Smith and the Hollow Force, as well as the invocation of a Clinton Doctrine that eschews the use of ground forces, have major implications. More forces, for example, could be placed in the reserves and scarce funds spent elsewhere. In addition, the military could switch to what Sen. John McCain (R- Ariz.) has called “Tiered Readiness:” a few forces would be kept on expensive ready status and be augmented by reserve forces that could be mobilized if a substantial threat to U.S. security arose. Military readiness is certainly important, and no one is suggesting a return to the truly shallow force of the late 1940s or the Hollow Force of the 1970s. But a close look at those forces shows that their difficulties involved much more than just poor readiness.

#### No impact to readiness

John Mueller 21, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, "Proliferation, Terrorism, Humanitarian Intervention, and Other Problems," in The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, Chapter 7, 02/17/2021, pg. 183-184.

Over the course of the last several decades, alarmists have often focused on potential dangers presented by rogue states, as they came to be called in the 1990s. These were led by such devils du jour as Nasser, Sukarno, Castro, Gaddafi, Khomeini, Kim Il-sung, Saddam Hussein, Milosˇevic´, and Ahmadinijad, all of whom have since faded into history’s dustbin.66 Today the alarm has been directed at Iran as discussed in Chapter 6 and also at North Korea as discussed in this one. However, neither country really threatens to commit major direct military aggression. Iran, in fact, has eschewed the practice for several centuries.

Nonetheless, it might make some sense to maintain a capacity to institute containment and deterrence efforts carried out in formal or informal coalition with concerned neighboring countries – and there are quite a few of these in each case. However, the military requirements for effective containment by their neighbors, by the United States, and by the broader world community are far from monumental and do not necessarily require the United States to maintain large forces-in-being for the remote eventuality.

This is suggested by the experience with the Gulf War of 1991 when military force was successfully applied to deal with a rogue venture – the conquest by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq of neighboring Kuwait. As noted earlier, Iraq’s invasion was rare to the point of being unique: it was the only case since World War II in which one United Nations country has invaded another with the intention of incorporating it into its own territory. It scarcely appears, as laid out in Chapter 3, that Iraq’s pathetic forces required a large force to be thrown at them to decide to withdraw: over a period of half a year, they did not erect anything resembling an effective defensive system and, when the chips were down, they proved to lack not only defenses, but strategy, tactics, leadership, and morale as well.

Countries opposed to provocative rogue behavior do not need to have a large force-in-being because there would be plenty of time to build one up (should it come to that) if other measures such as economic sanctions and diplomatic forays (including appeasement) fail to persuade.

### Deficit – Capacity

#### No capacity – and their personnel reform plank just means incompetent contractors

Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, <http://neptuneasc.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Neptune-Whole-of-Government-U.S.-Security-Cooperation-Review-20160208.pdf> /GoGreen!

Title 10 vs. Title 22. State perceives authority to have shifted in two basic ways: 1) new DoD authorities (i.e. 2282) that undercut State’s lead responsibility for security assistance planning, and 2) new DoD authorities that extend beyond assistance to “armed forces,” whereby DoD now has authority to train non-security forces. Generally speaking, Defense sees this as a necessary evolution of the security assistance system given the shifting nature of global threats. Specifically, Defense sees Title 22 authorities as diplomatic in nature, focused on relationship building as they have always been. By contrast, DoD sees the new Title 10 authorities as critical to filling real capability gaps that have a direct connection to U.S. national security interests. Moreover, they cite, in a time of significant budget constraints, increasing pressure and need to rely on partners and coalitions in this way. Finally, a very real connection exists between Title 10 and Title 22 authority growth and the relative level of activity (or inactivity) between the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees. State has not seen an authorizations bill in a decade, and the evolution of their authorities has not kept pace with the evolution of Defense committees. Many of the State authorities are relatively outdated, but their committees have not been successful in moving State authorization legislation through the system. Finally, and above all, Defense continues to stress the pragmatic urgency of the current situation, and State’s inability (due to lack of resources, not incompetence) to do industrial scale security cooperation work. For instance, Defense personnel typically concede that it is undesirable for U.S. military forces to be training civilian security personnel, but that this is better than it not being done, or the training being done by incompetent contractors.

### Deficit – DoS Bureaucracy

#### DoS internal turf wars gut solvency and thump the net benefit – and reforms won’t solve

Ross 17 Tommy Ross, senior associate with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Congressional Oversight on Security Assistance,” Commentary, 9-26-2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/congressional-oversight-security-assistance> /GoGreen!

Who’s in charge? As the Obama administration issued and then sought to implement Presidential Policy Directive 23 on security sector assistance, and as DoD’s security assistance profile has grown in recent years, debates both within and outside the government have recently been asking the “who’s in charge” question from an interagency perspective. Yet, the question is equally—and perhaps more—important inside the State Department itself.

Responsibility for security assistance is muddled and disjointed. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) leads a planning process around FMF and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, but the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources makes final decisions about funding allocations, and regional bureaus exercise substantial influence on how resources are divvied up within their assigned regions. PM’s power can seem to range somewhere between facilitation and administration.

Complicating matters further, other functional bureaus—such as the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau and the Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation—control significant security assistance resources, such as program funding under the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) accounts. Yet another major aid program, the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, is controlled by regional bureaus.

Developing integrated, holistic plans for security assistance across all these bureaus, which all report to different undersecretaries, is nearly impossible. There are numerous countries in which four or five different security assistance programs may be funding activities in the same general area (for example, maritime security) with competing objectives and limited awareness of other activities. And, in the current organization, there is no one sufficiently empowered to arbitrate conflicts between bureaus below the level of deputy secretary, the #2 official in the department.

Even as the Trump administration considers major reforms to the State Department bureaucracy, this muddle is not expected to improve considerably. Disjointed, uncoordinated programming risks strategic failure, redundancy, and waste; the question of who’s in charge thus becomes critically important. The committee would do well to press State Department leaders to begin sorting out the answer.

### Deficit – Conditionality

#### Our advantages are military in nature – subordinating them to State’s quixotic values crusades independently tanks solvency

Sadler 21 Brent Sadler, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology, Center for National Defense, The Heritage Foundation, MA Jochi University, MS National War College; and Janae Diaz, member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation; “Don’t Shift Security Cooperation To State Dept.,” Breaking Defense, 6-28-2021, <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/dont-shift-security-cooperation-to-state-dept/> /GoGreen!

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department.

That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged.

Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, these programs should prioritize national security. To this end, reforms should enhance joint State and Defense authorities so programs are evaluated in terms of America’s national strategic goals.

In the existing system, State consults with Defense on its security assistance designs. Defense then implements State programs, as well as its own security cooperation programs, such as multinational military exercises and military training and advising.

The departments differ in the scope to which they apply security assistance. Defense programs target narrower national security objectives, such as the Maritime Security Initiative, launched in 2015 to expand maritime domain awareness. State’s programs, such as the Central America Regional Security Initiative, emphasize broader regional stability and humanitarian goals.

Assistance programs can be better tailored to their objectives when State shares directive authority and decision-making power with the entity most relevant to each program’s purpose. For example, when the objective is military capacity-building, the Defense Department should be an equal partner; when the goal is justice system reform, the Department of Justice should be a full partner.

Consider how the Philippines used American-sourced coast guard cutters when responding to China’s intrusions at Whitsun Reef earlier this year. Given President Biden’s emphasis on strategic competition with China, strengthening partner nations to resist Beijing’s maritime coercion should be a no-brainer. In this context, State should ensure it ties the objectives of its weapons sales program to Defense Department priorities, such as improving maritime domain awareness, by enabling the Philippines and, perhaps other countries, to increase patrols of exclusive economic zones.

Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report’s recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations.

Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging — or compelling — State to design its programs in closer coordination with the Pentagon and in support of Defense Department’s operational needs, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability.

Congress should recognize and re-evaluate its role in these decision as well, as legislative earmarks can limit State’s directive agility and responsiveness. But even the best-laid plans cannot succeed without follow-through.

### Deficit – Delay

#### Massive delay

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/> /GoGreen!

Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department:

The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority

The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund

This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy.

Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency.